{"id":11416,"date":"2023-01-31T15:40:10","date_gmt":"2023-01-31T15:40:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/2023\/01\/ek\/"},"modified":"2024-11-20T21:50:05","modified_gmt":"2024-11-20T18:50:05","slug":"institutions-economic-development-and-foreign-policy-an-institutional-perspective-on-turkeys-foreign-policy-h-emrah-karaoguz","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/2023\/01\/institutions-economic-development-and-foreign-policy-an-institutional-perspective-on-turkeys-foreign-policy-h-emrah-karaoguz\/","title":{"rendered":"Institutions, Economic Development and Foreign Policy: An Institutional Perspective on Turkey\u2019s Foreign Policy – H. Emrah Karao\u011fuz"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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Foreign policy experts\nseldom focus on institutions that affect a country\u2019s economic development\ndynamics when conducting foreign policy analysis, as they often think these are\nout of scope. Although many aspects of the economy related to foreign policy\nare included in the discussions, it is rare to focus on institutions that\naffect economic development at home. Similarly, economists rarely look at the\nforeign policy aspect of growth in their analysis of Turkey. Even though\nexternal factors and critical foreign policy choices are included in the scope\nof the discussions, foreign policy-making processes and the relationship\nbetween these processes and institutions that affect economic development is\nnot a subject to be focused on. However, as an increasing number of studies\nemphasize, there is a direct interaction between these two, affecting Turkey\u2019s\neconomic development process and foreign policy preferences. To put it briefly,\n\u201cdevelopmental foreign policy\u201d is essential to successful developmentalism\nunder today\u2019s circumstances.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

First, it should be\nemphasized that which institutions trigger economic development is a\ncontroversial issue. There is no consensus on the concept of \u201cinstitution\u201d\nitself. This paper defines institutions as \u201cthe rules of the game\u201d per Douglass\nNorth\u2019s definition. Institutions described in this way shape the preferences\nand behaviors of actors on the one hand, and they are shaped by them in return.\nFormal (laws, regulations, etc.) or not (norms, values, culture, etc.)\ninstitutions ensure predictability in the system. They are more than organizations.\nFor instance, in general usage, the Ministry of Industry and Technology is a\ngovernment institution. However, the concept of institution used in political\neconomy analyses also covers the rules that the Ministry of Industry and\nTechnology has contributed to the formation of, created, or affected by. For\nexample, the Technopark Law or the R&D Law are formal institutions in this\ncontext. In what ways actors\u2019 preferences and behavior are affected by how laws\nare interpreted and implemented is about informal institutions. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Different types of\nstate-led developmentalism have emerged as prominent development models under the\ncurrent global conjuncture. Although there is no consensus on definitional\nissues, concepts such as state capitalism, developmental state, and\nentrepreneurial state concentrate on different dimensions of state-led\ndevelopment. Analyses in this line of thinking usually adopt an institutionalist\nperspective. The leading institutions in this regard are related to state\nstructure and state-society relationships. Besides genuine political will, critical\ninstitutions of 21st-century developmentalism are as follows: (i) institutions\nthat ensure professionalism and meritocracy in bureaucracy, (ii) whether\ncentralized or decentralized, institutions that prioritize entrepreneurship and\ninnovation in the state-society relationship, and (iii) institutions ensuring\nthe legitimacy of policymaking and implementation processes (outcomes also) by\nthe general public. The institutionalist perspective asserts that these\ninstitutions\u2019 degree of effectiveness conditions a country\u2019s switch to high\nvalue-added production, position in global value chains, and economic\ndevelopment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What do all these issues,\nnamely domestic institutions conditioning the success of a country\u2019s economic\ndevelopment initiatives, have to do with foreign policy? What does this mean in\nthe context of Turkey\u2019s foreign policy? These two questions can be examined based\non our co-authored\narticle<\/a> with Mustafa Kutlay. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

