{"id":11485,"date":"2022-11-11T11:08:17","date_gmt":"2022-11-11T11:08:17","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/2022\/11\/ma\/"},"modified":"2024-11-20T22:05:42","modified_gmt":"2024-11-20T19:05:42","slug":"the-soft-power-of-turkey-in-international-relations-meliha-benli-altunisik","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/2022\/11\/the-soft-power-of-turkey-in-international-relations-meliha-benli-altunisik\/","title":{"rendered":"The Soft Power of Turkey in International Relations- Meliha Benli Altun\u0131\u015f\u0131k"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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Soft power has been one of the most popular concepts\nof International Relations since Joseph Nye used it in his book Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of\nAmerican Power<\/em>.[1]<\/a> He later further developed the concept in other\nstudies.[2]<\/a> Although\nits definition has remained as fuzzy as many other concepts of the discipline\nand the debate continued as to what constitutes soft power and, more so, what\nthe impact of it on international relations, its usage continued not only in\nthe case of the United States but also other countries as well. Turkey is one\nof the countries on which a fair amount of literature developed in connection\nwith this concept.[3]<\/a>\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As Nye defines it, soft power, as opposed to hard\npower, is the ability to shape others\u2019 behavior through appeal and attraction. Nye identifies three broad categories of soft\npower: “culture”, “political values”, and\n“policies.” Thus,\n“a country may obtain the\noutcomes it wants in world politics because other countries \u2013admiring its\nvalues, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and\nopenness\u2013 want to follow it.\u201d[4]<\/a>\nIn this broad framework, it\ncan be argued that soft power emanates from what a country is and what it does.\nFurthermore, there is also a third dimension to the discussion, emphasizing\nthat soft power is contextual and temporal. Thus, a country\u2019s appeal and\nattraction are also a function of the particular context and the period. Within\nthis framework, I would argue that there have been two periods in Republican\nhistory where one can talk about Turkey\u2019s rising soft power. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The first period where Turkey\u2019s soft power became\nvisible was the period of the national war of independence and the\nestablishment of the Republic. Turkey became one of the few countries\nthat did not accept the\npost-World War I settlement imposed\non it by the winners of the war. Turkey\u2019s War of Independence was closely monitored\nby nationalists in different parts of the world, who were under colonial rule and formulating\ntheir plans for independence. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The appeal of Turkey\u2019s war for liberation was first\nand foremost felt in the Middle East and the Islamic world in general. It has been demonstrated<\/a> that Turkey\u2019s quest for independence had led to \u201chope\nand strong feelings\u201d in Tunisia, Egypt, and Algeria. Beyond the Middle East, several studies have shown<\/a> Turkey’s attraction to Indonesia and Malaysia. For\ninstance, Sel\u00e7uk Esenbel writes<\/a> that Turkey\u2019s war of independence was followed\nclosely and admired in Indonesia.\nDuring that period, an Indonesian statesman and\nnationalist, Mohammad Hatta, wrote, \u201cIn their struggle for independence, the Indonesian people found new\ninspiration and a source of strength in the victories won by the Turkish people\nunder the leadership of Kamal Ataturk. Ankara was regarded as the Mecca of\nmodern nationalism. The victories of the Turkish Army at Sakaria and Afyon\nKarahisar will remain in the memory of the Indonesians as momentous events that\ndetermined the course of history: the dawn of Asian freedom was beginning to\nbreak.\u201d[5]<\/a>\nAlthough the appeal of Turkey\u2019s war of independence\nwas higher among the Muslim-majority countries, it also existed elsewhere. For\ninstance, in India, it was not only Muslims who were inspired by what was going\non in Anatolia but also Hindus, as demonstrated by a study that focused on\nMahatma Gandhi\u2019s view about dealing with British colonialism was influenced by\nwhat was happening in Turkey.[6]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In addition to what Turkey did, what Turkey had become\nafter the establishment of the Republic also increased Turkey\u2019s attractiveness to\nsome states. During the early years of state formation, Turkey\nembarked on an extensive reform program to transform state and state-society relations.\nThese reforms became a source\nof inspiration, particularly for Iran, Tunisia, and Afghanistan. Despite these\ncountries\u2019 admiration for Turkey, which can be considered a soft power asset, the\nabolishment of the Caliphate and the adoption of laicism also led to some\ncriticism in the Islamic world.[7]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus, in establishing the Republic, Turkey became a\nsource of inspiration, appealed to many states under colonial rule, and engaged\nin post-colonial state-building, mainly in the Islamic world and beyond. The origins\nof this inspiration and appeal rested in what Turkey was and what Turkey was\ndoing. These soft power assets were made possible by the context of increasing\nnationalism and the struggle against colonialism. