{"id":11422,"date":"2023-01-16T13:56:36","date_gmt":"2023-01-16T13:56:36","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/2023\/01\/pb-3\/"},"modified":"2024-11-20T21:51:49","modified_gmt":"2024-11-20T18:51:49","slug":"better-arms-for-ukraine-zero-response-from-russia-pavel-k-baev","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/2023\/01\/better-arms-for-ukraine-zero-response-from-russia-pavel-k-baev\/","title":{"rendered":"Better arms for Ukraine, zero response from Russia &#8211; Pavel K. Baev"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\"><figure class=\"aligncenter size-large\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"732\" src=\"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/river-6990295_1920-1024x732.jpg\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-5655\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/river-6990295_1920-1024x732.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/river-6990295_1920-300x214.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/river-6990295_1920-768x549.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/river-6990295_1920-1536x1098.jpg 1536w, https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/river-6990295_1920-360x257.jpg 360w, https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/01\/river-6990295_1920.jpg 1920w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph\">No cease-fire can possibly\nmute artillery barrages in Donbas, but the intensity of political battles\nexceeds the intensity of this cannonade. Russian stubborn and costly attacks on\nBakhmut may yield only tactical success, but in geo-strategic terms, it is the\nshift in Western positions on supplying heavy arms to Ukraine that signifies\nthe most significant development in the war since the start of 2023. The\ninitiative came from Paris, as President Emmanuel Macron announced the decision\nto provide the AMX-10RC wheeled reconnaissance vehicle, which he described as \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.economist.com\/the-economist-explains\/2023\/01\/05\/what-is-a-tank-and-does-frances-gift-to-ukraine-fit-the-bill\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">light\ntank<\/a>\u201d. The follow-up was the coordinated\ndecision by US President Joe Biden and German Chancellor Olav Scholz to grant\nUkraine infantry fighting vehicles <a href=\"https:\/\/breakingdefense.com\/2023\/01\/biden-oks-sending-bradley-fighting-vehicles-to-ukraine\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">M2\nBradley<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/tvpworld.com\/65512508\/germany-should-send-all-operational-marder-vehicles-to-ukraine-vice-chancellor\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Marder-1<\/a>,\nrespectively. The UK is uncharacteristically absent from this initiative, but\nit is reportedly contemplating the decision on the heaviest type of weapons \u2013\nthe <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/87a94322-23a0-4734-a87a-11e7995743ed\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Challenger-2<\/a>\nmain battle tank.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The importance of these\ndecisions is not in changing the balance of forces on the battlefield, but in\naltering political judgements on the course of the war in the coming months. In\nthe trench warfare dominated by artillery, lightly armored vehicles are not\nparticularly useful, and the arrival of three different types of such tanks-lite\nis certain to create problems with supply chains and maintenance. But on the\npolitical plateau, the hard question that is hanging over every Western choice\nfor providing a new type of weapons for Ukraine is \u2013 How will Moscow respond? The\nconcern about triggering a further escalation of the destructive war has been evident\nin key Western capitals since its beginning a year ago, when the proposition\nfor enforcing a <a href=\"https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/considering-no-fly-zone-prospects-ukraine\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">no-fly-zone<\/a>\nwas debated \u2013 and rejected. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Several other\ndecisions were carefully measured and approved, and perhaps the most impactful\namong them was the US delivery of <a href=\"https:\/\/time.com\/6244479\/himars-rockets-ukraine-russia\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">M142\nHIMARS<\/a> high-precision multiple rocket launchers,\nwhich targeted the bridges across the River Dnipro and compelled the Russian\ncommand to execute the withdrawal from the Kherson region. The option that had\nbeen long-debated was the supply of <a href=\"https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/patriot-ukraine-what-does-it-mean\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">MIM-104\nPatriot<\/a> surface-to-air missile system, and\nthe escalation of Russian missile strikes on the Ukrainian energy\ninfrastructure convinced the Biden administration in the urgent need for building\nsuch defense around Kyiv. Worries about Russian responses evaporated when\nPresident Vladimir Putin declared that Russian missiles would easily \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2022\/dec\/22\/kremlin-says-us-supply-of-patriot-missiles-to-ukraine-will-not-harm-its-military-goals\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">knock\ndown<\/a>\u201d