{"id":11210,"date":"2024-07-20T07:53:57","date_gmt":"2024-07-20T04:53:57","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/2024\/07\/turkey-cyprus-ek\/"},"modified":"2024-11-20T20:30:12","modified_gmt":"2024-11-20T17:30:12","slug":"the-50th-anniversary-of-turkiyes-military-intervention-in-cyprus-and-the-quest-for-turkish-cypriot-sovereign-equality-erol-kaymak","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/2024\/07\/the-50th-anniversary-of-turkiyes-military-intervention-in-cyprus-and-the-quest-for-turkish-cypriot-sovereign-equality-erol-kaymak\/","title":{"rendered":"The 50th Anniversary of T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s Military Intervention in Cyprus and the Quest for Turkish Cypriot Sovereign Equality – Erol Kaymak"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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As T\u00fcrkiye prepares to commemorate the 50th anniversary of its military intervention in Cyprus on 20 July 1974, the symbolic weight of the occasion is dramatically underscored by the planned presence<\/a> of 50 Turkish naval vessels. This flotilla, a powerful representation of military might, is meant to serve as a potent reminder of the events of 1974 and T\u00fcrkiye’s enduring influence in the region. The magnitude of this display extends beyond a simple anniversary observance. It carries significant political implications, particularly in the ongoing Cyprus issue and the delicate balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean. T\u00fcrkiye intends to send a clear message about its commitment to protect what it perceives as Turkish Cypriot interests and its resolve in the face of international pressure. The naval display will feature the flagship TCG Anadolu, further emphasizing its maritime capabilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The historical context of 1974<\/strong><\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s intervention was prompted by a coup d\u2019etat on the island on 15\nJuly 1974 by Nikos Sampson, orchestrated by the then-ruling Greek military\njunta in Athens, aiming to unite Cyprus with Greece (the Enosis<\/em>). In\nresponse, T\u00fcrkiye, invoking its rights under the Treaty of Guarantee, initiated\nthe first phase of what it termed the \u2018Cyprus Peace Operation\u2019 (K\u0131br\u0131s Bar\u0131\u015f\nHarekat\u0131<\/em>) on 20 July 1974 to prevent the annexation of the island to Greece\nand protect the Turkish Cypriot community. The second phase of the operation,\nin August 1974, led to population displacements and the partition of the island,\nwhich has remained divided since then with ongoing efforts to resolve the dispute.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While the first phase of the operation was met with muted reactions\ninternationally, the second phase caused tension with T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s allies.\nDisagreement also arose within the Turkish government between Prime Minister\nB\u00fclent Ecevit and his coalition partner Necmettin Erbakan about the operation’s\nextent, with Erbakan favoring full control of Cyprus. Recently, President\nErdo\u011fan suggested<\/a> that T\u00fcrkiye could have taken all of Cyprus during\nthe 1974 intervention. His comments, aimed at domestic audiences, coincided\nwith a UN diplomatic mission to Cyprus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

 <\/em><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The broader regional and geopolitical dimension<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s resolve and show of power are not limited to the Cyprus\ndispute. It now also encapsulates a broader ambition and role in the Eastern\nMediterranean. This is not only related to disputes over energy and natural\nresources and differences over maritime boundaries but also to broader regional\naspirations. While T\u00fcrkiye utilizes the Montreux Convention to limit navies of\nnon-riparian countries -including its NATO allies- from entering the Black Sea,\nsimultaneously balancing Russia, it faces what it views as fait accompli<\/em>\nin the Eastern Mediterranean. Through its Memorandum of Understanding with the\nGovernment of National Accord (GNA) of Libya in November 2019, it attempted to\naffect the calculus of regional actors and corporations. However, the\nhostilities in the Gaza Strip have effectively strengthened the strategic bonds\nbetween Israel and the Greek Cypriot-led Republic of Cyprus. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

More recently, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan\nFidan has raised<\/a> significant concerns about the West’s utilization of\nCyprus for logistics and military operations in the wake of the Israeli\nmilitary offensive in Gaza. Fidan accused Western allies of using the\nhumanitarian corridor to Gaza for other purposes, asserting that Cyprus has\nbecome an operational hub since the outbreak of hostilities on October 7th<\/sup>.\nHe claims to have intelligence reports indicating that the \u2018Greek Cypriot\nAdministration of Southern Cyprus\u2019 is being used as a base for operations\nagainst Gaza, including intelligence and military flights. Fidan suggests that\nthe humanitarian aid corridor established to deliver food and medicine to\nPalestinians in Gaza through Cyprus -the\n\u2018Amalthea Initiative\u2019<\/a>– is a guise, stating it\n“has obviously turned into an activity that conceals the fact that it is\nactually a military base.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fidan’s concerns extend beyond the current situation, highlighting the\nincreasing militarization in the region and the need to prevent escalation. He\nexplicitly advises Greece and Greek Cypriots to distance themselves from the\nconflicts in the Middle East, warning that their involvement could lead to\nrepercussions. In diplomatic efforts, Fidan attempted to persuade his American\ncounterpart, Antony Blinken, to halt the Cypriot initiative, arguing against\nthe implementation of the Cyprus maritime corridor during\ntalks in Washington<\/a>. These efforts were further reinforced by Ibrahim\nKalin, Fidan’s successor at T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s National Intelligence Agency (MIT), who\nalso raised\nthe issue in Washington<\/a>. However, the US government\ndid not comply with these Turkish demands, maintaining strong support for the Amalthea\ninitiative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These diplomatic efforts, primarily directed toward Arab governments,\nhave been largely\nignored<\/a>, as the Arab countries and other interlocutors\ndisregarded Ankara’s claims. These actions highlight T\u00fcrkiye’s strategic\nconcerns regarding its Western allies’ use of Cyprus for military purposes,\nparticularly in the context of heightened tensions in the Middle East. Fidan’s\nstatements and T\u00fcrkiye’s diplomatic maneuvers underscore their perception of\nCyprus’s evolving role in regional geopolitics and its potential implications\nfor T\u00fcrkiye’s security interests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Seeking unity on the domestic front<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