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The\nsecond period where Turkey\u2019s soft power increased was\nin the late 1990s and 2000s. During this period, Turkey achieved considerable socioeconomic and\npolitical development compared to its neighbors in the\nMiddle East. More\nsignificantly, it has engaged\nin a rigorous reform process since the mid-1990s, mainly to become a member of the EU. The reforms began under the auspices of the coalition\ngovernment led by B\u00fclent Ecevit of the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik\nSol Parti<\/em>-DLP) and continued under the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalk\u0131nma\nPartisi<\/em>-JDP) which came to power as a majority government in late 2002. Turkey\u2019s\nsoft power increased in the JDP’s early years as the party focused on soft\npower tools extensively in its foreign policy. During this period, again\nTurkey\u2019s soft power emanated from what Turkey was and what Turkey did.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As\nto what Turkey was, coming to power with the JDP added a new dimension to\nTurkey\u2019s attraction and appeal, especially in the Islamic world. The JDP itself\nfocused on the importance of the Turkish experience as revealing the\npossibility of \u201cmoderate\u201d Islamism and its compatibility with democracy. This\n\u201cmodel\u201d was perceived as attractive in Muslim-majority countries where both the\nIslamist and the liberal opposition were looking for ways to get out of an\nimpasse of \u201cauthoritarian resilience.\u201d Furthermore, what the JDP rule represented,\nand its domestic and foreign policies were also attractive for the US,\npromoting this \u201cmodel\u201d as a panacea for addressing the\ngrowth of Islamist radicalism in the world, especially after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

What the \u201cTurkish model\u201d means and what\nconstitutes its assets is subject to debate. Unlike the JDP narrative, one could focus on the\nTurkish experience in a larger context, emphasizing the important example\nTurkey sets as a Muslim nation that is democratic, secular, economically\nwell-integrated with globalization, an accession country with the European\nUnion, and one historically belonging to key Western institutions such as NATO,\nOSCE, the Council of Europe, and OECD. Within such a larger framework, Turkey\u2019s\nappeal cannot be limited merely to the JDP or the moderation of Islam. Yet, this \u201cmodel\u201d was neither promoted by the JDP nor by\nthe external actors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In\naddition to Turkey, what Turkey was doing in its foreign policy also became an essential\npart of Turkey\u2019s soft power. In the early years of the JDP rule, Turkey\u2019s\nrejection of supporting the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 raised Turkey\u2019s profile\nas well as Turkey\u2019s constructive roles in international relations, such as\nmediation and facilitation in conflicts. Turkey\u2019s development aid policies, as\nwell as its \u201chumanitarian diplomacy,\u201d also increased its attractiveness. Within\nthis context, the open-door policy towards the Syrian refugees and hosting and providing\nfor large numbers of refugees were admired abroad. These policies raised\nTurkey\u2019s international profile and extended its influence in the Middle East, Western\nBalkans, parts of Africa, and beyond. Turkey established the Office of Public\nDiplomacy in 2010 to promote the branding of Turkey internationally through the\nefforts of the state actors and the support of the non-state actors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yet, in recent years Turkey has lost an essential part of its appeal and\nattraction both in terms of what Turkey is and what Turkey does. Turkey\u2019s soft\npower has been tarnished by domestic transformations starting in the 2010s that\nhave been characterized increasingly by concepts such as \u201ccompetitive\nauthoritarianism\u201d or \u201cpopulist authoritarianism.\u201d The country\u2019s standing in\nglobal democracy indexes, such as the Freedom House, downgraded to partly free.\nDomestic politics started to be polarized amid limitations on freedom of the press\nand freedom of expression. In addition, the image of Turkey\u2019s political\ndevelopment was negatively affected by a coup attempt in 2016. Turkey\u2019s\neconomic success was also replaced by a financial crisis, especially since 2018,\nwith soaring inflation, devaluing of the Turkish Lira, and increasing\nunemployment. In terms of what Turkey does, there has also been a negative\nshift in the perception of Turkey\u2019s foreign relations. For most of the 2010s\nuntil very recently, Turkey\u2019s foreign relations with the countries in the\nMiddle East turned highly problematic. Recent flaring up of conflicts with\nGreece and Turkey\u2019s frequent use of hard power also point to a very different\nTurkey in its regional policies than the 2000s.  All this has already been reflected in the\nindexes that measure soft power, where Turkey\u2019s standing has declined.[8]<\/a> Recent\nmedical aid diplomacy and policy in the Ukraine crisis seem to have helped to\nincrease that standing to some extent, ranking Turkey 22nd in 2022<\/a>, slightly above Israel and Saudi Arabia. Yet, it is clear that Turkey\u2019s\nappeal and attractiveness have declined both in terms of what it represents and\nwhat it does.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In sum, particularly in two periods of the history of the Turkish\nRepublic, there was a significant rise in Turkey’s attraction, namely during\nthe war of independence and the building of the Republic and late 1990s and\n2000s when Turkey engaged in an extensive reform program targeting the EU\nmembership and especially the JDP government’s enthusiasm to use soft power in\nits foreign relations. In the first period what Turkey is and does was seen as\nattractive by the state leaders as well as the people, whereas in the second\nperiod Turkey’s appeal largely existed among the people. In both cases, the\nappeal of Turkey began to polarize and eventually fade. In the first period,\nthe reforms in the state and state-society relations decreased Turkey’s appeal\nwhich continued with Turkey’s membership in NATO. In the second period,\nTurkey’s appeal disappeared among the liberals and then altogether declined due\nto the developments in Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy.
