{"id":11455,"date":"2022-12-17T11:02:45","date_gmt":"2022-12-17T11:02:45","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/2022\/12\/mc-2\/"},"modified":"2024-11-20T21:59:13","modified_gmt":"2024-11-20T18:59:13","slug":"energy-and-the-potential-for-cooperation-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-mitat-celikpala","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/2022\/12\/energy-and-the-potential-for-cooperation-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-mitat-celikpala\/","title":{"rendered":"Energy and the Potential for Cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean – Mitat \u00c7elikpala"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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The sanctions imposed by Western actors\nin response to Russia’s annexation and occupation of part of Ukrainian territory\nhave moved up energy security in the global agenda. The general expectation\nafter the referendums aimed at legitimizing the annexation of eastern Ukraine\ninto Russia is that the tension will last long and include the possibility of nuclear war. This situation, combined\nwith using the energy card as a weapon by Russia, Europe’s largest energy\nsupplier, has brought the topics of returning to alternative energy sources and\nenergy diversification into the debate again. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

While European actors prioritize accelerating the\ntransition to renewable energy sources, turning to alternative energy\/natural\ngas sources is also one of the goals. In this context, the supply of more\nliquefied natural gas (LNG) from providers such as the US and Norway, bringing\nCaspian and Central Asian gas to the agenda, and the tightening of relations\nwith North African partners such as Libya and Algeria were the first\nalternatives that came to mind. Data from the International Energy Agency<\/a> indicates that Europe’s LNG imports will increase by 60 billion cubic\nmeters this year. Another possible source that draws attention to this equation\nand closely concerns Turkey is the Eastern Mediterranean.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Does Eastern Mediterranean Gas Flow to the European Market?<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

With the agreement signed between the\nEU, Egypt, and Israel on 17 June 2022, it was<\/a> agreed to deliver\nEgyptian and Israeli gas to the European market as LNG through Egypt. This agreement also envisaged renewable energy, the\nuse of hydrogen, increasing energy efficiency, and developing electricity\nnetworks throughout the Mediterranean. The deal means<\/a> a new and different dimension after the\nEU and the US withdrew their support in 2021 from constructing the Eastern\nMediterranean Pipeline, considered the region’s most strategic project, due to\ntechnical and commercial limitations. While this\nstep opens up a new perspective on Europe’s energy security, the fact that it\nis moving away from Ankara’s energy, foreign, and security discourses and\npolicies is also apparent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The story began in the mid-2000s with\nthe discovery of natural gas deposits in the Eastern Mediterranean. Ankara\nconsidered it a development compatible with common interests that would\ninitially serve Turkey and Europe’s energy security and diversity. It was\nthought that the transportation of Eastern Mediterranean resources through\nTurkey to the European markets would contribute to meeting Turkey’s needs and\nturn Turkey into a kind of regional energy hub. This line, alongside supporting\nNorthern Iraqi and Azerbaijani resources, was significant for ensuring\ndiversity. However, it was rapidly reversed due to the developments in Syria\nunder the influence of the deterioration in Turkish-Israeli relations and the\ngeneral tension created by the Arab uprisings in the region. While the cold\nweather in Ankara’s relations with the EU and the US has turned Turkey’s EU\nadventure in the opposite direction, the increasing tension with Greece and the\nlack of a solution to the Cyprus problem have turned the Eastern Mediterranean\nfrom an issue of regional cooperation for Ankara into a clear competition\narena.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) agreements\nwere signed between the relevant countries after the discovery of Egypt of the 850 billion cubic meters of Zohr deposits in 2015 -added to the already\nfound deposits off the coast of Cyprus and Israel- leaving Ankara out. This development moved the issue into the area of\nsharing maritime jurisdiction. Moreover, initiatives such as the Eastern\nMediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), which marginalized Ankara by excluding it, also\nbrought the competition to the strategic level. This initiative was created in\nJanuary 2019 with the participation of Greece, the Greek Cypriot\nAdministration, Israel, Italy, Jordan, and Palestine, hosted by Egypt. The\nForum was an essential step in the context of regional actors such as Israel,\nJordan, and even Palestine, which had not previously established relations with\nthe Greek Cypriot Administration by considering their relations with Turkey,\nthus opening new channels of cooperation without Turkey, even despite Turkey. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The concrete results of the\ncollaboration within the framework of the Forum, which took place without\nTurkey, began to emerge in approximately three years. The momentum created by\nthis step, which can also be seen as the depth of the isolation of Turkey, led\nto the establishment of military and security cooperation platforms between the\ncountries mentioned above. This became the latest stage of a process in which\nTurkey is isolated and regional balances are shaped contrary to Turkey’s\nexpectations with the developments in the Middle East, mainly focused on Syria.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While Egypt’s transformation into a net\nnatural gas exporter since 2018 and the start of supplying gas to Israel will\nshift the focus in the Eastern Mediterranean equation to Cairo. The Eastern\nMediterranean gas will probably enter the European market as LNG through Egypt\nfrom the winter of 2022. Meanwhile, the biggest customer of Egyptian LNG from\nthe last quarter of 2021 was Ankara<\/a>. This alone is enough to\nfundamentally question Ankara’s Eastern\nMediterranean-oriented energy and\nsecurity policies of the previous ten years, which\naimed to become an energy hub in its region. The possibility of Eastern\nMediterranean gas flowing into international markets as a result of new\nagreements, leaving out Turkey, the most significant consumer and importer in\nthe region, will mean that one of the\nessential pillars of the policy of becoming a regional energy hub will be lost.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Understanding Ankara’s Agenda<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ankara has used different means of\nforeign policy, including military dimension and escalation, to overcome the\nregional exclusion it faced during this period. First, it increased its\nvisibility in Libya and signed maritime jurisdiction delimitation and\ncooperation agreements with that country. Despite the reactions of Greece and\nFrance, joint oil and gas exploration activities have been undertaken off the\ncoast of Libya. Finally, a memorandum of understanding\nwas signed on 3 October 2022, stipulating cooperation between the countries in\npetroleum energy and hydrocarbons. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the same period, Turkey’s\ninfrastructure was developed in the Mediterranean to enable energy exploration\nby scanning and mapping marine areas. As of 2017,\nfour drilling vessels named Fatih, Yavuz, Kanuni, and Abd\u00fclhamid Han have been\nadded to the seismic research vessels called Barbaros Hayreddin Pa\u015fa and MTA Oru\u00e7 Reis, which were introduced into the system in 2012 and\n2017. Thus, an exploration and\ndrilling fleet has been created. Following this, intensive seismic dredging\nand drilling activity was undertaken<\/a> in the maritime areas of Turkey in the Black Sea and\nthe Mediterranean.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This mobility, which we can consider\nTurkey’s attempt to change the balance and open a new area for itself in the\ngame, has clarified itself with the approach of exercising legal rights in the\nsea areas defined as Blue Homeland (Mavi\nVatan<\/em>) since 2006. In response to the Eastern Mediterranean Energy Forum\nand other military cooperation initiatives that exclude Turkey, Turkey’s letter<\/a> to the UN on 18 March 2019, which\ndefined the borders of its maritime areas as the country with the longest\ncoastal line in the Eastern Mediterranean, and made it clear that it would\nprotect this with the naval forces it sent to the region, was evaluated as\npreferring coercive diplomacy in the Mediterranean balances<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite all these steps, the process has\nnot progressed in line with Ankara’s expectations. Its exclusion from regional\nstructures such as the Energy Forum continues, and it has not been able to\nconvince its regional\/global interlocutors about the legitimacy of the approach\nit follows. In this environment, steps are being taken to open a new page in\nforeign policy. It is unclear whether these steps will meet expectations or\nproduce results. Although the stage of mutually appointing an ambassador\nto Israel has been reached, concrete gains have not yet been achieved in other\nareas. Relations with Egypt are uncertain. While\nthe tension with Greece extended to the Aegean with an atmosphere of elections\non both sides, the US signed additional agreements with Greece to increase its\nmilitary activity in this country and lifted the arms embargo that has been\nactive since 1987 against the Greek Cypriot\nAdministration. While these caused\nsignificant discomfort in Ankara, they also indicate that Turkey’s isolation in the region is not decreasing\nbut, on the contrary, increasing. Turkey’s continued tensions with the EU and\nsome member states also presage a situation that increases despair.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Is a Return to Collaborative Relationships Possible?<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is possible to say that the Eastern Mediterranean\nis no longer a problem that concerns only the Mediterranean region but has\nturned into a ‘new’ area of global competition that draws in the US and the EU.