As indicated above,\nbureaucratic structure, the functioning of the bureaucracy, and how the\nstate-society relationship is institutionalized affect the economic development\nof a country. The same holds for foreign policy\u2019s purpose, outcome, and\npolicy-making process. To exemplify in the context of Turkey\u2019s diplomatic\nnetwork in the world, it is said in the news<\/a>\npublished in November 2019: \u201cTurkish diplomacy continues to expand its network\nin the world with the goal of \u2018Strong Turkey on the Field and at the Table.\u2019 Eighty-three\nnew foreign representative offices have been opened in the last 17 years. The\nnumber of diplomatic missions, 163 in 2002, increased to 246.\u201d As frequently emphasized\nin the press<\/a>, Turkey is thus the fifth country with\nthe highest number of foreign representative offices worldwide. An important goal\nof foreign representative offices is to help increase exports and support Turkey\u2019s\neconomic development. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mevl\u00fct \u00c7avu\u015fo\u011flu, emphasized<\/a>\nthis aim of the offices with the following words: \u201cEach of our friends\n(ambassadors) has a goal. To increase Turkey\u2019s exports to the country where\nthey are located and accredited.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Increasing the number of\nforeign representative offices is a step taken in the right direction and a\nsignificant development. However, some issues need to be evaluated from an\ninstitutionalist perspective for Turkey to achieve exceptional export-led\ndevelopment success, like the \u201cAsian Tigers.\u201d For instance, how are foreign\nrepresentative offices structured to help increase exports? How long in advance\ndo the officials learn in which region or country they will work? For how long\ndo they stay on duty? Do the officials have the time to learn countries\u2019 languages\nand the nature of their institutions before their assignment to posts? To what\nextent are these issues and processes improved by getting feedback from\ndiplomats and officials? To what extent are the expectations of umbrella\norganizations representing the business world and the private sector more generally\nconsidered? To what degree are feedback mechanisms inclusive and\ninstitutionalized? These and similar questions are crucial. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

To exemplify, the\nfollowing statement that is taken from a MUSIAD\nreport<\/a> on trade diplomacy, which was published in 2018, is\nsuggestive: \u201cconsidering the literature on trade diplomacy, positive and\nnegative outcomes of implementations, and the business world\u2019s expectations, it\nis of great importance for the Turkish economy to switch to a new model based\non trade diplomacy, in which both the public and private sectors play a role.\u201d\nThe following suggestion in the same report is also related to this statement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cEntrepreneurial\nand business-oriented diplomats who cooperate with a wide variety of\ninstitutions and organizations should replace classical diplomats who perform\ntheir duties in isolation within the central bureaucracy. Even if the office\ncoordinating trade diplomacy is established by the state, the business\nrepresentatives working in this office must be more than public employees.\nThus, the business world will be able to put into practice the new ideas and\nstrategies it has developed directly through this unit. Reorganization of\nrepresentative offices abroad (responsible for economic relations) in this way\nis of critical importance.\u201d            <\/p>\n\n\n\n

These suggestions\nhighlighted in the MUSIAD report for Turkey to pursue an effective\ndevelopmental foreign policy are necessary. It is also essential that there is good\ncooperation among state organizations that focus on economic development and\nforeign relations. Having enough officials working abroad under a conducive\nbureaucratic structure is necessary. These officials should be able to follow\nboth the market conditions there (potential sectors, investment areas, etc.)\nand conditions in Turkey (investor profile, etc.). In addition, a nodal state agency\nshould ensure bureaucratic coordination and monitor the operation and\nperformance of the system with the necessary feedback mechanisms and impact\nanalysis. In brief, all institutions that affect economic development at home\nshould also work in foreign policy, which should be designed by considering the\ncountry\u2019s development goals. It is seen that these mechanisms have been\nimplemented to a large extent in the successful cases of \u201ctrading states\u201d such\nas Germany and South Korea.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