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[1]<\/a> Joseph Nye (1990) Bound to Lead: The Changing\nNature of American Power<\/em>, NY: Basic Books.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[2]<\/a> Joseph Nye (2004) Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics<\/em>, NY: Public Affairs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[3]<\/a> See, for example, Meliha B. Altun\u0131\u015f\u0131k (2005) \u201cThe\nTurkish Model and Democratization in the Middle East,\u201d Arab Studies\nQuarterly<\/em>, Vol. 27, Nos. 1 and 2, pp. 45-63; Tar\u0131k O\u011fuzlu (2007) \u201cSoft\npower in Turkish foreign policy,\u201d Australian Journal of International\nAffairs<\/em>, 61(1), pp. 81\u201397; Meliha B. Altun\u0131\u015f\u0131k (2008) \u201cThe Possibilities\nand limits of Turkey\u2019s soft power in the Middle East,\u201d Insight Turkey, <\/em>10,\npp. 41-54; Necati Anaz (2022) An Assessment of Turkey\u2019s Soft Power\nResources in Asia: Potential and Limitations, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies,<\/em> 24:5, 755-771.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[4]<\/a> Joseph Nye (2004) Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics<\/em>, NY: Public Affairs,\np.5.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[5]<\/a> From Esenbel 2013<\/a>: Muhammad Hatta, \u201cA\nMessage to the People of Turkey,\u201d Koleksi Muhammad Hatta <\/em>2, 35 (1950), Arsip Nasional Republic\nIndonesia, Jakarta. Quoted in \u0130smail Hakk\u0131 G\u00f6ksoy, \u201cAtat\u00fcrk ve T\u00fcrk \u0130nk\u0131lab\u0131n\u0131n\nEndonezya’daki Etkileri,\u201d Atat\u00fcrk\nAra\u015ft\u0131rma Merkezi Dergisi<\/em> 18, 52 (2002): 1-36.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[6]<\/strong><\/a> <\/strong>R.K. Sinha (1994).\nThe Turkish Question, Mustafa Kemal and Mahatma Gandhi, <\/em>Adam Publishers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[7]<\/a> R. Hattemer, R. (2000) \u201cAtat\u00fcrk and the\nReforms in Turkey as Reflected in the Egyptian Press,\u201d Journal of Islamic Studies<\/em>, 11<\/em>(1), pp. 21\u201342.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[8]<\/a> Sanem B. \u00c7evik (2019) \u201cReassessing\nTurkey\u2019s Soft Power: The Rules of Attraction,\u201d Alternatives<\/em>, 44(1), pp. 50\u201371.\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Prof. Dr. Meliha Benli Altun\u0131\u015f\u0131k, Middle East Technical University<\/h5>\n\n\n\n

Meliha Benli Altun\u0131\u015f\u0131k is a faculty member in the Department of International Relations at METU. She works on the international relations of the Middle East, Turkey’s Middle East Policy, Rentier states.<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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To cite this work: <\/strong>Meliha Benli Altun\u0131\u015f\u0131k , \u201cThe Soft Power of Turkey in International Relations\u201d, Panorama, Online, 11 November 2022, https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/blog\/2022\/11\/11\/ma\/ <\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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This article has been prepared with the support provided to the International Relations Council<\/a> and the Global Academy<\/a> by the Heinrich B\u00f6ll Stiftung Association Turkey Representative within the scope of the project titled ‘Foreign Policy for the 21st Century; Peaceful, Equitable, and Dynamic Turkey’.<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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Copyright@UIKPanorama. All on-line and print rights reserved. Opinions expressed in works published by the Panorama belongs to the authors alone unless otherwise stated, and do not imply endorsement by the IRCT, Global Academy, or the Editors\/Editorial Board of Panorama.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Soft power has been one of the most popular concepts of International Relations since Joseph Nye used it in his book Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power.[1] He later further developed the concept in other studies.[2] Although its definition has remained as fuzzy as many other concepts of the discipline and the […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":19,"featured_media":9675,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[510,486,508],"tags":[656,713,631,650],"class_list":["post-11485","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-100-years-of-the-republic","category-opinion","category-turkey","tag-english","tag-heinrich-boll-foundation","tag-soft-power","tag-turkiye"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11485","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/19"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=11485"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11485\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/9675"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=11485"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=11485"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=11485"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}