\nIn this context, Turkey is seen as an uncompromising and coercive actor, while\nit continues to be an influential game-changer. This role needs to be\ntransformed into a constructive actor to get quick results. Otherwise, Turkey’s\nregional exclusion will become increasingly standardized and settled. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite all kinds of contradictions, the\npriority should be to re-promote cooperation by creating areas of common\ninterest between Ankara and other regional actors through negotiations. In the\ncurrent circumstances, this is the sole remedy. Beyond the tension Turkey is experiencing with the regional countries over\nthe sharing of maritime areas, the economic and trade relations it has\nestablished\/will establish, especially in the region, can turn the process from\ncompetition to cooperation. Discourses and policies emphasizing common\ninterests regarding energy needs and diversification may also address regional\nrelations constructively.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Considering that the tension with Russia in the north\ncannot be resolved in the short term and tensions continue to exist between the\nallies in different areas, the meaninglessness of spending energy on the\ncompetition can be explained more understandably. In this context, the EU and\nthe US, too, must adopt an attitude that prioritizes cooperation rather than\nencouraging tensions between Ankara and Athens. It is a must for regional\nstability and security that they move away from the appearance of provoking\nTurkey and taking a side against Ankara, which should encourage the parties to\nfind a solution through negotiations, avoiding conflict. Without this, the\nresults of Turkey’s unilateral efforts will be limited.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Mitat \u00c7elikpala, Prof. Dr., Kadir Has University<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Prof. Dr. Mitat \u00c7elikpala is a faculty member at Kadir Has University, Department of International Relations. \u00c7elikpala’s areas of work include the former Soviet geography and the Caucasus, diaspora studies, the Black Sea Region and its security, Turkish-Russian relations, energy security, critical infrastructure security and the fight against terrorism. He completed his undergraduate education at METU, his master’s degree at Hacettepe, and his doctoral study at Bilkent University. Oxford University St. A Senior Associate Member at Antony’s College and a member of the EDAM Board of Directors, \u00c7elikpala is an academic advisor at NATO Anti-Terrorism Center of Excellence, Turkish Armed Forces Strategic Research Center (SAREM), Ministry of Foreign Affairs Strategic Research Center, as well as various international institutions, think tanks and companies. \u00c7elikpala has articles and reviews published   in academic journals and current media on the above-mentioned issues <\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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To cite this work: <\/strong> Mitat \u00c7elikpala, \u201c”Energy and the Potential for Cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean\u201d, Panorama, Online, 17 December 2022, https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/blog\/2022\/12\/17\/mc\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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This article has been prepared with the support provided to the International Relations Council<\/a> and the Global Academy<\/a> by the Heinrich B\u00f6ll Stiftung Association Turkey Representative within the scope of the project titled ‘Foreign Policy for the 21st Century; Peaceful, Equitable, and Dynamic Turkey’.<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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Copyright@UIKPanorama. All on-line and print rights reserved. Opinions expressed in works published by the Panorama belongs to the authors alone unless otherwise stated, and do not imply endorsement by the IRCT, Global Academy, or the Editors\/Editorial Board of Panorama.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The sanctions imposed by Western actors in response to Russia’s annexation and occupation of part of Ukrainian territory have moved up energy security in the global agenda. The general expectation after the referendums aimed at legitimizing the annexation of eastern Ukraine into Russia is that the tension will last long and include the possibility of […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":179,"featured_media":9309,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[510,486,508],"tags":[558,608,656,713,666,650],"class_list":["post-11455","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-100-years-of-the-republic","category-opinion","category-turkey","tag-eastern-mediterranean","tag-energy-environment-resources","tag-english","tag-heinrich-boll-foundation","tag-mediterranean","tag-turkiye"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11455","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/179"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=11455"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11455\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/9309"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=11455"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=11455"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=11455"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}