{"id":11406,"date":"2023-03-11T12:00:00","date_gmt":"2023-03-11T12:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/2023\/03\/zo\/"},"modified":"2024-11-20T21:47:12","modified_gmt":"2024-11-20T18:47:12","slug":"the-nuclear-deal-and-its-ramifications-for-turkey-us-relations-zelal-ozdemir","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/2023\/03\/the-nuclear-deal-and-its-ramifications-for-turkey-us-relations-zelal-ozdemir\/","title":{"rendered":"The Nuclear Deal and its Ramifications for Turkey-US Relations – Zelal \u00d6zdemir"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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The nuclear agreement between the United\nStates and Iran on July 14, 2015, also formally known as the Joint\nComprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), has been heralded as a diplomatic\ntriumph. The agreement was reached after years of intense negotiations between\nthe two countries, and it represented a major breakthrough in their relations.\nThe JCPOA is designed to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, and it\nincludes strict limits on Iran’s nuclear activities with increased\ninternational monitoring of Iran’s nuclear program. In exchange for these\nlimits, the international community has agreed to provide Iran with relief from\ncrippling economic sanctions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Although the nuclear deal was a major\naccomplishment of the Obama Administration, and being praised as a major\ndiplomatic victory, the deal was always controversial in the U.S., and has been\nmet with criticism particularly from Republicans in Congress. The deal would\nallow for UN inspectors to have access to Iranian nuclear sites, in return for\nthe lifting of sanctions. Critics argue that the deal will not prevent Iran\nfrom acquiring a nuclear weapon, while supporters argue that it is the best\noption available to prevent such a weapon from being acquired. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

On Tuesday, May 8th, 2018, President Trump\nannounced that the United States will withdraw from the nuclear deal with Iran.\nThis move has been widely anticipated and has drawn criticism from both\nRepublican and Democratic lawmakers alike. The president has characterized the\nagreement as \u201cthe worst deal ever\u201d[1]<\/a> and said\nthat he will work to reinstate sanctions on Iran. The Trump Administration then\nimposed new sanctions on Iran, and tensions between the two countries\nincreased. With a \u201cmaximum pressure\u201d[2]<\/a> policy,\nthe idea was lowering Iran’s resources through economic sanctions that would\nreduce its disruptive operations overseas: In in the words of then Secretary of\nState Mike Pompeo, \u201ceither fight to keep its economy off life support at home\nor keep squandering precious wealth on fights abroad. It won\u2019t have the\nresources to do both.\u201d[3]<\/a> The\nTrump administration\u2019s decision to withdraw from the nuclear deal with Iran\ngenerated a great deal of controversy and raised many questions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

President Biden, in October 2019, announced\nthat his first foreign policy move as president would be to turn back to the\ntable to reinstate the deal.[4]<\/a> The\ndecision of policy makers in the Biden administration to return to the Iran\nnuclear deal has been met with mixed reactions. Some argue that the move is a\nnecessary step in order to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, while\nothers contend that it simply diplomatizes a regime that cannot be trusted.\nHowever, there is no denying that the deal represents a change in policy from\nthe Trump administration, which withdrew from the agreement in 2018. Under the\nterms of the deal, Iran agreed to limit its nuclear program in exchange for\nlifted economic sanctions. The return to the deal is seen as a sign that the\nBiden administration is willing to engage in diplomacy with Iran, rather than\nresorting to military action or economic pressure. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

While it remains to be seen whether the deal\nwill ultimately be signed, it is clear that this agreement represents a\nsignificant shift in U.S. foreign policy towards Iran, a daunting task faced by\nthe Biden Administration. In this new round, the circumstances have changed for\nboth the U.S. and Iran. Iran is now a much stronger regional power than it was\nin 2015. While the U.S. has lost credibility as a negotiating partner, the\n“maximum pressure” campaign of the Trump Administration was responded\nwith a \u201cmaximum resistance\u201d campaign that was framed by the Supreme Leader Ali\nKhamenei as \u201cthe resistance economy\u201d[5]<\/a>. Against\nthe expectations of the Trump Administration, the sanctions have failed to\nbring Iran to its knees rather the outcome brought Iran closer to obtain a\nnuclear weapon.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Therefore, the change in policy of the Biden\nAdministration, which has been foretold during Biden\u2019s 2020 election campaign\nas \u201csmarter way to be tough on Iran\u201d, is welcomed by many policy makers, who\nbelieve that it is the only way to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons\nas well as that continuing hostility and conflict with Iran is a far worse alternative[6]<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