the batteries of old and ineffectual\nPatriots, so Germany had few doubts about sending <a href=\"https:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2023\/1\/5\/germany-to-send-armored-carriers-patriot-battery-to-ukraine\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">its\nown missiles<\/a> of this type to Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In fact, the upgraded\nair defense system built around the Patriot missiles can effectively intercept\nRussian cruise missiles, even of newer types, while Russia\u2019s ability to deliver\nmassive attacks will be increasingly diminished by the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.russiamatters.org\/blog\/russia-running-out-missiles-or-not\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">limited\nproduction<\/a>. The <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2023\/01\/03\/world\/europe\/ukraine-russia-drones.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">dilemma<\/a>\nof expending expensive missiles for intercepting cheap drones imported from\nIran will also go away as Ukraine deploy better-equipped teams of <a href=\"https:\/\/www.thedrive.com\/the-war-zone\/ukrainian-teams-hunt-russian-drones-with-laser-rifles-gun-trucks-apps\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">drone-hunters<\/a>,\nwhich can cover all vulnerable directions. Russian strategy of air war against\nUkraine is set to fail, and the top brass are perfectly aware of this prospect,\nbut they cannot invent any combination of effective counter-measures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Russia\u2019s inability\nto produce punishing responses to accumulating military and political setbacks\nwas exposed in the early December, when Ukraine delivered <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2022\/dec\/05\/details-of-the-two-russian-military-airbases-hit-by-explosions\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">long-distance\nstrikes<\/a> on two airbases (Dyagilevo and\nEngels), which hosted long-range bombers. The noisy gang of military-patriotic\nbloggers demanded a devastating retaliation for this <a href=\"https:\/\/meduza.io\/en\/feature\/2022\/12\/07\/hundreds-of-miles-past-the-border\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">first-ever\nattack<\/a> on Russia\u2019s strategic assets, but\nnothing of any import ensued, so Engels was <a href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/russia-ukraine-war-vladimir-putin-drone-attack-hits-russias-engels-airbase-for-second-time-in-a-month\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">hit\nthe second time<\/a> in late December. Unsurprisingly,\nafter much messaging regarding the consequences of the deployment of Patriot\nmissiles, Moscow opted to shrug the matter off, and the in the similar way, the\ndecision on delivering Marder IFVs and other light armor is ignored. Russian\nleadership tried to make a big show out of sending the Admiral Gorshkov frigate\narmed with new <a href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/russia-ukraine-war-vladimir-putin-drone-attack-hits-russias-engels-airbase-for-second-time-in-a-month\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Tsirkon<\/a>\nhypersonic missiles, but even the <a href=\"https:\/\/svpressa.ru\/war21\/article\/357888\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">jingoist commentators<\/a>\nare skeptical about this cruise.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-drop-cap wp-block-paragraph\">This pattern of feeble\nreaction is increasingly embarrassing for Moscow because every new step forward\nin providing arms for Ukraine is typically accompanied by loud debates in\nBerlin, Paris or Washington DC. It is in fact, much easier for the Kremlin to ignore\nthe expanding military cooperation between Ukraine and Turkey, which started\nwith the now-famous <a href=\"https:\/\/www.dailysabah.com\/business\/defense\/turkish-made-drones-playing-huge-role-in-ukraine-says-senior-nato-official\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">TB2\nBayraktar<\/a> drones and now includes even <a href=\"https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2023\/01\/10\/turkey-cold-war-cluster-bombs-ukraine\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">cluster\nartillery munitions<\/a>, because Ankara as well\nas Kyiv are careful not to advertise it with great fanfare. The pressure to do\nsomething is building up in Moscow, and the attempt to fake a response, as the\nDefense Ministry attempted with the alleged missile hit on <a href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/russian-claims-of-revenge-attack-on-ukraine-kramatorsk-debunked-war\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Kramatorsk<\/a>\nafter the Ukrainian devastating strike on <a href=\"https:\/\/www.themoscowtimes.com\/2023\/01\/04\/death-toll-from-ukrainian-strike-on-makiivka-rises-to-89-a79870\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Makiivka<\/a>\nonly make the matters worse.