On 20 July 2024, President Erdogan is scheduled to deliver a speech at\nthe Turkish Cypriot parliament building, which is no surprise. What is\ndifferent is his emphasis on involving political rivals in commemorating the\nmilitary operation. On July 18, 2024, the Turkish\nparliament passed a resolution<\/a> marking\nthe 50th anniversary of the Cyprus Peace Operation. The resolution calls for\ninternational recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and\nan end to the isolation of Turkish Cypriots. It criticizes the Greek Cypriots’\nstance and supports a two-state solution for lasting peace. T\u00fcrkiye reaffirms\nits support for the TRNC and its guarantor role.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Significantly, the Turkish main opposition party leader, \u00d6zg\u00fcr \u00d6zel, of\nthe Republican People’s Party (CHP), will be visiting Cyprus and in attendance.\nCHP’s approach towards the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) has\nchanged since \u00d6zel assumed leadership in November 2023, and the party is now\nactively engaging with the TRNC at all levels. This represents a strategic\nshift for T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s main opposition party and indicates a re-prioritization of\nthe TRNC for the CHP.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Erdogan’s invitation to the opposition CHP for the Cyprus Peace\nOperation anniversary reflects efforts to reduce political polarization in T\u00fcrkiye.\nThe CHP’s engagement with the TRNC could strengthen ties and impact T\u00fcrkiye-TRNC\nrelations. The CHP’s presence at the commemoration would also signal unity in Cyprus\nto the international community. However, deep mistrust and divergent political\nagendas between the governing AKP and CHP cast\ndoubt on the long-term sustainability<\/a> of the\nnormalization process. For its part, CHP also seeks to build relations with the\nTurkish Cypriot opposition in anticipation of elections in T\u00fcrkiye and TRNC. In\nparallel, renewed\ncontact<\/a> between Turkey\u2019s ruling AK Party and the main\nopposition party in Northern Cyprus, the Republican Turkish Party (CTP),\nillustrates a broader initiative seeking strategic alignment. These developments\nwill be closely watched for further indications of shifting political alliances\nand their potential impact on Cyprus and Turkish foreign policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots remain polarized over strategy.\nWhile the TRNC President, Ersin Tatar, aligned with Ankara, advocates for a two-state\nsolution based on \u2018sovereign equality,\u2019 a significant portion of the electorate\ncontinues to favor a federal settlement based on the political equality of the\nTurkish Cypriots. Thus, the internationally endorsed bizonal, bicommunal\nfederation (BBF) model remains\nthe formal aim<\/a> of the main opposition party, CTP, led by Tufan Erh\u00fcrman.\nIt remains to be seen whether the newly forged bilateral ties between \u00d6zel\u2019s\nCHP and Erh\u00fcrman\u2019s CTP may lead to more consensual political strategies going\nforward, presumably with CTP subtly moving towards confederal stances over BBF.\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Run up to the 50th<\/sup> anniversary<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

