{"id":11470,"date":"2022-11-23T12:06:28","date_gmt":"2022-11-23T12:06:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/2022\/11\/ma-2\/"},"modified":"2024-11-20T22:02:42","modified_gmt":"2024-11-20T19:02:42","slug":"the-us-and-the-middle-east-in-the-context-of-shifting-global-and-regional-politics-meliha-benli-altunisik","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/2022\/11\/the-us-and-the-middle-east-in-the-context-of-shifting-global-and-regional-politics-meliha-benli-altunisik\/","title":{"rendered":"The US and the Middle East in the Context of Shifting Global and Regional Politics- Meliha Benli Altun\u0131\u015f\u0131k"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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In recent years, one of the primary debates in the study of\ninternational relations of the Middle East has been understanding the United\nStates’ changing role in the region. After being the most important\nextra-regional power for decades, the question emerged as to whether the region\nhas lost its importance for Washington, especially since the Obama\nadministration. Those who argued for the declining importance of the Middle\nEast for Washington have referred to several reasons. First and foremost, it\nwas argued that Middle Eastern oil which was one of the original reasons for the\nUS involvement in the region after WW II, was losing its importance as the US\nonce again became a net exporter of oil for the first time since the early\n1950s with the discovery of shale oil. Secondly, it was argued that with the\nrise of China, the US was finally determined to pivot Asia and thus wanted to\nfocus its energy and attention on the Far East rather than the Middle East.\nFinally, the frustration with the results of the US involvement in the Middle\nEast, particularly with the invasion of Iraq, has been cited as one of the\nreasons for declining US interest in the region. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, despite the arguments that the Middle East losing its\nimportance for Washington, it has also been clear that the US has not been really\nwithdrawing from the region as it is sometimes claimed. Instead, the concept of\nretrenchment has been used to argue that the US was still involved in the\nregion, but the extent and the nature of its involvement have changed and overall\ndeclined. There are several indicators of continuing US relevance for regional\npolitics. In fact, what the US does and does not do continues to impact\nregional politics. When a new administration comes to power, the regional\nactors still reposition themselves accordingly based on their expectations of\nthe policy choices of the new administration. Specifically, US policies also\nhave an impact on different issue areas. The fact that the Obama administration\nchose to sign the nuclear agreement (formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan\nof Action-JCPOA) with Iran and then the Trump administration unilaterally\nwithdrew from it, and the Biden administration made a pledge to come back to\nit, all had an impact not only on Iranian politics and foreign policy but also\non regional politics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Similarly, the US decision to withdraw its combat forces from Iraq has\nhad repercussions on how Washington has decided to get involved in the Syrian\ncrisis. The Trump administration\u2019s decision to move the US embassy to Jerusalem\nand its pivotal role in signing the Abraham Accords impacted the Palestinian\nissue. It also triggered a wave of shifts in regional politics. Therefore, it really\nis not possible to talk about a US withdrawal from the region, although it is\nstill possible to argue for an important shift in US engagement with the\nregion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I would argue that the most significant shift in the US engagement with\nthe region has been the disappearance of Washington’s order-making role. This\nrole which had been the overarching element in the US policy towards the region\nsince the end of World War II, has disappeared in recent years. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Cold War Years<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

As the emerging global hegemon after World War II, the US had already\nrecognized the rising importance of the Middle East during the War due to the\nregion’s oil potential. Thus, as Daniel Yergin writes in The Prize<\/em>, a State\nDepartment memo during the War predicted that “the center of gravity would\nshift to the Middle East after the war” and advised the US to prepare to\nact accordingly. In fact, the US was ready to compete with its closest ally\nGreat Britain to have access to the region\u2019s oil resources right after the War.\nWith the emergence of the Cold War between the wartime allies, the US and the\nSoviet Union, the strategically located oil-rich Middle East became even more\nimportant. Washington tried to prevent any Soviet encroachment into the region.\nTo that end, it built a network of alliances and did not hesitate to interfere\nin the domestic affairs of its allies to protect their regimes. In this\ncontext, it perceived the rising Arab nationalism as a threat and mainly a\nstooge for Soviet expansionism. Especially after the 1967 War, support for Israel\nalso became an important part of US policy in the region. Thus, the US vision\nof a Middle East order aimed to protect its interests mainly by protecting\naccess to Middle East oil at reasonable prices and preventing Soviet influence\nin the region. However, the original US policy of building a NATO-like alliance\nsystem to achieve these objectives and support its regional allies failed\nmainly due to the Arab-Israeli conflict that constituted the core issue in the\nregion. Thus, to achieve its goals, the US instead build a network of bilateral\nalliances.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

