{"id":11443,"date":"2022-12-23T09:38:10","date_gmt":"2022-12-23T09:38:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/2022\/12\/turkiye-and-the-changing-world-order-mehmet-ali-tugtan\/"},"modified":"2024-11-20T21:56:59","modified_gmt":"2024-11-20T18:56:59","slug":"turkiye-and-the-changing-world-order-mehmet-ali-tugtan","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/2022\/12\/turkiye-and-the-changing-world-order-mehmet-ali-tugtan\/","title":{"rendered":"T\u00fcrkiye and the Changing World Order – Mehmet Ali Tu\u011ftan"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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To discuss T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s place in the changing world\norder, one should clarify the term \u2018world order.\u2019 We call the body of\ninstitutions and rules devised by the victors of the Second World War and have\nbeen evolving since as the \u2018World Order\u2019. This order rests on three pillars:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

i)\nThe distribution of capabilities in the neo-realist sense (Or the structure of\nthe international system);<\/p>\n\n\n\n

ii)\nThe architecture of international institutions formed around the United Nations\n(UN); and<\/p>\n\n\n\n

iii)\nThe international political economy structure formed around Bretton Woods\ninstitutions and rules.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The momentous developments witnessed in the ongoing\nRussia-Ukraine War show that this structure has completed its useful lifespan\nand is bound for change. Since an inquiry into the reasons and historical\nprocess of this change would require a narrative too lengthy for the scope of\nthis article, here the existence of change will be treated as given, and the\nestimated trajectory of change in the international order and T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s place\nin this process will be discussed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As a background for this discussion, one should note\nthe following:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The early post-Cold War era was a period when the\nunipolar hegemony of the US emerged and dominated the other great powers in\nterms of capability distribution. In this period, the US and its allies could institute\nand implement the rules-based international system, resting on the three pillars\nmentioned above, without much resistance. As a result, the military\ninterventions from the Gulf War to Bosnia were implemented with the legitimacy\nprovided by the UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, and the Bretton Woods\ninstitutions embraced neoliberal globalization in the world economy within the\nframework of the Washington Consensus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, this US hegemony over the international\nsystem plunged into crisis with the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the US\ninvasion of Iraq in 2003. The mishandling of Afghanistan and Iraq occupations\nunder the banner of the \u201cInternational War on Terror\u201d has seriously reduced the\nability of the United States to extend its political and economic model to the\nrest of the world through voluntary adoption. The reputation of the US as a\nbenign hegemon, which had been the most critical feature of the unipolar moment\nof the 1990s, has been largely tarnished by developments after 2001. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Further, the 2008 financial crisis that accompanied\nthis hegemonic crisis and the Great Recession it triggered reduced the ability\nof the US and its allies to impose governance over the world economy and\nclearly showed the harmful consequences of neoliberal deregulation, which\nconstituted the basic infrastructure of globalization.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another contribution of the Great Recession to the\ndeepening crisis of hegemony was the defense spending cuts necessitated by\ngovernment interventions to alleviate the recession. Because of this, the US\nsignificantly reduced the number of its troops and the scope of its military\noperations in the Middle East, especially in Iraq, where it owed its ongoing\ninfluence primarily to its permanent military presence and the military and\neconomic support it provided to its local allies. As a result, during the Arab\nSpring, the US consented to overthrow pro-American autocratic regimes through\nthe widespread opposition movements, which were more critical of the US rather\nthan propping them up. The US also declared that she would be willing to work\nwith the governments formed by these popular movements if they abide by specific\ncriteria. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In parallel, where popular forces failed to overthrow\nanti-American autocratic regimes, the US and its allies shied from converting\ntheir military capabilities into power to support the overthrow of these\nregimes -even though from Libya to Syria, they increasingly faced the direct\ninterventions of the Sino-Russian Axis and its local allies. This\ncounterbalancing trend started in 2007 and was not limited to the Middle East:\nfrom Eastern Europe to Southeast Asia, the Sino-Russian axis (i.e., the \u201cEurasian\nBloc\u201d) and its local allies engaged in balancing acts against the US-Europe\naxis (the \u201cTrans-Atlantic bloc\u201d) and its regional allies. This new situation,\nin which the relative power differences between the US and other great powers have\ndecreased in the international system, is conceptualized by experts as \u201cloose\nmultipolarity\u201d or \u201cCold War 2.0\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