In July 2024, Turkish President Erdo\u011fan undertook a series of\nstrategically planned overseas visits with geopolitical aspirations in mind.\nHis travels began on July 3rd<\/sup> when he attended the Shanghai\nCooperation Organisation Summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, where he met with\nRussian President Vladimir Putin. However, on July 5th<\/sup>, he abruptly\ncanceled his attendance at the Organisation of Turkic States (OTC) summit to\ntravel to Berlin to witness the Euro 2024 quarterfinal match between T\u00fcrkiye\nand the Netherlands. This decision came after UEFA investigated a Turkish\nplayer making a ‘grey wolf’ sign during a previous game. Vice President Cevdet\nY\u0131lmaz represented Erdogan at the OTC, which was formed in 2009 to promote\ncooperation among Turkic-speaking states, with T\u00fcrkiye playing a significant\nrole. Erdo\u011fan’s itinerary then included the NATO leaders’ summit in Washington\nD.C. from July 9th<\/sup> to 11th<\/sup>, where he met, among others,\nwith the Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mitsotakis will also participate in memorial services and commemorative\nevents in the Greek Cypriot-led Republic of Cyprus on July 20th<\/sup>,\ncoinciding with the Turkish celebrations. Despite improving bilateral relations\nbetween Greece and T\u00fcrkiye, progress on the Cyprus issue and the broader\nEastern Mediterranean remains challenging to achieve. During a meeting with\nErdo\u011fan on the sidelines of the NATO summit on July 10th<\/sup>, Mitsotakis\nunderscored\nthe urgency<\/a> of advancing reunification discussions in Cyprus. He\nreiterated this message in a subsequent meeting with UN Secretary-General\nAntonio Guterres a few days later.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Whereas Turks commemorate the \u2018peace operation\u2019, the Greek Cypriots\nmourn and protest the \u2018Turkish invasion of Cyprus\u2019 (\u03a4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03ba\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae \u03b5\u03b9\u03c3\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae \u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd\n\u039a\u03cd\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf<\/em>). On July 15, 2024, Greek Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides led\nevents marking the 50th<\/sup> anniversary of the 1974 coup and Turkish\nintervention. The day included sirens at 8:20 am, a memorial service, and\nwreath-laying in Nicosia. Christodoulides stressed<\/a>\nhonesty, accountability, and respect for differing views to prevent future\nconflicts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The background of stalled settlement talks<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The ceremonies are taking place in the context of stalled peace talks.\nNo formal negotiations have been held since 2017. The Crans Montana Summit of\n2017 marked a watershed moment, with negotiations collapsing and the Turkish\nside shifting away from the previously agreed-upon framework of a BBF model. Endorsed\nby the UN Security Council, the model aims to reunite the island under a single\nfederal structure with power-sharing provisions for Greek and Turkish Cypriots.\nHowever, the Turkish Cypriot leadership, now aligned with T\u00fcrkiye’s stance, has\nsince advocated a two-state solution, arguing that the BBF model is no longer\nviable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This shift is rooted in several factors, including the perception that\ndecades of negotiations based on the BBF have failed to yield results and have\nallowed the Greek Cypriot side to maintain a dominant position. The Turkish\nside now insists on recognition of “sovereign equality” and\n“equal international status” as a precondition for future talks,\nessentially demanding international recognition of a separate Turkish Cypriot\nstate. They argue that this is necessary to address the historical injustices\nthey perceive and to ensure a sustainable solution that guarantees their rights\nand security. This stance is further underscored by Turkish Cypriot President\nErsin Tatar’s assertion<\/a>\nthat there will be “never again” a settlement without sovereign\nequality. This position has significant implications for the future of the\npeace process, effectively ruling out a return to the negotiating table under\nthe previous framework.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Greek Cypriot side, meanwhile, remains committed to the BBF model as\nthe only viable path to reunification. They view the Turkish Cypriot demands\nfor “sovereign equality” as a veiled attempt to legitimize the\nisland’s partition and entrench the existing division. This stalemate has\ncreated a profoundly polarized environment, exacerbated by accusations of bad\nfaith and provocative actions on both sides.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

 <\/em><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Open letter by the UNSG\u2019s Personal Envoy<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Despite this apparent stalemate, the United Nations Secretary-General\n(UNSG), Antonio Guterres, appointed former Colombian Foreign Minister Maria\nAngela Holguin Cuellar as his Personal Envoy in January 2024. Holguin submitted\nher report<\/a> to Guterres on 10 July. The report was submitted\nafter the UNSG had submitted his Good Offices report on July 3, allowing Guterres\nsufficient time to reflect on the way forward in preparation for the UN General\nAssembly meetings in September 2024. Surprisingly, Holguin also published\nan open letter<\/a> on July 10, reflecting on her six months of experience.\nHolguin\u2019s open letter did not address substantive matters. Still, it did hint\nthat her mission to uncover \u2018common ground\u2019 and \u2018political will\u2019 to recommend\nthe recommencement of fully-fledged and formal peace talks was not successful. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