End of the Cold War<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The end of bipolarity and thus the Cold War opened the way for the US to\nbe the sole order maker without competition from a global superpower. The 1990s\nstarted with the Gulf Crisis, which provided further opportunities to\nconsolidate US dominance in the region and its acceptance by regional actors.\nThus, the Clinton administration that came to power soon after the Gulf War\nengaged in an effort to create a new Middle East order as part of the new global\norder in the making. This vision was composed of several elements: The most\nimportant one was an Arab-Israeli peace process that would end the conflict, which\nhad been a source of instability in the region and had been one of the\nchallenges to the US policy of alliances between like-minded states. Thus, a\npeace process between Israel and the Arab states and a resolution of the\nPalestinian issue would open the way to the integration of Israel into the\nregion and bring stability. As the multilateral tracks of the Madrid peace process\ndemonstrated, there were more expectations from the peace process as to\ncreating economic interdependencies, water cooperation and arms control\nagreements in the region. This was in line with the global agenda of political\nand economic liberalization promoted by the US and global institutions like the\nIMF and the World Bank in the region. Iran and Iraq were seen as the spoilers\nof this vision of a new Middle East. Thus, the Clinton administration adopted\nthe policy of Dual Containment (later Dual Containment plus), which basically\naimed to contain these two states and, better yet, put enough pressure on them\nto change their regimes. In the meantime, the US increased its military\npresence in the region to unprecedented levels, especially in the Gulf. By the\nend of the 1990s, however, the project of a new Middle East order was facing\nserious problems and can be argued to collapse by the beginning of the new\ncentury. The Arab-Israeli peace process only produced a peace treaty between\nIsrael and Jordan, which was not surprising. The rest of the process collapsed\nin 2000. The start of the second Palestinian intifada was a symbol of that\ncollapse. The US policy of dual containment also weakened and started to be\ncriticized in the US as well. After all, it failed to achieve its aim of regime\nchange. The US allies did not even support the containment of Iran. In the case\nof Iraq, the international consensus started to crumble beginning in the\nmid-1990s. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Post 9\/11 and the US Response in the Middle\nEast<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Bush administration, which was already critical of the Middle East\nvision of the Clinton administration, came up with another Middle East order\nproject. The new vision was crafted by the neo-conservatives that were dominant\nin the administration and influenced by the 9\/11 terrorist attacks on the US,\nputting the “war on terror” at the center of that order instead of\nthe Arab-Israeli conflict. According to its advocates, this would have mainly\ntwo interrelated dimensions: First, the invasion of Iraq, which would not only\nbring long-waited regime change in that country but accompanied by the\ndiscourse of “rogue states” and “axis of evil”, which would\nalso install fear in foe regimes in Iran and Syria. Second, the so-called\n“freedom agenda” that was based on the idea that authoritarianism was\nthe main problem in the region would also target the friendly regimes. This new\nvision which was tried to be implemented through military and economic means,\nalso failed. It agitated not only the foes but also Washington’s friends; thus,\nall in their own ways, they tried their best to make sure that US policies\nfailed. But the main challenge to the US position in the region emanated from\nthe Iraq invasion. Although it became a symbol of US hegemonic overlay, it also\nmarked the beginning of shifting US position in the region. This War, which was\ndeclared as “illegal” by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, was\ncriticized not only in the region but also in the US itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Lack\nof a Grand Strategy: Obama, Trump, and Biden Years<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The criticisms of the Iraq experience and a reassessment of the evolving\nUS interests in the region have led to an overall US retrenchment from the\nMiddle East, starting with the Obama administration. However, as argued above,\nthe US continued to be engaged in varying degrees with the region and its\npolicies, such as Syria, Iran nuclear issue, and Arab-Israeli relations\ncontinued to have far-reaching consequences. Yet what is different is that Washington\nno longer seems to have an overarching vision for the region. The Obama\nadministration’s most important initiative, which aimed to prevent Iran from\nbecoming a nuclear power, did not come with a vision of how the region should\nbe organized after such an agreement. Similarly, it is not clear what have been\nthe general strategic objectives of the US in Syria beyond defeating ISIS and\nhow its specific policies have been serving those objectives. As to the Abraham\nAccords, again, there has been ambiguity as to whether these have been part of\na broad vision of a Middle East order that the Trump administration had in\nmind. Similarly, it was unclear how the Trump administration planned to tackle\nthe Iranian nuclear issue after withdrawing from the JCPOA.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Biden administration has\nnot developed a comprehensive Middle East strategy either. Until recently, it\nhas had two major policy lines: to restart nuclear negotiations with Iran,\nwhich have so far produced no results; and to make democracy and defend human\nrights the core of its relations with regional countries, which in practice\nmeant unlike President Trump distancing from the GCC countries, mainly Saudi\nArabia and to some extent the UAE. This policy also seemed to change with the\nreset of US policies towards Saudi Arabia, which was blamed for Jamal Jamal Khashoggi\u2019s <\/strong>brutal murder in the Saudi\nconsulate in Istanbul.