After 16 months of indirect talks between the\ntwo countries with the mediation of the EU, the final text has been prepared on\nAugust 8th 2022, exchanged and waiting for the final decision to be made. The\nfinal document was written on August 8th, 2022, after 16 months of indirect\nnegotiations between the two countries, mediated by the EU. While the deal\nsigned by the Obama Administration was limited to the nuclear problem, the\nscope of the latest negotiations is broader. Considering Trump\u2019s withdrawal\nfrom the 2015 deal, Iran demanded verification of the removal of Western\nsanctions and guarantees that the United States would not withdraw from the\naccord in the future. Most importantly, Iran and the United States were unable\nto reconcile their differences over the US designation of the Islamic\nRevolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a foreign terrorist organization. Moreover,\nthe main regional allies of the U.S., especially Israel has been in the\nforefront of efforts to uncover and prevent a potential Iranian nuclear weapon\nfor more than a decade. It was one of the most vociferous opponents of the\nnuclear negotiations with Iran that culminated in July 2015 in a final\nagreement. In this new round, Israel has kept its oppositional stance. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite all these tensions, the final text of\nthe nuclear deal has been exchanged, and the final decision is still pending. This\npaper attempts to elucidates the possible implications of this final decision,\neither positive or negative, on the relations between Turkey and the U.S., as\nwell as on the Middle East. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Turkey and the US of the Nuclear Deal<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons\nand aggravating instability in the Middle East have been decades-long U.S.\npriorities. The normative interest is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear\nweapons, which would increase the number of states with the capability to\nthreaten the United States and its allies. The security interest is to protect\nagainst an Iranian nuclear weapon, which could be used directly against the\nUnited States or its allies, or could fall into the hands of terrorists. The\nstrategic interest is to prevent Iran from becoming a regional hegemon, which\nwould give it dominance over the oil-rich Persian Gulf and allow it to project\nits power and influence throughout the Middle East.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The U.S. has pursued all three of these\ninterests in its diplomacy with Iran. The normative interest has been pursued\nthrough international organizations like the International Atomic Energy Agency\n(IAEA), which is responsible for preventing the proliferation of nuclear\nweapons. The security interest has been pursued through bilateral negotiations\nand, more recently, through sanctions. The strategic interest has been pursued\nthrough diplomacy with Iran’s neighbors, particularly Saudi Arabia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The different approaches to these three\ninterests have led to controversial outcomes. The normative interest has been\nlargely successful during the Obama Administration as the IAEA has been able to\nprevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. The security interest has been\nless successful, as Iran has accelerated its nuclear program despite\ninternational pressure under the Trump Administration. The strategic interest\nhas also been less successful, as Iran has increasingly asserted its influence\nin the region despite American efforts to contain it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Turkey’s position on the nuclear issue, on\nthe other hand, is shaped at the intersection of its own interests and its\nrelationships with the United States and Iran. Turkey is a close ally of the\nUnited States and a member of NATO, and albeit the tensions it also maintains\nworking relations with Iran. While Turkey agrees with the United States that\nIran should not obtain nuclear weapons, it urged Washington to exempt it from\ncertain sanctions, notably those related to oil purchases.