While Holguin’s appointment initially offered a glimmer of hope for\nreinvigorating the stalled peace process, her open letter and the reactions it\nelicited paint a less optimistic picture. Holguin’s mandate, as outlined\nby the UN Secretary-General<\/a>, was to assess the\nfeasibility of restarting negotiations and to identify any potential common\nground between the two sides. However, her open letter, published ahead of her\nofficial report submission, suggests that this mission has been unsuccessful. She\nnotes the lack of trust between the parties and the need to move beyond past\nsolutions that have only led to greater disagreement and frustration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Significantly, Holguin highlights a sense of resignation among Cypriots,\nsuggesting that many have accepted the status quo<\/em> due to the repeated\nfailures of past negotiation attempts. This perceived apathy poses a challenge\nto any future peace efforts, as a lack of public support or pressure can make\nit easier for leaders to maintain entrenched positions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another surprise was the open\nletter<\/a> by the Greek Cypriot opposition leader from the\nDemocratic Rally (DISY) Party, Annita Demetriou, calling on President\nChristodoulides to make urgent progress as the international community loses\npatience in the pursuit of a federal settlement to the Cyprus issue. Demetriou\nwarns that the international community’s patience with the stalled peace process\nis wearing thin and calls for the resumption of the T\u00fcrkiye-EU High-Level\nDialogue, contingent on the restart of Cyprus negotiations, highlighting the\ninterconnectedness of the Cyprus issue with broader regional dynamics and T\u00fcrkiye’s\nrelationship with the EU. This linkage underscores the need for a comprehensive\napproach that addresses not only the internal divisions on the island but also\nthe external factors influencing the situation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sovereign equality, the EU, and the strategy<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Strategic disagreements among Turkish Cypriots persist. In the aftermath\nof local elections in T\u00fcrkiye, President Erdo\u011fan\u2019s position has been somewhat\nweakened, so there seem to be efforts to forge a broader coalition regarding\nCyprus. This relates to Erdo\u011fan\u2019s call on the opposition to join him in Cyprus\nfor commemorations. For its part, CHP also seeks to build relations with the\nTurkish Cypriot opposition in anticipation of elections in T\u00fcrkiye and\nTRNC<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Whereas Turkish Cypriots remain internally divided on strategy, Erdo\u011fan\nand TRNC President Ersin Tatar continue to pursue a two-state settlement as the\nbasis of negotiations. This means that Tatar has rebuffed all calls to restart\nnegotiations based on the BBF model based on the political equality of the\nGreek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. Instead, the Turkish side\ninsists on the acknowledgment of the \u2018sovereign equality\u2019 and equal\ninternational standing of the two sides as a prerequisite for formal talks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Critics argue that T\u00fcrkiye’s pursuit of a two-state solution in Cyprus\nis a non-starter and hinders the EU’s positive agenda. However, this stance can\nbe seen as a strategic move tied to broader regional dynamics and T\u00fcrkiye’s\nambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean. The emphasis on sovereign equality strengthens\nT\u00fcrkiye’s geopolitical position, enhances the international legitimacy of the\nTRNC, and secures greater autonomy for Turkish Cypriots. These actions can\ncomplement the EU’s goals by promoting realistic negotiations, contributing to\nregional stability, and fostering cooperation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The EU has been striving to implement conditions on its proposed<\/a>\n\u2018Positive Agenda for T\u00fcrkiye,\u2019 aiming to prompt changes in the stances of T\u00fcrkiye\nand the TRNC. However, these efforts have yet to yield the desired results,\ncomplicated by T\u00fcrkiye’s steadfast position on Cyprus, which presents a\nsignificant challenge for the EU and the international community in pursuing\nstrategic relations with T\u00fcrkiye.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye’s demands are not explicitly centered on the overt recognition\nof the TRNC as a precondition for settlement talks. Instead, insights can be\ngleaned from the annexes to Guterres\u2019 Good Offices reports. In the latest\nreport, TRNC President Tatar emphasizes the 3Ds \u2013direct flights, direct trade, and\ndirect diplomatic contacts- as a tangible demonstration of the acknowledgment\nof the Turkish Cypriot side\u2019s sovereign equality and equal international\nstanding. This position, likely endorsed by Ankara, is well understood by international\ndiplomats as the official Turkish stance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This suggests that resolving the issue of extending the customs union to\ninclude the Republic of Cyprus, thereby fulfilling T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s obligations to the\nEU, could be achievable if the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots is addressed.\nThe intricate dynamics between the EU, T\u00fcrkiye, and the Cyprus issue,\nparticularly in relation to the EU’s conditional positive agenda and T\u00fcrkiye’s\ndemands for the TRNC, are crucial to understanding this situation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s strategy, while complex, could potentially align with broader\nregional and European interests. This alignment offers pathways to a lasting\nresolution of the Cyprus issue, benefiting all parties involved.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The EU has employed a carrot-and-stick approach, offering potential\nrewards like modernizing the Customs Union and visa facilitation in exchange\nfor Turkish cooperation in Cyprus, among other issues, centered on leveraging\nits relationship with T\u00fcrkiye. The bloc seeks a “cooperative\nand mutually beneficial relationship<\/a>” with\nT\u00fcrkiye, recognizing its strategic importance in the Eastern Mediterranean.\nHowever, the EU remains steadfast in its commitment to a “comprehensive\nsettlement of the Cyprus problem<\/a>”\nwithin the UN framework.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

