{"id":11497,"date":"2022-10-12T11:26:13","date_gmt":"2022-10-12T11:26:13","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/2022\/10\/indo\/"},"modified":"2024-11-20T22:07:40","modified_gmt":"2024-11-20T19:07:40","slug":"the-future-of-alignments-in-the-indo-pacific-sanem-ozer","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/2022\/10\/the-future-of-alignments-in-the-indo-pacific-sanem-ozer\/","title":{"rendered":"The Future of Alignments in the Indo-Pacific – Sanem \u00d6zer"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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The\nIndo-Pacific region is a political term to dub the geopolitical area that\nstretches from the west coast of the United States (U.S.) to the west coast of\nIndia. It connects the tropical waters of the Indian Ocean with the western and\ncentral Pacific Ocean and is made up of twenty-four countries, all of which\nhave remarkably different political structures and levels of power. The term\n\u201cIndo-Pacific\u201d initially used by the Obama Administration[1]<\/a> and announced by the\nSecretary of State Hillary Clinton to define the U.S. strategic plans to\nconnect Indian and Pacific Oceans with an Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor (IPEC)\nand through the political and military \u201cpivot to Asia\u201d is increasingly\nsuperseding the previously common term \u201cAsia-Pacific\u201d. President Barack Obama\u2019s\nforeign policy response to the rise of China was combining economic,\ndiplomatic, and cultural engagement with military containment. [2]<\/a> The policy of containment\nand engagement towards China stands on the policy of intensive engagement with\nChina, which has been executed since President Richard Nixon\u2019s 1972 visit.\nHowever, China\u2019s growing strength, and its economic mercantilism led Trump and\nBiden administrations to distance from engagement as they perceived China\u2019s\nstance as a challenge to the U.S. global leadership. The map below displays how\nthe roads for hegemonic and regional powers to international engagement cross\nas the global order continues to shift first to the Asia-Pacific trade axis\nthen to the Indo-Pacific Region.[3]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Map 1: <\/strong>The Indo-Pacific: International Engagement and Trade Axis <\/figcaption><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n

US \u2013 China Rivalry in the Region<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Obama\nfollowed his predecessor George W. Bush administration\u2019s example and sought to\nrebalance in Asia-Pacific through adopting a burden-sharing strategy with NATO\nand sliding a significant part of the U.S. military presence from the Middle\nEast to the Asia-Pacific region and consolidating economic multilateralism. The\ncuts, which have been made to overseas contingency operations in Iraq and\nAfghanistan during the Obama administration would be channelled to new\ninvestments in high-end military capabilities, such as cyber and space warfare,\nstealth technology, drones, and precision-guided weaponry to maintain long-term\nmilitary edge against China\u2019s military modernization programmes and deny China\nmilitary hegemony in the South and the East China Seas.[4]<\/a> Despite the election of\nDonald Trump in 2016, the U.S. foreign policy showed continuity in terms of\nrebalancing strategy toward the Asia-Pacific with a focus on China in\nparticular and a geopolitical aim of maintaining American power in the region. The\nTrump administration, for instance followed in the footsteps of Obama\u2019s\ncommitment to work with China to reduce the risk of North Korea\u2019s nuclear arms,\nalbeit with less persuasion and more intimidation. The U.S. insisted that China\nacts as an intermediary for the talks with North Korea, conveying the necessary\nmessages and demanded that it persuades North Korea to cooperate. Although the Trump\nadministration seemed to use trade wars to press China for this objective[5]<\/a>, it was Beijing who was\nwilling to become a responsible stakeholder and highlight the emergence of a\nmultipolar world. China apparently prefers deescalating tensions to a policy of\nregime change, which may have wider and negative repercussions within the\nregion. Indeed, the U.S. response to Russia-Ukraine War may lead the\nIndo-Pacific countries to have second thoughts about labelling China as an\nadversary or transforming NATO into a global alliance. Despite territorial\ndisputes, rest of the Indo-Pacific countries refer to regional alignments and\nplatforms to preserve dialogue with friend and foe alike. The emergence of a\nmultipolar world expresses itself through regional alignments in the\nIndo-Pacific.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A new\nEconomic and Political Hub?<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Although\nthe Indo-Pacific region is becoming the new economic and political hub of the\nworld, the geographic maps we are accustomed to viewing do not necessarily fit\nin the existing political dimensions. Thus, centring the Indo-Pacific may\nbroaden our perspective and help us appreciate how regional alignments have\nevolved alongside security alliances. The central position of the Indo-Pacific\nbecomes apparent as security and economic competition with China intensifies.