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Turkey’s interests include preventing the\nproliferation of nuclear weapons, protecting against an Iranian nuclear weapon,\nand ensuring regional stability. Turkey has consistently advocated for a world\nfree of nuclear weapons and has signed and ratified all major international\ntreaties related to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. In addition,\nTurkey is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. So, the normative\ninterest of Turkey is to support the international nuclear non-proliferation\nregime and to contribute to global efforts for disarmament. For Turkey, a world\nfree of nuclear weapons would make it easier to address other security\nchallenges and reduce the risks of nuclear proliferation. The security interest\nof Turkey, is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to its immediate\nneighborhood. This is directly related to Turkey’s membership in NATO, as any\nproliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East would increase the security\nrisks to Turkey. The strategic interest of Turkey is to maintain good relations\nwith both the United States and Iran. This is important for Turkey because it\nwants to be seen as a regional power and a key player in the Middle East.\nTurkey has tried to pursue all of these interests at the same time, but this\nhas not always been easy. For example, Turkey was one of the few countries that\nvoted against sanctions against Iran at the United Nations Security Council in\n2006. This was because Turkey saw the sanctions as counterproductive and\nbelieved that they would only make it harder to find a diplomatic solution to\nthe Iranian nuclear issue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The relationship between the two nations is\ncomplicated and marked by both times of friction and collaboration. Maintaining\na “tight line” between fierce opposition and friendly ties has\ndefined Turkey and Iran’s diplomatic culture.[7]<\/a> Both\nnations have a vested interest in developments in neighboring states,\nparticularly Iraq and Syria. Thus, it is not surprising that they often attempt\nto expand commerce, address security concerns, and strike a balance between\ntheir respective objectives yet, both nations are often rivals in Central Asia\nand the Middle East, and they regard each other’s efforts and engagement with\nintense distrust.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The proximity of the two countries heightens\nthe stakes of a potential battle between the two countries. A comparable instability in Iran to that\nwhich Turkey has seen in Iraq and Syria would undoubtedly lead to an increase\nin migration, the threat of terrorism, and many security and economic worries\nfor Turkey. Therefore, for Turkey, stability in Iran is of significance\nimportance rather than impending collapse. Thus, Turkey has always opposed\nmilitary intervention in Iran over the nuclear issue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A nuclear-armed Iran not only offers\nstrategic problems to Turkey in terms of the power balance between the two\nnations in the Middle East, but also places Turkey in a precarious position if\nIran’s nuclear aspirations precipitate a war between Iran and other major\ncountries. Such a conflict on Turkey’s borders would have significant\nrepercussions, ranging from the Kurdish issue, refugee influxes to nuclear\ncatastrophes. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Iran would develop the nuclear arms it would\nlead the arm race in the region, it is highly likely that other countries in\nthe region would seek to develop their own nuclear weapons capability in order\nto maintain a balance of power. This would lead to an increase in regional\ntensions and could potentially trigger a new arms race. If the deal fails to be\nsigned, it would further isolate Iran from the international community and\ncould lead to increased internal instability within Iran. This would have a\nknock-on effect on stability in Turkey and the region as a whole. Turkey stands\nto lose from the imposition of more sanctions on Iran and stands to gain from\ntheir withdrawal. Turkey has little option but to participate in trade with\nIran; it shares a border with the country, purchases natural gas from it, and\nhas its sights set on a big market with so many potentials to exploit, should\nthe conditions allow. Furthermore, rising isolation of Iran paved the way for a\nmore aggressive Iranian foreign policy which would leave Turkey and Iran at further\ndivergence as regards their approach to the Middle East.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Iranian issue will keep the Turkish foreign\npolicy from striking a good balance between domestic and international\nconcerns. Turkey and Iran have coexisted in the region despite the cohabitation\nof cooperation and competition between the two countries. Turkey has\nstrengthened its ties with Iran for energy and security reasons, and it has\nstood by Iran despite harsh international condemnation, especially with its\nstance on Iran’s nuclear program. If the nuclear deal with Iran is not signed\nand the U.S. adopts a tougher policy against Iran, this will leave Turkey in a\ndifficult situation for converging its policies toward Iran with the U.S. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, the successful conclusion of the\ndeal is not risk free for the U.S.-Turkey relations. This risk resembles the\nconcerns that other allies of the US in the Middle East have. As Mark Lynch\npoints out, the risk of realignment of American foreign policy in favor of Iran\nin the region is particularly concerning for Israel and the Saudi Arabia.[8]<\/a> The U.S.\nhas made significant efforts to \u201creassure\u201d these countries on issues ranging\nfrom the war in Yemen to arms sales in order to keep them on board for the\nhigher priority Iran deal. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