President Tatar’s articulation of the 3Ds sheds light on T\u00fcrkiye’s\nstrategy. These demands, characterized as tangible manifestations of sovereign\nequality, suggest a desire for practical recognition of the TRNC, even without\nformal international recognition. This strategy aims to break the TRNC’s\nisolation and potentially strengthen its claim to statehood in the long run,\naligning with T\u00fcrkiye’s broader geopolitical goals in the region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The complexities and potential roadblocks associated with T\u00fcrkiye’s\ndemands are significant. The EU’s insistence on a UN-backed settlement in\nCyprus and its rejection of a two-state solution directly clashes with T\u00fcrkiye’s\npreconditions for progress. Additionally, the EU’s emphasis on conditionality\nin its engagement with T\u00fcrkiye underscores the challenges in finding common\nground. While extending the customs union to Cyprus may not hinge solely on\nlifting the TRNC’s isolation, the contrasting positions and lack of tangible\nprogress on the 3Ds suggest this remains a significant obstacle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The EU’s conundrum is evident: balancing its strategic interests in\nengaging with T\u00fcrkiye against its commitment to a Cyprus settlement based on UN\nresolutions. T\u00fcrkiye’s unwavering stance on sovereign equality for the TRNC and\nits strategic use of the 3Ds further complicate the path toward a resolution. The\nstalemate will likely persist without a fundamental shift in either side’s\nposition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Turkish side seeks to upgrade its status through the OTC and open\nports to direct trade and strengthen its position. There is also a\nbroader push<\/a>, supported by various international advocates,\nincluding British politician Ian Duncan Smith and others from the UK and\nbeyond, to challenge the isolation of Turkish Cypriots and facilitate direct\ntrade and direct international flights through Ercan airport. However, the\nGreek Cypriot side views these demands as unreasonable and counterproductive to\npeace. They criticize the Turkish refusal to acknowledge the BBF as the agreed\nbasis for negotiations. They see the push for direct trade and recognition\nthrough the OTC as attempts to solidify a two-state solution and undermine the\nUN-led peace process. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

 <\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Property disputes<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

In this context, the Greek Cypriot side’s recent legal actions regarding\nproperty in Northern Cyprus appear to be a coercive tactic to pressure the\nTurkish Cypriot side amid stalled settlement negotiations. Domestically, the\nGreek Cypriot side is signaling an intent to deter EU citizens from trading in\nGreek Cypriot-owned properties in the north. Although these matters are under\nthe purview of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) via the Turkish\nCypriot Immovable Property Commission (IPC), such actions are seen as measures\nto compel Turkish Cypriots to revise policies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Greek Cypriot side is intensifying efforts to prevent the sale and\ndevelopment of Greek Cypriot-owned properties in the north, evidenced by recent\narrests of individuals, including EU citizens, involved in such transactions.\nNotably, a German woman and an Israeli businessman were arrested for promoting\nproperty sales in the north, highlighting a concerted effort to deter such\nactivities. While these arrests seem to target EU citizens, Turkish Cypriots\nare also potentially vulnerable, as seen in the case of Turkish Cypriot lawyer\nAkan K\u00fcr\u015fat, who was arrested for his involvement in property transactions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While the IPC is recognized by the ECHR as a legal mechanism (i.e., a\ndomestic remedy) for addressing property disputes, the Greek Cypriot side\nargues that these arrests<\/a>\nare justified. They view the IPC as a tool used by the Turkish Cypriot side to\nlegitimize the acquisition of Greek Cypriot properties, which they consider\nillegal under international law. The Turkish Cypriot representative at the\nParliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), O\u011fuzhan Hasipo\u011flu, criticizes\nthese actions<\/a>, claiming they contradict the ECHR’s acceptance of\nthe IPC and violate international law. He calls for an investigation into these\narrests, asserting they are politically motivated to pressure the Turkish\nCypriot side into accepting the Greek Cypriot position.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The broader context of property disputes between the two sides is\ncomplex. Hasipo\u011flu accuses the Greek Cypriot side of expropriating Turkish\nCypriot properties in the south without compensation. This highlights the\nintricate nature of the property issue, which remains a significant point of\ncontention and a potential flashpoint for legal battles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