\nForeign policy strategy of the U.S. has included moving closer to emerging\npartners like India and Vietnam, strengthening relationships with leading\nregional partners, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand,\nSingapore, Taiwan, and deepening regional treaty alliances with Australia,\nJapan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. The U.S. foreign policy\nneeds to adapt to the changing post-war international regime and perhaps develop\/accept\na complementary role for the surviving bilateral alliances of the U.S. \u2018hub and spoke\u2019 system in the\nAsia-Pacific.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Robert\nOsgood defines an alliance as a formal agreement that commits states to working\ntogether to use their military resources against a particular state or states,\nand an alliance typically requires one or more signatories to use force or to\nconsider using force (unilaterally or in consultation with allies) in certain\nsituations.[6]<\/a>\nThe U.S. has not spared in signing military alliances with Asia-Pacific\ncountries and provided the much needed security and guarantee when the Cold War\nwas at its peak. Thus, these countries were able to mobilize their resources\nfor development. Yet, instead of overstretching its capacity and establishing a\nmultilateral structure such as NATO, the U.S. turned to a series of bilateral\nalliance pacts with regional strategic partners.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The U.S.\nhub-and-spokes system of alliances includes but not confined to the San\nFrancisco Peace Treaty in 1951, which establishes the foundation of the\nJapan-US alliance and the Australia, New Zealand, United States Treaty (ANZUS)\nmilitary alliance, which was broken up due to New Zealand\u2019s non-nuclear policy\nand U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defence Treaty. The U.S. has also signed alliance\npacts with South Korea (1953), Thailand (1954), and Taiwan (1954, which would\nbe replaced with Taiwan Relations Act). Strategic partnerships are a loose form\nof alignment, with a flexible and non-binding nature. The U.S. is also pursuing\nstrategic partnerships with smaller states that are reluctant to sign rigid and\nbinding agreements. This provides the opportunity for the Indo-Pacific\ncountries to mix and match collaborations from different security, economic,\nand diplomatic alignments. The U.S. hub-and-spokes system of alliances stands\nas the oldest and the most deeply rooted pillar of three alignment blocs in the\nAsia-Pacific, with Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) strategic\npartnership, and the ASEAN security community. These three blocs of alignments\nare functional in transforming the regional order and reshaping it through\ncomplicated networks. Though the multitude of regional agreements, regimes, and\ninstitutions in the Indo-Pacific calls into mind the definition of\n\u201cnoodle-bowl\u201d, it is well adjusted to the multiplicity of needs and quest of\nregional states and represents the development of a contemporary world of\nalignments rather than alliances. The U.S.\u2019s call for support to the \u201cwar on\nterror\u201d has temporarily revitalized the U.S. alliance with Asian states. Again\nthe U.S. has been pushing for deeper military integration and security\ncooperation under the \u201cFree and Open Indo-Pacific\u201d (FOIP) vision to check Chinese\nassertiveness in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean. Yet, it would be more\naccurate to call the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) process between the\nU.S., Japan and Australia and India\u2019s participation into the \u201cQuad\u201d process\nmerely \u201cstrategic partnerships\u201d, which are the extension of the existing\nhub-and-spoke system. Since the Trump administration abolished the\nTrans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2017, the U.S. has done little to fill in\nthe gap and offer a clear, comprehensive regional strategy that goes beyond a strategic\npartnership confined to the security of an exclusive \u201cclub\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Regional IOs in the <\/strong>Indo-Pacific:\nSCO and ASEAN<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The contemporary\nsecurity issues are transcending the traditional regional security paradigm in scope\nand comprise a gamut of challenges such as the\nspread of infectious diseases, natural disasters, resource scarcity, climate\nchange and environmental degradation, migration pressures, transnational crime,\nbut also threats such as state sponsored violence on domestic populations and\nthe emergence of non-state armed actors. Some of these security concerns,\nwhether local or global in scope, call for the management of non-military\nthreats to the security of environment, societies, and individuals. These\nchallenges also necessitate international cooperation if they exceed national\nresources and capacity. It reveals the importance of bilateral and regional\nalignments in such situations. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)\nstrategic partnership network on the one hand represents a formal organisation\nestablished to handle non-traditional security concerns namely, terrorism,\nseparatism, and religious extremism, on the other hand serves as a platform to\npromote a multipolar world order.[7]<\/a>\nThis network attracts countries across the Eurasian region that see benefit in\na \u201cweb\u201d of bilateral strategic partnerships. Thus, China superintends an exclusive\nmultilateral arrangement, which has gradually extended membership from Shanghai\nFive to admit the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan,\nand Tajikistan, and to include cautious opponents India and Pakistan. Countries\nholding Observer Status and Dialogue Partners from Asia far and wide reveal how\nChina has become a centre of gravity. According to Wilkins SCO stands out as an\nalternative centre of power in the Indo-Pacific and a possible rival to the\nregional order that Washington and its allies support.[8]<\/a>\nThe multiple fields of operation ranging from diplomacy to security and economy\nand the potential for joint energy projects, new financial architecture, and\ndevelopment funds backed by China makes this hybrid security alignment\ndistinctive. The SCO also covers areas related to intelligence, cyber, and\nsocial-cultural issues. This organisation is valuable since it provides a\nplatform for dialogue among its members, however it has not been able to keep\nChinese assertiveness in the South China Sea at bay or prevent Russian\naggression in East Europe. It is not comparable to NATO in Europe and is\ncompletely different from the U.S. hub-and-spoke alliance. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

ASEAN\nsecurity community was first established as a regional intergovernmental organisation\nin 1967 in defence against the interventions by the communist states of Vietnam\nand China.[9]<\/a>\nIt has steadily developed into a non-alliance alternative to the SCO and a\nnetwork that supports military, educational, economic, political, security, and\nsocial integration efforts. ASEAN members believe that their security is\npromoted collectively, even though they stay distant to a collective defence\nagreement. It is crucial for Indo-Pacific\u2019s middle powers to make sure that the\nSino-U.S. rivalry does not negatively impact their interests and security. Yet,\nthey recognise the need to defend against Chinese coerciveness. Thus, these middle\npowers are aligning to adapt to the changing dynamics in the Indo-Pacific and they\nare following a proactive diplomacy. The ASEAN security community has provided\nthe ground for such a diplomacy through lobbying, insulating and rulemaking in the\ndomains of security, trade, and international law. The so-called \u201cAsian Way\u201d is\nnot a simplistic assertion of \u201cAsian\u201d values instead of \u201cWestern\u201d. Again, it is\nan effort to solidify Asia\u2019s central situation in the geopolitical and economic\nmap. ASEAN members have been successful in mediating tensions between Southeast\nAsia and external powers through multilateral institutions including but not\nlimited to the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN+3 (Japan, the\nRepublic of Korea and China), East Asian Summit (ASEAN + 3 with India, Australia, and New\nZealand-signatories of ASEAN\u2019s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation), and\nASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting+ and the Regional Comprehensive Economic\nPartnership. Unfortunately, ASEAN members lack a common vision since their\npriorities differ, and they have not settled their territorial disputes. ASEAN\nmembers seem to have at least agreed on the principles of non-interference in\nthe internal affairs and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Still, the\ncurrent security problems of the region bring to mind the question of how\napplicable ASEAN\u2019s consultation and consensus norms are.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Indo-Pacific corresponds to a wider regional security order in the process of formation. U.S.-aligned middle powers of the region, such as Australia, Japan, Canada, and India may well create a synergy for cooperation with or without U.S. involvement as long as they can mobilise their capability-based contributions for dealing with regional security issues. Indo-Pacific region can benefit from preserving free flow of data, providing disaster relief and quick response to humanitarian crisis, defending the liberty of movement in international waters, cooperating with regional states in their efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change. These non-traditional security issues may have a diverse nature, but they can support convergence of interests and even create a spill-over effect. The regional states are no stranger to alignments after all. Yet, it may not be