{"id":11403,"date":"2023-03-18T14:58:15","date_gmt":"2023-03-18T14:58:15","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/2023\/03\/dg\/"},"modified":"2024-11-20T21:46:33","modified_gmt":"2024-11-20T18:46:33","slug":"us-turkey-relations-in-the-context-of-syria-crossroads-for-new-bilateral-and-regional-alignments-derya-gocer","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/2023\/03\/us-turkey-relations-in-the-context-of-syria-crossroads-for-new-bilateral-and-regional-alignments-derya-gocer\/","title":{"rendered":"US-Turkey Relations in The Context of Syria: Crossroads for New Bilateral and Regional Alignments – Derya G\u00f6\u00e7er"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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Tunisian uprising in late 2010\ninspired different segments across the Middle East to have bolder demands for\nchange. The change in focus was broadly conceived, ranging from political\nchange, change of leaders and regimes to social and economic changes. Despite\nthe varying political and historical dynamics in the region, this demand for\nchange resonated and contributed to the protests in other countries, including\nSyria. Starting with children\u2019s protest and subsequent repression in Daar\u2019a,\nSyria\u2019s Assad regime faced increasingly vocal and later armed opposition.\nSyrian regime in the late 2000s was on the cusp of domestic restructuring of\nits economy. Traditional Syrian alignment in the Middle East included support\nfrom Iran. New alignments included increasing cooperation with Turkey,\nespecially during Davuto\u011flu\u2019s time as Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs.\nLabelled as \u2018zero problems with neighbors\u2019 policy, Davuto\u011flu had emphasized the\neconomic and social benefits of being closer to Syria, all under the narrative\nof former Ottoman unity in these lands. These new economic and social links\ntranslated increasingly to political affinity. The end of US predominance in\nglobal affairs had affected Turkey\u2019s sense of increased maneuvering space and\nSyria presented an opportunity to try out that maneuvering capacity. So, in\n2011 Turkey attempted to play the role of the peace maker in Syrian affairs as\nwell as in the larger Middle East. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            That role has failed as Assad regime turned to more violent repression of the opposition and as the opposition turned outwards to foreign powers for support. Syrian uprising turned to Syrian civil war. The general Arab uprising transformations in the region also quickly turned against Turkey\u2019s positioning. Turkey found itself with a desire for increased autonomy in global and regional affairs, yet a not-so-friendly region. In Syria, Turkey threw its weight against Assad regime and supported the opposition groups in various ways. This did not affect US-Turkey bilateral relationships that intensely at that time. The rise of ISIS and US interest in fighting ISIS while at the same time sending minimal military support culminated in US support to YPG. Turkey raised its objections to this support in several and very clear ways but did not reach a tangible result. There was a new proactive stance of Turkey in late 2000s, early 2010s which can be considered as a rupture from the foreign policy of 1980s and 1990s. However the objection to its allies\u2019 building bridges with YPG could be counted as the continuation of earlier Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, from 1990s. Turkey counts PKK, the armed group, as a continuous national security threat. That has been a constant theme in Turkey\u2019s bilateral and regional relations. Turkey also considers YPG to be organically linked to PKK. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            US-Turkish\ntensions on the topic only deepened after 2015\/6. 2015 was the year of Russia\u2019s\nentrance to the Syrian civil war and 2016 was the year of the failed coup\nattempt in Turkey. While Russia\u2019s entrance showcased how increased\nmultipolarity at the global level was experienced in the region, the failed\ncoup attempt strained US-Turkey relations further as Fethullah G\u00fclen, believed\nto be behind the attempt was residing in the USA. After 2016 Turkey\u2019s foreign\npolicy tools changed drastically. \u2018\u2018In terms of foreign policy tools, the AKP\ngovernment started to resort to military means, frequently using military\nintervention, escalation, and gunboat diplomacy to achieve foreign policy\nobjectives\u2019\u2019 (Altun\u0131\u015f\u0131k, 2022a: 171). The last military intervention that was\nannounced by President Erdo\u011fan himself towards Syria in the late Spring of 2022\nwas stalled, despite several attempts to get a greenlight from Russia. So, Turkey\nis using these tools with limited maneuvering capacity and with mixed results.\nTurkey has been unable to change US policy on YPG. Turkey did manage to control\nsome areas in Syria and prevented full YPG control across the borderlands, and\nallied partially with Russia and Iran, enough to give Turkey a say in the\nfuture of Syria but not enough to change border crossings, YPG\u2019s position or\nits links with PKK. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