As a matter of fact, the visit of Biden to\nthe to Israel, the West Bank, and Saudi Arabia in the mid- July 2022 can be\nread as an act of re-assurance on the part of the US.[9]<\/a> With\nthis tour, the Biden Administration intended to reassure its traditional friends\nthat the United States is committed to regional challenges, particularly the\nnuclear issue. The Jerusalem Declaration of July 2022, signed by President\nBiden and Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid, states that the United States will\ndeploy “all instruments of national strength” to prevent Iran from\nacquiring nuclear weapons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This worry also applies to Turkey. Given the\nfact that, Turkey\u2019s relations with the U.S. under the Biden Administration are\nfar from what Turkey hoped for, a revival of strategic relations of Iran with\nthe West, may left Turkey in a disadvantageous position in three regards: First\nof all, Iran could be a constructive force for regional stability. Europe might\nexpand its collaboration with Iran on the anti-ISIS effort in Iraq and get more\ninvolved in the resolution of the Syrian war. \nIran’s influence may be used to reduce the war in Yemen. Secondly, Iran\nhas a strategic location at the intersection of many pipeline lines leading\nfrom Afghanistan and the southern Caucasus to Turkey, as well as various sea\nroutes leading north (Caspian Sea) and south (Persian Gulf). Therefore, Iran\ncan eventually help Europe diversify its energy supply. Finally, Iran, one of\nthe remaining large untapped rising markets in the world, has an enormous\nconsumer base of 80 million people.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Added to this\nis the political and security ties between Greece and Cyprus, and the United\nArab Emirates and Saudi Arabia that have advanced significantly in the last\nyear. There are signs of a new regional alignment taking shape, including\npolitical conferences, security pacts, and joint military drills. The\nreproachment between these countries is pointed out by the Cypriot foreign minister\nas, “The evolving web of regional cooperation is creating a new\nnarrative.”[10]<\/a>\nAccording to Guzansky and Lindenstrauss[11]<\/a>, with\nthis move, UAE and Saudi Arabia seek to build deeper connections with Brussels\nand strengthened relations with the European Union in order to offset Turkey’s\nrising assertiveness. Even if the alliance is ephemeral, it has significant\npolitical importance as it enhances Ankara’s isolation and compels it to\nreevaluate its regional strategy. Turkey and the U.S. should carefully navigate\nthis \u201cnew narrative\u201d in order to preserve a long history of alliance,\npartnership and cooperation between the two countries. Turkey may become more closer to Russia, China block and can\nbe drifted away from the Western bloc. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In addition to\nbeing highly significant for Turkey, the US, the region and the web of\nrelations, an agreement is also very important at the normative level. The\nJCPOA will be a major victory for international law. The agreement establishes\na clear legal framework for resolving disputes, and it sets a strong precedent\nfor future negotiations. It will also be a major achievement for\nmultilateralism. The agreement was reached through negotiations between Iran\nand the US with the mediation of the EU, it represents a victory for diplomatic\nengagement. The deal is a positive development for the Biden Administration as\nwell as its foreign policy and it represents a significant accomplishment for\nUS diplomacy. The agreement will help to restore America’s credibility in the\nworld, and it will increase President Biden’s leverage in dealing with other\nglobal challenges. Turkey, on the other hand, is interested in how the\nagreement may affect Iran’s regional policy.
<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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[1]<\/a> Beauchamp, Z. (2018, May 8). \u201cTrump\u2019s Withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal, explained\u201d. Vox, available at: https:\/\/www.vox.com\/world\/2018\/5\/8\/17328520\/iran-nuclear-deal-trump-withdraw<\/a>
[2]<\/a> Joobani, H. A. & Daheshvar, M. (2020).\u201d Deciphering Trump\u2019s \u201cMaximum Pressure\u201d Policy: The Enduring Challenge of Containing Iran\u201d, New Middle Eastern Studies, <\/em>Vol.10 (1).