persuasive enough for emerging states to embrace a collective defence pact. Instead, traditional American allies \u2013 Australia, Japan, and India \u2013 contribute to the construction of the concept of the Indo-Pacific as an area of cooperation. IPEC would foster economic cooperation and present an alternative to Xi Jinping\u2019s Belt and Road Initiative. Yet, U.S. strategy to unify the Pacific and Indian Oceans as \u201ca single and key maritime entity\u201d[10]<\/a> would not only provide trade integration, but also physical connectivity through a beneficial economic corridor within Southeast and South Asia, which strategic partners would be more than inclined to defend. The need to facilitate and preserve global flows through transportation infrastructure especially when bottlenecks are identified, or free movement in international waters are threatened by Chinese claims, might serve as a unifying goal for coastal states. However, the U.S. would not succeed in initiating a free trade area confined to the U.S. allies and partners in the region. On the contrary, the U.S. would withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a multilateral trade agreement. This would clearly mark that the U.S. economic power and appeal was lagging behind China. In return, the U.S. increasingly leans on bilateral deals with regional powers rather than multilateral platforms such as ASEAN. Indeed, ASEAN was a produce of the U.S. dominated regional order. Still, the U.S. hardly embraces multilateralism in the region. The regional powers are thus inclined to define a free and open Indo-Pacific according to individual norms and further distance from taking collective action since the U.S. shades multilateral organizations with scepticism.[11]<\/a> Eventually, regional powers have resorted to draw individual spheres of influence and interests in the region. Building a culture of constructive cooperation becomes more difficult under these conditions. For now, these countries avoid from stepping on one another\u2019s toes. However, the naval capacity of the regional powers may once again determine who will be the next maritime power in the region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Map 2:<\/strong> Indo-Pacific: Geographical Interpretation of the various actors[12]<\/a> <\/figcaption><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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The U.S.\nIndo-Pacific strategy combines internal balancing, so-called \u201cAmerica First\u201d\nprinciple, since the term was coined by the Trump Administration, with external\nbalancing. Thus, the U.S. would respond to China immediately and adopt\nnecessary measures to level the conditions for the American businesses. Trump\u2019s\neconomic nationalism would accompany protectionism. In the meantime, external\nbalancing would set two goals: first starting and managing formal alliances,\nsecondly establishing bilateral relationships with Indo-Pacific allies and\npartners for external balancing in the wider Indo-Pacific. Yet, relatively\nweaker powers did not automatically join a balancing coalition with China\u2019s neighbours\nto contain Beijing. They preferred balancing with the U.S. against China, while\npreserving \u201ctheir own hedging strategies\u201d.[13]<\/a>\nThese strategies overlap on the geographical interpretation of the region like\nconcentric circles. However, the circumference of each circle differs. Japan\u2019s\nFree and Open Indo-Pacific strategy closely coincides with the wide\ngeographical interpretation of the U.S. In December 2017 the U.S. adopts the\nsame concept Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) with Japan and stresses the four\nprinciples: respect for the sovereignty and independence of all states,\npeaceful conflict resolution, free trade, and respect for international law.\nFirst three of these principles do not seem to contradict with the foreign\npolicy principles or at least rhetoric of China. China was not ostensibly\nexcluded from the regional integration and developments in FOIP. Since 2019,\nhowever, the U.S. State Department defines China as a primary opponent, a\ncompetitor and \u201ca revisionist power\u201d, as it increasingly undermines openness \u2013\nfree access to international waters, airspace, and digital space. China,\nhowever, interprets openness as free access to regional markets through a\nregionalism established and enforced by state-directed infrastructure\ninvestment. China is also blamed for undermining the rules-based international\norder, in other words challenging American order. For China, displacing the\nU.S. hegemony in the region will open the door for Beijing to project\nleadership over global governance.[14]<\/a>\nChina raises its game and switches from undermining American dominance by\nmaritime denial to establishing new order by sea control. Doshi states that\nChinese military investment in aircraft carriers, capable surface vessels,\namphibious warfare, marines, and overseas bases prove that Beijing does not\nfear from making the U.S. feel vulnerable or unsettling its neighbours anymore.[15]<\/a>\nOn the contrary, China develops its force structure in response to the\ngeographical interpretation of the various actors including the U.S., Japan, India,\nand Australia. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion:\nWhat\u2019s next in the Region?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