 <\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The prospects for an interim deal<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The consequences of the lack of common ground for formal negotiations do\nnot negate the substantive elements of the Cyprus issue. It does, however,\noffer T\u00fcrkiye an opportunity to argue not only in favor of a two-state solution\nbut also to claim that the preconditions of the EU for progressing on strategic\nareas of mutual interest should not be linked to progress on Cyprus talks via\nthe Turkish side\u2019s reaffirmation of the BBF model. Guterres is unlikely to\nproduce a report that opens that path. It is more likely that he will push for\na package of CBMs that address Turkish Cypriot concerns over isolation while\nsimultaneously strengthening the Technical Committees to negotiate the\nimplementation of CBMs and cooperation agreements. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this context, the question becomes whether the Greek Cypriot side can\nbe induced into a normalization process through the Technical Committees.  The difficulty for Greek Cypriot leader Christodoulides\nis that he has openly\nreferenced<\/a> fully-fledged negotiations based on BBF, including\nconvergences and the acquis of the talks through the failed Crans Montana Summit\nas a diplomatic goal. Moreover, he has attempted to avert the introduction of\nCBMs that have the effect of upgrading the TRNC, opting instead to retain\ncontrol over the process by introducing selective CBMs aimed at the rights of\nTurkish Cypriots as citizens rather than as a political community. In the\nannexes to Guterres\u2019 most recent report, he touts the 14 unilateral measures\nhis government took announced on 26 January 2024. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The UN, the EU, and the broader international community will undoubtedly\nwatch domestic political developments in T\u00fcrkiye and the TRNC. Among Turkish\nCypriots, the upcoming presidential elections, scheduled in 2025, are likely to\nfeature a challenge by opposition candidates to Tatar\u2019s re-election.\nNotwithstanding T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s influence, polls\nsuggest<\/a> the unpopularity of the current governing coalition\nheaded by the National Unity Party (UBP) and that opposition leader Tufan Erh\u00fcrman\nleads Tatar. Of course, how a change in government or president would affect\npolicy remains to be seen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Aside from any potential softening of stances on the part of Turkish\nCypriot leadership, the real gauge is whether President Erdo\u011fan of T\u00fcrkiye,\npotentially supported by the main opposition CHP, seeks closer relations with\nthe West and thus progress on Cyprus-related issues. This would manifest itself\npartly vicariously through the positions of the Turkish Cypriot leadership. Taken\nat face value, Tatar must realize the 3Ds he seeks cannot be granted to him via\nHolguin\u2019s contacts, especially over direct flights. This implies that the\nTurkish side hopes that the UN will not only determine a lack of common ground\nregarding the settlement model but also advocate for the lifting of the\ninternational isolation of the Turkish Cypriots.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Independent of Tatar\u2019s\nview<\/a> that the 3Ds are not subject to negotiation, the real\nissue is whether the authorization of Ercan Airport for international flights\nis subject to reversal. Ercan\u2019s status has been part of previous CBM proposals,\nincluding one proposed in 2022 through the initiative of the Greek Cypriot Foreign\nMinister, Ioannis Kasoulides, who suggested<\/a>\nthat the airport could open under UN administration in exchange for the\nsimultaneous administrative control of Varosha\/Mara\u015f. Still, should TRNC\nsucceed in upgrading its international status through the OTC and other\ninstitutions, the claim to sovereign control over ports may be strengthened\nwithout the need for trade-offs. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Direct trade, by contrast, is an area where progress could be made,\ngiven the precedent of the proposed\ndirect trade regulation<\/a> by the European Union in\n2004. Whereas it was shelved, it is within the purview of the EU to revive the\nproposal or otherwise propose how trade can be facilitated to overcome the\nlimitations of the current Green Line Regulation that administers crossings of\nindividuals and goods across the Green Line that divides Cyprus. Moreover, it\nrelates to T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s obligations to the EU to extend customs union to all\nmembers, including the Republic of Cyprus. This suggests that while the Turkish\nside is not prepared to negotiate BBF and engage in fully-fledged negotiations,\nrebuffing any efforts to link CBMs to the affirmation of federalism, it is open\nto negotiation of the positive agenda and customs union via the 3Ds tabled by\nPresident Tatar in Cyprus. Whereas EU member state diplomats are constrained by\nthe European Conclusions of April 2024, there is ample opportunity to exchange\nideas with T\u00fcrkiye via Corepor, if not directly with the Turkish Cypriot\nleadership.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In discussing this with respect to Holguin’s mandate, the Turkish side\nhas been emphasizing that it’s not really for the duration of her mandate,\nalthough they underlined six months, which was to determine whether there was\n\u2018common ground.\u2019 This does not foreclose the possibility that some other\ndiplomat, if not herself, could be reappointed under a different mandate. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

While the Turkish side remains adamant in its stance, it still relies on\nthe UN-led process precisely because the Good Offices mission of the UNSG and\nrelevant UN Security Council resolutions provide a forum that underlines the\nequality of the sides. Therefore, going forward, the Turkish side will pursue\nUN-based contacts rather than the EU, as the latter serves to consolidate the\nsovereign authority of the Greek Cypriot side over the Republic of Cyprus. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cJoint Statement from the EC, Cyprus, the UAE, the US, and the UK\nEndorsing the Activation of a Maritime Corridor to Deliver Humanitarian\nAssistance to Gaza.\u201d 2024. European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement\nNegotiations (DG NEAR)<\/em>. March 8. https:\/\/neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu\/news\/joint-statement-ec-cyprus-uae-us-and-uk-endorsing-activation-maritime-corridor-deliver-humanitarian-2024-03-08_en<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cPresident Expresses Commitment to a Cyprus Solution According to UNSC\nResolutions.\u201d 2024. \u039a\u03a5\u03a0\u0395<\/em>. https:\/\/www.cna.org.cy\/en\/article\/6707214\/president-expresses-commitment-to-a-cyprus-solution-according-to-unsc-resolutions<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cTurkish Parliament Passes Resolution Regarding 50th Anniversary of\nCyprus Peace Operation.\u201d 2024. Anadolu Ajans\u0131<\/em>. https:\/\/www.aa.com.tr\/en\/turkiye\/turkish-parliament-passes-resolution-regarding-50th-anniversary-of-cyprus-peace-operation\/3279043<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bianet. 2024. \u201cErdo\u011fan\u2019\u0131n \u2018K\u0131br\u0131s Tamamen Bizim Olabilirdi\u2019 S\u00f6zlerine\nYunanistan\u2019dan Tepki.\u201d March 19. https:\/\/bianet.org\/haber\/erdogan-in-kibris-tamamen-bizim-olabilirdi-sozlerine-yunanistan-dan-tepki-293231<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