[3]<\/a> Sadjadpour, K. (2021, March 25). \u201cHow to Win the Cold War with Iran\u201d. The Atlantic, available at: https:\/\/www.theatlantic.com\/ideas\/archive\/2021\/03\/how-win-cold-war-iran\/618388\/
Beauchamp, Z. (2018, May 8). \u201cTrump\u2019s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, explained\u201d. Vox, available at: https:\/\/www.vox.com\/world\/2018\/5\/8\/17328520\/iran-nuclear-deal-trump-withdraw
[4]<\/a> Maizland, L. (2021, January 21). \u201cBiden\u2019s First Foreign Policy Move: Reentering International Agreements\u201d, Council on Foreign Relations, available at: https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/in-brief\/bidens-first-foreign-policy-move-reentering-international-agreements
[5]<\/a> Leader\u2019s speech to President Ahmadinejad and Cabinet members, (2012, August 23). available at: http:\/\/english.khamenei.ir\/news\/1691\/Leader-s-Speech-to-President-Ahmadinejad-and-Cabinet-Members
[6]<\/a> Burns, W. J. & Sullivan, J. (2017, September 17). \u201cThe Smart Way to Get Tough with Iran\u201d, New York Times, available at: https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/2017\/09\/21\/smart-way-to-get-tough-with-iran-pub-73185
[7]<\/a> Sinkaya, B. (2019). Introduction. In Turkey-Iran Relations after the JDP. Istanbul: Institut fran\u00e7ais d\u2019\u00e9tudes anatoliennes. doi:10.4000\/books.ifeagd.3069.
[8]<\/a> Lynch, M. (2015, July14). \u201cCan the Iran deal be a new Camp David?\u201d, Washington Post, available at: https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/news\/monkey-cage\/wp\/2015\/07\/14\/can-the-iran-deal-be-a-new-camp-david\/
[9]<\/a> Vakil, S. (2022, July 19). \u201cBiden\u2019s Middle East trip shows the long game is his\u201d, Chatham House, available at: https:\/\/www.chathamhouse.org\/2022\/07\/bidens-middle-east-trip-shows-long-game-his-aim<\/a>; Ross, D. & Jeffrey J. (2022, July 27). \u201cThe True Promise of Joe Biden\u2019s Middle East Trip\u201d, Washington Institute, available at: https:\/\/www.washingtoninstitute.org\/policy-analysis\/true-promise-joe-bidens-middle-east-trip<\/a>
[10]<\/a> Guzansky, Y. & Lindenstrauss, G.  (2021) \u201cThe Gulf and the Eastern Mediterranean: Is a Gulf-Hellenic Alignment in the Making?\u201d, the Institute for National Security Studies. INSS Insight No. 1458. April 25. Available at: https:\/\/www.inss.org.il\/publication\/greece-cyprus-gulf\/
[11]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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This paper is one of the outputs of the Opportunities for Shared Security Project, conducted by the Middle East Studies program at METU, supported by by the U.S. Embassy, Ankara, Grant No: STU15019612017. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Dr. Zelal \u00d6zdemir, Middle East Technical University<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

Dr. Zelal \u00d6zdemir received her doctoral degree in Area Studies at METU. She has postgraduate degrees from School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) and London School of Economics (LSE) in International Politics and Sociology. Her research interests include the Middle East studies, identity politics, border studies and migration, civil society and social movements. She has been involved in many national and international projects (FP6, FP7, Horizon 2020). She is the PI of Horizon 2020 Project, \u2018Europe\u2019s Regional Partnership for Gender Equality in the Digital Age\u2019- \u2018EQUALS-EU\u2019. Her research interest includes the Middle Eastern Studies, critical border studies, critical geopolitics, nationalism and identity politics. She has several publications in peer-reviewed journals including Political Geography. <\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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To cite this work: <\/strong>Zelal \u00d6zdemir , \u201c The Nuclear Deal and its Ramifications for Turkey-US Relations \u201d, Panaroma Analysis<\/em>, 11 March 2023, https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/blog\/2023\/03\/11\/zo\/<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Copyright@UIKPanorama. All on-line and print rights reserved. Opinions expressed in works published by the Panorama belongs to the authors alone unless otherwise stated, and do not imply endorsement by the IRCT, Global Academy, or the Editors\/Editorial Board of Panorama.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The nuclear agreement between the United States and Iran on July 14, 2015, also formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), has been heralded as a diplomatic triumph. The agreement was reached after years of intense negotiations between the two countries, and it represented a major breakthrough in their relations. The JCPOA […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":198,"featured_media":9982,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[510,497,506,508],"tags":[656,586,591,617,650,641],"class_list":["post-11406","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-100-years-of-the-republic","category-essay","category-mena","category-turkey","tag-english","tag-middle-east","tag-nuclear-deal","tag-regional-politics","tag-turkiye","tag-united-states-us"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11406","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/198"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=11406"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11406\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/9982"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=11406"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=11406"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=11406"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}