All this analysis prompts\nthe following question: According to the institutionalist perspective presented\nhere, to what extent has Turkey become a \u201cresilient\u201d trading state between 2002\nand 2010? In other words, if Turkey had been an institutionalized trading state\nlike Germany and South Korea in this period, would it have followed a more\npragmatic strategy (prioritizing economic relations) when faced with post-2010\nglobal and regional shocks (especially Arab uprisings)? On a different note, to\nwhat extent are policy-making processes related to state support for increasing\nexports in the defense industry sector, where successful initiatives are\ncurrently observed, systematic and participatory? To what extent does the\nprivate sector get state support in building and improving foreign relations? What\nroles do foreign representative offices play in this context? It is essential to\nexamine all these questions that relate economic development to foreign\n(economic) policy in detail. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

To conclude, if an\ninstitutionalist and political economy perspective is taken on the\nmulti-dimensional issue of foreign policy, it can be seen that Turkey aims to\npursue a developmental foreign policy today. This is so when neoliberal\nglobalization is weakening and more state-led and protectionist globalization\nis dominant. Nevertheless, it should be noted here that Turkey\u2019s realization of\nits envisaged developmental foreign policy will also depend on to what degree\nthe institutions mentioned above will function. Institutionalized participatory\npolicy-making processes will prevent drastic economic and foreign policy drifts\ncaused by changing internal and external conditions, strengthening the\nconsistency of long-term strategic plans. From this angle, it would be useful\nto examine the steps and initiatives taken on economic development and foreign\npolicy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

* This elaboration draws\non the following study: Karao\u011fuz, H\u00fcseyin Emrah, and Mustafa Kutlay. 2022. \u201cThe\nTies That Don\u2019t Bind: Trading State Debates and Role of State Capacity in\nTurkish Foreign Policy.\u201d Southeast\nEuropean and Black Sea Studies<\/em> 0 (0): 1\u201321, DOI:\n10.1080\/14683857.2022.2109828.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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H. Emrah Karao\u011fuz<\/strong> is an assistant professor at Kadir Has University, International Relations Department. His research is mainly on international\/comparative political economy, political economy of development, and political economy of foreign policy. His articles have appeared in\u202fThird World Quarterly<\/em>,\u202fGlobalizations, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, and Turkish Studies<\/em>\u202famong others <\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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To cite this work: <\/strong> Emrah Karao\u011fuz, \u201cInstitutions, Economic Development and Foreign Policy: An Institutional Perspective on Turkey\u2019s Foreign Policy\u201d, Panorama, Online, 31 January 2023, https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/blog\/2023\/01\/31\/ek\/ <\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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This article has been prepared with the support provided to the International Relations Council<\/a> and the Global Academy<\/a> by the Heinrich B\u00f6ll Stiftung Association Turkey Representative within the scope of the project titled ‘Foreign Policy for the 21st Century; Peaceful, Equitable, and Dynamic Turkey’.<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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Copyright@UIKPanorama. All on-line and print rights reserved. Opinions expressed in works published by the Panorama belongs to the authors alone unless otherwise stated, and do not imply endorsement by the IRCT, Global Academy, or the Editors\/Editorial Board of Panorama.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Foreign policy experts seldom focus on institutions that affect a country\u2019s economic development dynamics when conducting foreign policy analysis, as they often think these are out of scope. Although many aspects of the economy related to foreign policy are included in the discussions, it is rare to focus on institutions that affect economic development at […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":194,"featured_media":9894,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[510,486,508],"tags":[559,656,563,713,576,650],"class_list":["post-11416","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-100-years-of-the-republic","category-opinion","category-turkey","tag-economic-development","tag-english","tag-foreign-policy-and-diplomacy","tag-heinrich-boll-foundation","tag-institutional-perspective","tag-turkiye"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11416","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/194"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=11416"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11416\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/9894"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=11416"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=11416"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=11416"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}