CNN T\u00fcrk. 2024. \u201cK\u0131br\u0131s Bar\u0131\u015f Harekat\u0131n\u0131n 50. Y\u0131l D\u00f6n\u00fcm\u00fc: Programa\nCumhurba\u015fkan\u0131 Erdo\u011fan, Bah\u00e7eli ve \u00d6zel Kat\u0131lacak – Haberler.\u201d https:\/\/www.cnnturk.com\/turkiye\/kibris-baris-harekatinin-50-yil-donumu-programa-erdogan-bahceli-ve-ozel-katilacak-2131330<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Constantinos Tsindas. 2024. \u201cUS Rejected Turkish Demands to \u2018kill\u2019\nCyprus Humanitarian Corridor to Gaza.\u201d Incypruscom<\/em>. March 31. https:\/\/in-cyprus.philenews.com\/local\/us-rejected-turkish-demands-to-kill-cyprus-humanitarian-corridor-to-gaza\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

European Commission. 2004. https:\/\/eur-lex.europa.eu\/legal-content\/EN\/TXT\/PDF\/?uri=CELEX%3A52004PC0466&from<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

European Commission. 2024. https:\/\/neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu\/system\/files\/2023-11\/Joint%20Communication%20to%20the%20European%20Council%20-%20State%20of%20play%20of%20EU-Turkiye%20political%2C%20econo<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

European Council. 2024. https:\/\/EU\nrelations with T\u00fcrkiye – Consilium (europa.eu)<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kanl\u0131, Yusuf. 2024. \u201cFragile Steps towards Normalization in T\u00fcrkiye and\nCyprus.\u201d Yetkin Report<\/em>. June 29. https:\/\/yetkinreport.com\/en\/2024\/06\/29\/fragile-steps-towards-normalization-in-turkiye-and-cyprus\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kassianos, George, Jean Christou, Theo Panayides, and Elias Hazou. 2024.\n\u201c \u2018We Must Be Honest\u2019 President Says on Coup Anniversary.\u201d Cyprus Mail<\/em>.\nJuly 15. https:\/\/cyprus-mail.com\/2024\/07\/15\/we-must-be-honest-president-says-on-coup-anniversary\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kassianos, George, Jean Christou, Theo Panayides, and Elias Hazou. 2024.\n\u201cFormer UK Minister Visits North and Calls for Direct Flights.\u201d Cyprus Mail<\/em>.\nJuly 12. https:\/\/cyprus-mail.com\/2024\/07\/12\/former-uk-minister-visits-north-and-calls-for-direct-flights\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kassianos, George, Jean Christou, Theo Panayides, and Elias Hazou. 2024.\n\u201cHolguin Gives Guterres Her Report on Cyprus Problem and Prospects to Start\nTalks.\u201d Cyprus Mail<\/em>. July 10. https:\/\/cyprus-mail.com\/2024\/07\/10\/holguin-gives-guterres-her-report-on-cyprus-problem-and-prospects-to-start-talks\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kassianos, George, Jean Christou, Theo Panayides, and Elias Hazou. 2024.\n\u201cDisy Leader Issues Stark Warning on Future of Cyprus Talks.\u201d Cyprus Mail<\/em>.\nJuly 10. https:\/\/cyprus-mail.com\/2024\/07\/10\/disy-leader-issues-stark-warning-on-future-of-cyprus-talks\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kassianos, George, Jean Christou, Theo Panayides, and Elias Hazou. 2024.\n\u201cPolice Get Tough on Those Selling Property in North.\u201d Cyprus Mail<\/em>. July\n9. https:\/\/cyprus-mail.com\/2024\/07\/09\/police-get-tough-on-those-selling-property-in-north\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kassianos, George, Jean Christou, Theo Panayides, and Elias Hazou. 2024.\n\u201cPACE Rep Calls for Investigation into Cyprus over Property Arrests.\u201d Cyprus\nMail<\/em>. July 8. https:\/\/cyprus-mail.com\/2024\/07\/08\/pace-rep-calls-for-investigation-into-cyprus-over-property-arrests\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kassianos, George, Jean Christou, Theo Panayides, and Elias Hazou. 2024.\n\u201cHolguin Says \u2018We Must Think Differently\u2019 in Parting Letter.\u201d Cyprus Mail<\/em>.\nJuly 6. https:\/\/cyprus-mail.com\/2024\/07\/07\/holguin-says-we-must-think-differently-in-parting-letter\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kassianos, George, Jean Christou, Theo Panayides, and Elias Hazou. 2024.\n\u201cTatar Calls for \u2018objective\u2019 UN Report.\u201d Cyprus Mail<\/em>. July 2. https:\/\/cyprus-mail.com\/2024\/07\/02\/tatar-calls-for-objective-un-report\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

K\u0131br\u0131s Postas\u0131. 2024. \u201cCMIRS\u2019in Anketine G\u00f6re Y\u00fczde 35,48\u2019le Tufan\nErh\u00fcrman A\u00e7\u0131k Ara \u00d6nde.\u201d July 17. https:\/\/www.kibrispostasi.com\/c35-KIBRIS_HABERLERI\/n526418-cmirs-anketi-ctp-ve-tufan-erhurman-onde<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