            The\nlimits of these tools stem firstly from the failure of Turkey to play the\nintended role of \u2018peace maker\u2019 in the region. Turkey had to face and is still\nfacing a Gulf region that acts increasingly more autonomous from global and\nregional alliances. In fact, as Altun\u0131\u015f\u0131k argues the region itself is becoming\nmore and more Gulf-centric (Altun\u0131\u015f\u0131k 2022, this policy paper series), as the\nGulf countries act in unison in critical issues such as Syria. One of the\ncharacteristics of this new order is containment of Iran and the second\ncharacteristics may very well be containing the newly proactive Turkey. The\nfirst front of that containment would be the consolidation of a new Syria.\nAssad managed to get into collaborations with Gulf states and other Arab\nstates, most notably over the issue of gas and electricity. The new Biden\nadministration did not object to that collaboration, signaling what Steve Cook\ncalls ruthless pragmatism<\/a> and continuation of the Trump\npolicy of minimal involvement in Syria, and the larger Middle East. In fact, as\nof August 2022, the US presence in Syria is totaling to 900 officers. Even that\npresence is causing friction, notably with the fourth state that shows presence\nin Syria, Iran. Iranian forces retaliate against Israeli attacks by attacking\nUS base and personnel in Syria. US then responds by attacking Iran backed\nmilitias in Syria. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

So, the US policy in Syria is\nconsistent with a Great Power in rivalry with other Great Powers, most notably\nChina and is investing more attention in Asia. US still needs to protect Israel\nto some degree, ensure the flow of oil and at least negotiate the price of oil.\nUS also still offers a security umbrella to the Gulf, although there are calls\nfrom within US and within the Middle East for the Middle East to establish its\nown security alliance in this new Gulf-centric regional order. That seems to be\nanother continuation from Trump to Biden administration and this perspective\nwould deprive Turkey from a regional middle power status even further. Turkey\u2019s\nattempts to have more military control over Syria should be read within this\ncontext as well. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Syrian civil war challenged Turkey\non domestic, regional and global levels. There are security challenges against\nTurkey arising from the war in Syria. There are also limits to the regional\nsupport Turkey gathers that partially stem from the Syrian civil war. There are\nalso issues that relate to global positioning of Turkey that partially stem\nfrom the Syrian civil war. This global re-positioning explains Turkey\u2019s ease in\ncompartamentalizing its relations with Russia and Iran and aligning itself at\ntimes with these two powers. Finally, there is a domestic political challenge\nto Turkey\u2019s regime that is further prolonged as the civil war itself is\nprolonging. That is the challenge that is presented with the Syrian refugees in\nTurkey and the issue of return that Turkish opposition voices as a strong\ncriticism towards President Erdo\u011fan. The almost 4 million refugees, by their\nsheer number and their various positioning within the Turkish domestic\npolitical system, provide a fertile ground for opposing the newly transitioned\npresidential system in Turkey. The opposition demands a decrease in the number\nof refugees by returning them back to Syria, a demand problematic on moral,\nlogistical and political grounds. However, any resettlement would help the\ncurrent office holders in Turkey in their bid to win elections in 2023. The\nrising nationalist sentiments in the general public and in Turkey\u2019s opposition\nparties amount to a nationalist turn. This of course also has a bearing on the\nYPG issue and relations with the United States. \nSince nationalism is rarely contained within distinct issues and rising\nsentiments against Syrians may spill over to increased nationalist discourse\ntowards the Kurds as well. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Currently, Turkey starts a\nrepositioning towards the Syrian regime, with talks of a future meeting with\nAssad and potential acceptance of the durability of the Assad regime. Despite\nthe obstacles and red light from allies, Turkey still insists on a future\nmilitary intervention to the North. Regionally, Turkey softened its position\ntowards Israel and the GCC, attempting to gather a new regional momentum while\nat least partially giving up its bid for regional middle power. US also\nsoftened its position towards Saudi Arabia and continued Trump\u2019s policies of\nfor negotiating for better relations between Israel and the Arab Middle East.\nIt also softened its economic pressure on Syria that had started with 2019\nCaesar Act. It turns a blind eye to the Arab states re-engagement with Assad\nregime. Iran and Turkey\u2019s military presence will be controversial over the\ncoming months. Iran is already using that presence in Syria to engage in\nclandestine conflicts with US forces to send a message to Israel. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Turkey-US bilateral relation may converge\nthrought this parallel softening towards the Assad regime and the domestic need\nof both countries to not engage in lengthy military frictions in the region. As\nUS pays more attention to Asia and the rivalry with China, it needs the Syrian\ncivil war shortened and not prolonged. Turkey entering the election season,\nalso needs some settlement in Syria, especially to turn the refugee issue into\na less damaging one for the current office holders. The main divergence will\nremain US-YPG relations which may change form if Assad regime consolidates\nitself further and pushes Iran\u2019s military presence somewhat to the fringes of\nthe civil war zones. If it does not change form, this issue will continue to be\na thorn in the bilateral relations, even in the case of electoral change in\nTurkey, due to the nationalist streak rising in Turkish politics. Another\ndivergence in Syria may come from Turkey controlled zones and their future.\nTurkey engages in construction projects in these zones, investing in multiple\nways to these territories. So, if the Gulf-centric order decides to contain\nTurkey and Iran in Syria\u2019s future rebuilding, and if US continues to support\nthat order as it seems to be doing at the moment, this containment of Turkey\nmay be another divergence in bilateral relations, originating in Syria. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Syria presents both points of\ndivergence and convergence for bilateral relations. The weight of the former\nwill be determined by the coming changes in domestic electoral politics in\nTurkey as well as the pace and direction of the new regional order. The global\ndimension of the Syrian civil war, with Russian and Iranian presence may be\naffected by the changes in the regional order. Either way changes and\ndevelopments in the global dimension will be slower than the domestic and\nregional levels. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Altun\u0131\u015f\u0131k, Meliha. \u2018\u2018Change In\nTurkey\u2019s Foreign Policy: Global Shifts and Domestic Politics\u2019\u2019 in The Routledge\nHandbook Of Diplomacy And Statecraft, ed. B.J.C. McKercher, London: Routledge,\n2022. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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This paper is one of the outputs of the Opportunities for Shared Security Project, conducted by the Middle East Studies program at METU, supported by by the U.S. Embassy, Ankara, Grant No: STU15019612017. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Dr. Derya G\u00f6\u00e7er, Middle East Technical University<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

Derya G\u00f6\u00e7er\u202fis an\u202fAssist. Prof.\u202fat METU, Turkey. She holds MSc and PhD degrees\u202fin International Relations\u202ffrom the\u202fLSE.\u202fShe is the chair of\u202fMiddle East Studies at METU.\u202fDr. G\u00f6\u00e7er focuses\u202fon the interaction between international and domestic politics,\u202fsocial movements, and comparative area\u202fstudies. Her\u202frecent publications focus on\u202fBRI\u202fin the Middle East, particularly Turkey and Iran.\u202f <\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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To cite this work: <\/strong>Derya G\u00f6\u00e7er , \u201c Us-Turkey Relations In The Context Of Syria: Crossroads For New Bilateral And Regional Alignments \u201d, Panaroma Analysis<\/em>, 18 March 2023, https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/blog\/2023\/03\/18\/dg\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Copyright@UIKPanorama. All on-line and print rights reserved. Opinions expressed in works published by the Panorama belongs to the authors alone unless otherwise stated, and do not imply endorsement by the IRCT, Global Academy, or the Editors\/Editorial Board of Panorama.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Tunisian uprising in late 2010 inspired different segments across the Middle East to have bolder demands for change. The change in focus was broadly conceived, ranging from political change, change of leaders and regimes to social and economic changes. Despite the varying political and historical dynamics in the region, this demand for change resonated and […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":200,"featured_media":9992,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[510,497,506,508],"tags":[656,586,617,633,650,641],"class_list":["post-11403","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-100-years-of-the-republic","category-essay","category-mena","category-turkey","tag-english","tag-middle-east","tag-regional-politics","tag-syria","tag-turkiye","tag-united-states-us"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11403","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/200"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=11403"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11403\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/9992"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=11403"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=11403"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=11403"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}