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The next decision\ncurrently in the making in the Western coalition is about arming the Ukrainian\nforces with <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2023\/jan\/10\/german-foreign-ministers-kharkiv-visit-gives-hope-of-tank-supply\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Leopard\n2<\/a> main battle tanks, and Moscow most\nprobably will opt again for pretending that its advanced anti-tank weapon\nsystems would easily neutralize this threat. The big difference with this\nprospect is that several hundred of these tanks \u2013 rather than a few dozen of\nIFVs \u2013 could be delivered. This new capability will not only deny Russia any\nchance for launching a new offensive in the spring but would also grant Ukraine\na serios opportunity for executing a new breakthrough, perhaps in the direction\nof Melitopol, that might amount to a decisive turn in the course of the war.\nThe success of such operation would depend upon the one after next decision in\nWashington DC \u2013 on supplying Ukraine with the <a href=\"https:\/\/euromaidanpress.com\/2023\/01\/09\/russians-have-adapted-to-himars-what-are-ukraines-alternatives\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">MGM-140\nATACMS<\/a> missiles that could hit Russian\nlogistical hubs and command centers to the depth of 300 km. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Russian forces\nhave no defense against such strikes and no similar capabilities, and the only way\nit could respond is to begin preparations \u2013 rather than usual empty threats \u2013\nfor using non-strategic nuclear weapons. This would signify a long and risky\nleap on the proverbial ladder of escalation, and the combination of Western\ndeterrence and Chinese dissuasion can effectively discourage President Putin\nfrom such irresponsible strategic acrobatics. &nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-media-text alignwide\" style=\"grid-template-columns:15% auto\"><figure class=\"wp-block-media-text__media\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"227\" height=\"231\" src=\"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/03\/Pavel-Baev-copy.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-1591\"\/><\/figure><div class=\"wp-block-media-text__content\">\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Pavel K. Baev, Dr., Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO)<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Dr. Pavel K. Baev&nbsp;is a Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). He is also Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the Center for the U.S. and Europe at the Brookings Institution (Washington D.C.), Senior Associate Researcher at the&nbsp;Institut Fran\u00e7ais des Relations Internationales(IFRI, Paris), and Senior Associate Research Fellow at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI, Milan). His research interests include the transformation of the Russian military, the energy and security dimensions of the Russian-European relations, Russia\u2019s Arctic policy, Russia-China partnership, post-Soviet conflict management in the Caucasus and the Caspian Basin, and Russia\u2019s Middle East policy, which is supported by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. He writes a weekly column in&nbsp;<em><a href=\"http:\/\/www.jamestown.org\/programs\/edm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Eurasia Daily Monitor<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>To cite this work:<\/strong> Pavel K. Baev, Better arms for Ukraine, zero response from Russia, for good\u201d, <em>Panorama<\/em>, Online, 16 January 2023, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/blog\/2022\/12\/16\/pb\">https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/blog\/202\/12\/16\/pb-2\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">  Copyright@<em>UIKPanorama.<\/em> All on-line and print rights reserved. Opinions expressed in works published by the <em>Panorama<\/em>  belongs to the authors alone unless otherwise stated, and do not imply  endorsement by the IRCT, Global Academy, or the Editors\/Editorial Board  of Panorama. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>No cease-fire can possibly mute artillery barrages in Donbas, but the intensity of political battles exceeds the intensity of this cannonade. Russian stubborn and costly attacks on Bakhmut may yield only tactical success, but in geo-strategic terms, it is the shift in Western positions on supplying heavy arms to Ukraine that signifies the most significant [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":21,"featured_media":9867,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[512,486,507],"tags":[656,760,621,644],"class_list":["post-11422","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-crisis-in-ukraine","category-opinion","category-russia","tag-english","tag-putin-en","tag-russia","tag-ukraine"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11422","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/21"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=11422"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11422\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/9867"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=11422"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=11422"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=11422"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}