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The\nConsequences<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Changing US engagement with the Middle East has already had some\nconsequences. First, it has allowed more room for maneuver for regional powers\nto develop and try to implement their visions for regional order. This\ndevelopment initially led to a deterioration of regional stability and\ninsecurity as main contenders engaged in fierce geopolitical competition in and\naround the region. However, in the last two years, regional countries have\nseemed to realize the unsustainability of this competition which has led to a\nwave of normalization in the region. The main project of a regional order\ncurrently is a \u201cGulf-centered\u201d one which is mainly underwritten by the Gulf\nstates’ financial and economic power. However, such efforts are still highly\nfragile.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Second, it has also allowed other global actors to be more active in the\nMiddle East. Russia recognizing US disinterest in comprehensive involvement in Syria\nhas become the leading actor. Russian interest in the Middle East has expanded\nto the Gulf, Egypt, and Libya. Similarly, especially after the Belt and Road\nInitiative launch in 2013, China has increasingly become interested in the\nregion, and its economic and strategic reach has expanded. These developments\nalso led regional countries increasingly adopt hedging strategies. As these two\ncountries have increasingly become US\u2019s global competitors, their involvement\nin the region may turn it into an area of global competition. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Third, the US policies and lack of a clear commitment to a regional\norder led to questions of the dependability of the US and even worse suspicions\nabout its aims in its allies. The disastrous withdrawal of the US from\nAfghanistan further strengthened these views. On the other hand, US foes looked\nfor ways to extend their influence in a region where the US was retrenching. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Russian invasion of Ukraine seems to have changed things to some extent. The Biden administration is under pressure domestically for high energy prices. Thus, especially Gulf oil producer states became important in the US policy calculations once again, which led to a reset in relations with Saudi Arabia, which was initially considered a pariah state. But more significantly, the invasion ended the already weakened ambiguity about Russia’s place in the emerging global order for the Biden administration in the wake of its quest to consolidate the US hegemonic position in global politics and its leadership role. Parallel to this, relations with China continued to deteriorate amid the arguments for a “new Cold War”. These recent shifts seem to push the Biden administration to re-engage the Middle East as well. The significance of President Biden’s first trip to the region in July 2022 was not only the reset with Saudi Arabia but also the beginning of a new strategic network of allied Arab states and Israel. It is still not clear to what extent this would turn into a project of a new Middle East order. Yet one of the most important challenges to such an effort by the US is how to deal with the two other significant non-Arab states of the region, Iran, and Turkey, in this new order. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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This paper is one of the outputs of the Opportunities for Shared Security Project, conducted by the Middle East Studies program at METU, supported by by the U.S. Embassy, Ankara, Grant No: STU15019612017. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Prof. Dr. Meliha Benli Altun\u0131\u015f\u0131k, Middle East Technical University<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

Meliha Benli Altun\u0131\u015f\u0131k is a faculty member in the Department of International Relations at METU. She works on the international relations of the Middle East, Turkey’s Middle East Policy, Rentier states.<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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To cite this work: <\/strong>Meliha Benli Altun\u0131\u015f\u0131k , \u201c The US and the Middle East in the Context of Shifting Global and Regional Politics \u201d, Panorama, Online, 23 November 2022, https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/blog\/2022\/11\/23\/ma-2\/ <\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Copyright@UIKPanorama. All on-line and print rights reserved. Opinions expressed in works published by the Panorama belongs to the authors alone unless otherwise stated, and do not imply endorsement by the IRCT, Global Academy, or the Editors\/Editorial Board of Panorama.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In recent years, one of the primary debates in the study of international relations of the Middle East has been understanding the United States’ changing role in the region. After being the most important extra-regional power for decades, the question emerged as to whether the region has lost its importance for Washington, especially since the […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":19,"featured_media":9705,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[497,508],"tags":[656,586,617,650,641],"class_list":["post-11470","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-essay","category-turkey","tag-english","tag-middle-east","tag-regional-politics","tag-turkiye","tag-united-states-us"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11470","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/19"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=11470"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11470\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/9705"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=11470"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=11470"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=11470"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}