K\u0131br\u0131s Postas\u0131. 2024. \u201cCTP Sends Letter to Cuellar: Our Request Is a\nResults-Oriented Solution Timetable on a Federal Basis.\u201d https:\/\/www.kibrispostasi.com\/c140-DAILY_NEWS\/n505424-ctp-sends-letter-to-cuellar-our-request-is-a-resultsoriented-solution-timetable-on-a-federal-basis<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

K\u0131br\u0131s Postas\u0131. 2024. \u201cTufan Erh\u00fcrman: 2024, Erken Se\u00e7im Y\u0131l\u0131d\u0131r.\u201d https:\/\/www.kibrispostasi.com\/c35-KIBRIS_HABERLERI\/n504444-tufan-erhurman-2024-erken-secim-yilidir<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kouremenos, Achilleas. 2024. \u201cIn Washington, Mitsotakis Tells Erdogan\nCyprus Unity Talks Need Restarting.\u201d The National Herald<\/em>. July 11. https:\/\/www.thenationalherald.com\/in-washington-mitsotakis-tells-erdogan-cyprus-unity-talks-need-restarting\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Middle East Monitor. 2024. \u201cT\u00fcrkiye Reveals Intelligence That Cyprus\nServes as Military Base for Israel.\u201d Middle East Monitor<\/em>. June 26. https:\/\/www.middleeastmonitor.com\/20240626-turkiye-reveals-intelligence-that-cyprus-serves-as-military-base-for-israel\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Rosenberg, D. E. 2024. \u201cWhy Arab States Haven\u2019t Broken with Israel.\u201d Foreign\nPolicy<\/em>. https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2024\/04\/19\/arab-states-israel-iran-attack-saudi-arabia-jordan-uae\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The National Herald. 2022. \u201cTo Save Varosha Resort, Cyprus Wants UN to\nRun Ercan Airport.\u201d The National Herald<\/em>. February 9. https:\/\/www.thenationalherald.com\/to-save-varosha-resort-cyprus-wants-un-to-run-ercan-airport\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

UNSG Good Offices Report (S\/2024\/256). 2024. https:\/\/www.passblue.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/07\/240703-SG-report-on-good-offices-in-Cyprus-advance-copy.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

VOA T\u00fcrk\u00e7e. 2024. \u201cAK Parti Iktidar\u0131 KKTC\u2019deki Ana Muhalefet ile\nNormalle\u015febilecek Mi?\u201d VOA T\u00fcrk\u00e7e<\/em>. June 27.\nhttps:\/\/www.voaturkce.com\/a\/ak-parti-iktidari-kktcdeki-ana-muhalefet-ile-normallesebilecek-mi\/7675481.html.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yetkin, Murat. 2024. \u201cTurkish Cypriot Leader Tatar:\n\u2018Never Again\u2019 without Sovereign Equality.\u201d Yetkin Report<\/em>. February 26. https:\/\/yetkinreport.com\/en\/2024\/02\/26\/turkish-cypriot-leader-tatar-never-again-without-sovereign-equality\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n
\"\"<\/figure>
\n

Erol Kaymak<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Erol Kaymak is a Fellow at the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP). He is currently on leave from the Eastern Mediterranean University, where he serves as a Professor of International Relations. Dr. Kaymak has authored or contributed to numerous reports on Cyprus, published by organizations such as the United Nations in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), CIVICUS, Interpeace, and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES). He is also the coordinator for the Cyprus Chapter of the Greek Turkish Forum.<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

Bu yaz\u0131ya at\u0131f i\u00e7in:<\/strong> Erol Kaymak, \u201cThe 50th Anniversary of T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s Military Intervention in Cyprus and the Quest for Turkish Cypriot Sovereign Equality”, Online, 20 July 2024, https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/blog\/2024\/07\/19\/iran-secimler-gs\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

Telif@UIKPanorama<\/em>. \u00c7evrimi\u00e7i olarak yay\u0131mlanan yaz\u0131lar\u0131n t\u00fcm telif haklar\u0131 Panorama dergisine aittir. Aksi belirtilmedi\u011fi s\u00fcrece, yay\u0131mlanan yaz\u0131larda belirtilen g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fler yaln\u0131zca yazar\u0131na\/yazarlar\u0131na aittir. U\u0130K, Global Akademi, Panorama Yay\u0131n Kurulu ile edit\u00f6rleri ve di\u011fer yazarlar\u0131 ba\u011flamaz. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

As T\u00fcrkiye prepares to commemorate the 50th anniversary of its military intervention in Cyprus on 20 July 1974, the symbolic weight of the occasion is dramatically underscored by the planned presence of 50 Turkish naval vessels. This flotilla, a powerful representation of military might, is meant to serve as a potent reminder of the events […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":243,"featured_media":10670,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[497,501,508],"tags":[735,656,650],"class_list":["post-11210","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-essay","category-mediterranean","category-turkey","tag-cyprus","tag-english","tag-turkiye"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11210","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/243"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=11210"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11210\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/10670"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=11210"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=11210"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=11210"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}