We can talk about three basic characteristics of\nT\u00fcrkiye that determine its position in this changing international environment:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

i)\nT\u00fcrkiye is a middle power in the neorealist sense, occupying a critical\ngeostrategic location at the intersection of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East;<\/p>\n\n\n\n

ii)\nT\u00fcrkiye is a country that has had unique relations with Russia since the\nestablishment of the republic; and<\/p>\n\n\n\n

iii)\nT\u00fcrkiye is a NATO member and a candidate state with a customs union with the EU\nand has engaged in institutional military and political partnership with the US\nand the EU for more than 70 years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These three characteristics pose many risks and\nopportunities for T\u00fcrkiye in the current international conjecture. To\nelaborate:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As a middle power with high geostrategic rent, T\u00fcrkiye\nhas found an expanding room for maneuvering in this loose multipolar\nenvironment during the last 20 years. T\u00fcrkiye has cooperated with Russia, especially\nafter 2016, to benefit from this room of maneuver and gain more regional\nautonomy in its relations with the US and the EU. But as it jockeyed for a\nbetter position between the rival Trans-Atlantic and Eurasian blocs, T\u00fcrkiye\nhas also been mindful of its institutional belonging and fundamental\ncommitments to the Trans-Atlantic bloc, the source of its primary collective\ndefense guarantees. Thus, T\u00fcrkiye has actively participated in local power\nstruggles in vast geography from Syria to Libya, from Azerbaijan to Somalia, in\nline with its interests, increasing its effectiveness in the Middle East, the\nMediterranean, the Balkans, and the Caucasus. In this process, T\u00fcrkiye\ndeveloped intricate relations with the great powers and their local allies\ninvolved in the same struggles and managed not to engage in direct conflict\nwith any great power -despite occasional close calls, to which the crisis after\nthe downing of a Russian warplane on the Syrian border in 2015 was the most\nprobable example. Still, the conflict was avoided there as well. On the other\nhand, the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War constitutes the zenith of this middle\npower politics regarding the risks and opportunities it poses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Russia-Ukraine War is important for T\u00fcrkiye for\ntwo reasons: first, among the crises so far, this war is the biggest challenge\nT\u00fcrkiye has faced in maintaining its ongoing special relationship with Russia\nin tandem with its membership in the Western bloc. Secondly, this war marks the\nmoment of disintegration of the post-World War II world order that has been in\ntrouble since 2003. Aware that this order can no longer be restored, T\u00fcrkiye\nshould nevertheless act in a way that preserves its institutional gains (such\nas collective defense guarantees) arising from this order, especially in the\nshort and medium term. In this context, the noticeable positive results of T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s\nmaintenance of open communication channels with Russia have been visible since\nthe first days of the war. On the other hand, T\u00fcrkiye should continue to approach\nthe Russia-Ukraine War without deviating from the general policy line of NATO\nsince its collective defense guarantees, by and large, arise from its\ninstitutional membership in the Western alliance. These guarantees would be\nmore critical against hot regional conflicts increasing in number and intensity\nas the world order continues to dissolve.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s current line can be pursued so long as the\nRussia-Ukraine war retains its present local and conventional character.\nHowever, in the event of escalation (either by the involvement of NATO allies\nor an escalation to the nuclear phase), T\u00fcrkiye will\/should make its choices in\nline with its Western bloc identity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This brings us to the last point: T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s\nhistorical, deep-rooted, and institutional relations with the US and the EU.\nThe first question that needs to be answered in the medium term is the\ndirection of T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s domestic political preferences: rather than being a\ntransactional partner, if T\u00fcrkiye wants to be an ally in the Western bloc\nwithin the framework of shared political values (as was the case during the\nCold War), then compliance with the internationally accepted rules of\ndemocracy, pluralism and market economy are the prerequisites for such an\nalliance. Another condition is the willingness to resolve bilateral disputes\nthrough international law and within the institutional frameworks of the\nWestern bloc. Of course, this does not mean that T\u00fcrkiye should ignore its\ncultural values and national interests. Still, it would be increasingly\ndifficult for a country whose general orientation points to Shanghai rather\nthan Brussels to stay in the Western bloc.