{"id":11400,"date":"2023-03-26T09:32:53","date_gmt":"2023-03-26T09:32:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/2023\/03\/cn-2\/"},"modified":"2024-11-20T21:46:02","modified_gmt":"2024-11-20T18:46:02","slug":"turkey-and-the-eu-common-challenges-and-shared-interests-in-a-conflict-ridden-world-cigdem-nas","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/2023\/03\/turkey-and-the-eu-common-challenges-and-shared-interests-in-a-conflict-ridden-world-cigdem-nas\/","title":{"rendered":"Turkey and the EU: Common Challenges and Shared Interests in a Conflict-Ridden World – \u00c7i\u011fdem Nas"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
\"\"<\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n
To download the pdf version of article titled “Turkey and the EU: Common Challenges and Shared Interests in a Conflict-Ridden World”, please click the download button.<\/a>Download<\/a><\/div>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n

Turkey-EU\nrelations have traditionally been characterized by fluctuations and cycles<\/a>\nby which it diverges and moves closer to the EU. Nevertheless, since the mid-2010s,\nTurkey-EU relations deteriorated from a process of accession to a transactional\nrelationship and further towards an interest-driven and even adversarial one. The\nrevitalization of the relations upon the background of the Syrian refugee\ncrisis in 2015-16 could not be sustained in the medium term. The state of emergency\ndeclared in the wake of the July 15 failed coup attempt and the transition to\nthe presidential regime in Turkey following the 2017 referendum triggered increasing\ncriticism from the EU and a widespread perception that Turkey was \u201cmoving\naway from Europe<\/a>\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Turkey\u2019s\nbacksliding regarding the political aspects of the Copenhagen Criteria was\ncoupled with multiplying disagreements on the foreign policy front. In 2019,\nthe EU adopted a series of sanctions against what it regarded as Turkey\u2019s \u201cillegal\ndrilling activities\u201d<\/a> in the Eastern Mediterranean. Efforts by some Member\nStates and the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy to prevent\nfurther tension with Turkey led to the initiation of the \u201cPositive\nAgenda<\/a>\u201d, a framework for measures such as trade facilitation,\nCustoms Union modernization, high-level dialogues and people-to-people contacts\naiming to bring about renewed engagement between the parties. However, such efforts\nhad limited effects and failed to revitalize the Turkey-EU relationship towards\na more positive, trustful, and cooperative path. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia\u2019s\nassault on and invasion of Ukraine changed the underlying conditions of\nEuropean security and interstate relations. Considerations about the European\nsecurity order, defined by multidimensional security threats in the post-Cold\nWar World, focused on the need for the common defense against a fundamental\nthreat to the survival of an independent and sovereign country and its people\nand hence a threat to the rules-based international system. Under these\nextraordinary conditions, the collective defense commitment through NATO\nassumed a critical relevance, and Ukraine, followed by Moldova and Georgia, applied\nfor EU membership, the second-best option to NATO membership. While this\nprocess reignited the almost still EU enlargement, President Macron\u2019s proposal\nfor a European Political Community (EPC) aimed to bring together countries of\nthe wider European geography, leaving out Russia and Belarus as a symbolic act\nof defiance against aggression. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Turkey\u2019s\nposition as a NATO member and an honest broker between Russia and Ukraine\nbecame a critical factor in the changing European security landscape. Although\nTurkey\u2019s non-committal to the sanctions regime against Russia raised eyebrows\nin both the US and the EU, there was also a considerable degree of\nunderstanding displayed towards Turkey due to its geostrategic location\nbordering Russia and Ukraine across the Black Sea, its support to Ukraine\u2019s war\neffort and its endeavor to mediate between the parties such as in the case of\nthe Grain Deal. Nevertheless, the EU noted its concerns about Turkey\u2019s rising\ntrade with Russia since this may undermine\nEU sanctions,<\/a> especially regarding the free circulation of dual-use\ngoods by the Customs Union. Hence, an interest-only relationship based on\neconomic and trade priorities may hit the rocks due to political differences,\ngrowing rift and mistrust, and inability to engage and cooperate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Under\nthe prevailing circumstances, it stands to reason that the challenges from\nrising adversity between Russia and the West, impending rivalry, and clash over\ngeopolitical interests between the US and China, and various types of\nconventional, non-conventional, nuclear, and hybrid threats necessitate closer\ncoordination and cooperation between Turkey and the EU. After all, Turkey is a\nNATO country, a candidate country to join the EU, and a Customs Union partner\nof the Union. Turkey\u2019s participation in the EPC Summit in Prague was significant\ndue to its inclusion in the anti-Russia front. However, its growing relations\nwith Russia can place Turkey-EU cooperation in danger and alter Turkey\u2019s\nforeign policy priorities and national interest calculations. Given the low\nlevel of dialogue and engagement between Turkey and the EU, how can the parties\ncreate the conditions conducive to further cooperation and coordination against\ncommon threats?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Turkey\nand the EU share many areas of interest, including but not limited to deterring\nRussian aggression. In addition to increasing defense and security cooperation\nboth within NATO and regarding the EU security and defense policy and PESCO\nframework, high-level dialogue meetings at the foreign ministers\u2019 level and\nregular Turkey-EU summits may be initiated. Turkey and EU cooperation may also\nintensify in critical areas such as energy security, the fight against\ndisinformation, and green transformation. The launch of the Turkey Investment\nForum, aimed partly at sustaining Turkey\u2019s alignment with the European Green\nDeal, is a case in point. Turkey may also greatly aid the EU\u2019s energy\ntransition efforts by its favorable disposition toward renewables and potential\nto produce green\nhydrogen<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Closer\ncooperation and dialogue between Turkey and the EU may facilitate a paradigm\nchange in the Eastern Mediterranean from a region beset by conflict over\nhydrocarbons to one exemplifying cooperation over renewables. However,\ndivergent positions on Cyprus and Greek-Turkish dispute over the Aegean stand\nin the way of closer cooperation. It is possible to read expressions regarding\na staunch stance against Turkey\u2019s position in various EU documents and Council\nconclusions characterizing Turkey\u2019s actions as illegal and against good\nneighborly relations. In the recent regular report on Turkey, the European\nCommission noted\nthat Turkey<\/a> should respect the sovereignty and territorial\nintegrity of all Member States and take steps to fully respect international\nlaw, de-escalate tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean and promote good\nneighborly relations. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Turkey\nwas also criticized for failing to comply with the EU\u2019s foreign and security\npolicy statements with a \u201cvery\nlow alignment rate of 7 %<\/a>\u201d. Expecting Turkey\u2019s alignment with EU common\npolicies and statements while keeping the accession process frozen is not an\neffective strategy. Although Turkey is partly to blame for the failure of the\naccession process due to its diversion from EU reforms, it was the EU that\nsuspended eight chapters in 2006 in connection with the Cyprus conflict and\nthen failed to open further chapters due to Member State vetoes. Therefore, a genuine\nengagement and closer cooperation would depend upon a renewed effort to resolve\nthe Cyprus dispute and further engagement between Greece and Turkey over\nbilateral issues. Without the Cyprus problem out of the way, it will be\ndifficult for the EU and Turkey to cooperate on security issues, intensify\nbilateral relations, step up Turkey\u2019s integration into the Single Market and\nimprove their cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The\naccession prospect still seems to be the most effective framework for\nregulating Turkey-EU relations and integrating Turkey further into the European\nsecurity order, although it is not the most plausible under the current EU\napproach. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n
\"\"<\/figure>
\n