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The second important question that needs to be\nanswered is whether T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s bloc membership will be handled with the\nimportance it deserves by its Western counterparts. Because ultimately, an alliance\nis only possible between two willing and able parties. Suppose the US and EU\nexclude T\u00fcrkiye (whose critical importance for them in more than one region due\nto its geostrategic location and capabilities is obvious) from the\ninstitutional processes and guarantees of the Western bloc out of domestic\npolitical considerations. In that case, T\u00fcrkiye will have to find its place in\na new world order yet to be established. In this framework, a significant part\nof the choices that will determine T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s place in the \u2018new\u2019 world order, in\nthe long run, will be made by T\u00fcrkiye and the West.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As we approach the 100th anniversary of the republic,\nT\u00fcrkiye is at a turning point in a turbulent international environment. For\nmiddle powers like T\u00fcrkiye, such turning points involve great opportunities and\nrisks. Suppose both T\u00fcrkiye and its interlocutors make prudent choices. In that\ncase, T\u00fcrkiye can quickly achieve a politically pluralistic and democratic\nstructure and grow sustainably economically by transcending the middle-income\ntrap and inefficiency. Otherwise, a picture may emerge for T\u00fcrkiye in which\npolitics is increasingly arbitrary and authoritarian, and the economy suffers\nfrom ever-increasing inefficiency and income inequality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Dr. Mehmet Ali Tu\u011ftan, \u0130stanbul\nBilgi University<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dr.\nFaculty Member Mehmet Ali Tu\u011ftan has been a faculty member at the Department of\nInternational Relations at Istanbul Bilgi University since 2008. He received\nhis PhD degree from Bo\u011fazi\u00e7i University Political Science program in 2008. His\nareas of expertise are Turkish-American Relations, Current World Policy and\nSecurity Studies.<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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To cite this work: <\/strong> Mehmet Ali Tu\u011ftan, ” T\u00fcrkiye and the Changing World Order\u201d, Panorama, Online, 23 December 2022, https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/blog\/2022\/12\/23\/mat\/<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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This article has been prepared with the support provided to the International Relations Council<\/a> and the Global Academy<\/a> by the Heinrich B\u00f6ll Stiftung Association Turkey Representative within the scope of the project titled ‘Foreign Policy for the 21st Century; Peaceful, Equitable, and Dynamic Turkey’.<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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Copyright@UIKPanorama. All on-line and print rights reserved. Opinions expressed in works published by the Panorama belongs to the authors alone unless otherwise stated, and do not imply endorsement by the IRCT, Global Academy, or the Editors\/Editorial Board of Panorama.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

To discuss T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s place in the changing world order, one should clarify the term \u2018world order.\u2019 We call the body of institutions and rules devised by the victors of the Second World War and have been evolving since as the \u2018World Order\u2019. This order rests on three pillars: i) The distribution of capabilities in the […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":9333,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[510,486,508],"tags":[656,563,566,713,650,689],"class_list":["post-11443","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-100-years-of-the-republic","category-opinion","category-turkey","tag-english","tag-foreign-policy-and-diplomacy","tag-geo-economic-challenges","tag-heinrich-boll-foundation","tag-turkiye","tag-world-order"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11443","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=11443"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11443\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/9333"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=11443"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=11443"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=11443"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}