Cigdem Nas<\/strong> is the Secretary-General of the Economic Development Foundation (IKV), an NGO specialized on Turkey-EU relations. She is also an associate professor of international relations and a member of staff at the Department of Political Science and International Relations of the Yildiz Technical University in Istanbul. She graduated from the Political Sicence Department of Bosphorous University in 1988, completed her Masters on European Social Policy at the London School of Economics and Political Science and her Doctorate athe Marmara University EU Institute on the minority rights regime in Europe in 2000. She worked as a researcher at the Istanbul Chamber of Industry between 1992-94, then joined the EU Institute of the Marmara University as a research assistant. She became an associate professor in 2007 and transferred to the Yildiz Technical University. She is the author or several books and articles on the EU and Turkey-EU relations including Turkey and the EU: Processes of Europeanization ve Turkey and EU Integration: Achievements and Obstacles published by Routledge. She is a member of the Turkish University Studies Association on EU Studies (TUNAECS), Academic Network of European Studies in Turkey (A-NEST), the Europe Team of the Delegation of the EU in Ankara, Jean Monnet Scholars Association, Global Relations Forum, and International Political Science Association (IPSA).<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

To cite this work: <\/strong> \u00c7i\u011fdem Nas, \u201cTurkey and the EU: Common Challenges and Shared Interests in a Conflict-Ridden World\u201d, Panorama, Online, 26 March 2023, https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/blog\/2023\/03\/26\/cn<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>
\n
\n

This article has been prepared with the support provided to the International Relations Council<\/a> and the Global Academy<\/a> by the Heinrich B\u00f6ll Stiftung Association Turkey Representative within the scope of the project titled ‘Foreign Policy for the 21st Century; Peaceful, Equitable, and Dynamic Turkey’.<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

Copyright@UIKPanorama. All on-line and print rights reserved. Opinions expressed in works published by the Panorama belongs to the authors alone unless otherwise stated, and do not imply endorsement by the IRCT, Global Academy, or the Editors\/Editorial Board of Panorama.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Turkey-EU relations have traditionally been characterized by fluctuations and cycles by which it diverges and moves closer to the EU. Nevertheless, since the mid-2010s, Turkey-EU relations deteriorated from a process of accession to a transactional relationship and further towards an interest-driven and even adversarial one. The revitalization of the relations upon the background of the […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":25,"featured_media":9755,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[510,504,486,508],"tags":[656,599,609,563,713,650],"class_list":["post-11400","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-100-years-of-the-republic","category-europe","category-opinion","category-turkey","tag-english","tag-europe","tag-european-union","tag-foreign-policy-and-diplomacy","tag-heinrich-boll-foundation","tag-turkiye"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11400","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/25"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=11400"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11400\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/9755"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=11400"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=11400"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=11400"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}