While it\nhas been revealed that America neither designed a new order in the Indo-Pacific\nnor has the opportunity and capacity to maintain the old order, for now the\nregional powers are filling this gap with the bilateral and multilateral\nrelations they have established with allied and rival powers. On the one hand\nthe U.S. resists accepting the apparent emergence of a multipolar world, on the\nother hand lacks the political strategy or vision to organize allies and\npartners more tightly around the existing regional alignments. Scott argues\nthat U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy is using one rising power (India) to help\nconstrain another rising power (China).[16]<\/a>\nHowever, India\u2019s Indo-Pacific concept reflects a preoccupation to ensure\nIndia\u2019s maritime security. New Delhi clearly prioritizes security over economic\nissues. The discomfort from increasing activities of Chinese military vessels\nin the Indian ocean and the perceived threat to the freedom of navigation in\nthe South China Sea make India to intensify security cooperation with United\nStates, Japan, Australia, and Southeast Asia. However, India is an advocate of\na multipolar world and stands away from any idea of exclusionary regional pacts\nlet alone an American formulation of FOIP. India follows a delicate\ncounterbalancing policy against China, which does not exclude cooperation with\nBeijing. While India contributes to maritime exercises with the U. S., Japan, Australia,\nand Southeast Asian countries, it joins in BRICS and SCO with China. Neither India\nnor Japan wants to be restricted by an alliance created to contain China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Japan\nrefrains from formulating FOIP as a containment strategy against China and\nresorts to a so-called FOIP vision that is supposedly capable of coexisting with\nand even complementing China\u2019s Belt and Road Initiative. Meanwhile, Japan is\ncontent with the security guarantee provided by the alliance with the U.S. With\nthe other partners, however, Japan welcomes increased security cooperation\nrather than a defence alliance. For Japan, FOIP comes to mean increased\nconnectivity, infrastructure development and economic growth in two oceans, but\nnot hard policy issues that may pull Tokyo into a direct conflict with Beijing.\nJapan may also regain its foregone economic weight in the region. With such an\nexpectation Tokyo has filled in the void the U.S. has left with its withdrawal\nfrom TPP. Japan regards Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership as another\nopportunity to play an important role in the region. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Australia\u2019s\nIndo-Pacific concept coincides with both India\u2019s and Japan\u2019s in terms of\nemphasizing the importance maritime security and freedom of navigation. Besides\nAustralia agrees with India and Japan to extend the Western border of the Indo-Pacific\nas far as East Africa, where China is already active and developing economic\nand diplomatic ties. Australia is another state, which benefits from the\nAmerican security guarantee in the region. Australia also complements the U.S.-Australian\nalliance with bilateral and in group cooperation with the regional states that\nshare most in common with Australia in terms of liberal and democratic\ninstitutions and values. All three states constitute major democracies in the\nregion and consider preserving universal values, and compliance with\ninternational law as vital to maintain stability in the region. As long as the\nstatus quo is not challenged, regional states can and will pursue economic\nrelations with China, their principal economic partner, whereas the U.S. will\nremain as the main security partner. However, the future of this complicated\nweb of relations depends on whether the U.S. and China will behave responsibly\nor escalate conflicts through disruptive policies.
<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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[1]<\/a> Hillary Clinton (2011).\n \u201cAmerica\u2019s Pacific Century.\u201d Foreign\nPolicy<\/em>, 11 October 2011, https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2011\/10\/11\/americas-pacific-century\/<\/a> (Accessed 07\/10\/2022).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[2]<\/a> David J. Bertau,\nMichael J. Green and Zack Cooper (2014). Assessing the Asia-Pacific Rebalance<\/em>.\nLanham and Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield,  https:\/\/csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com\/s3fs-public\/legacy_files\/files\/publication\/150105_Berteau_AssessingAsiaPacificRebal_Web.pdf<\/a> (Accessed 07\/10\/2022).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[3]<\/a> Andre Wheeler (2020). \u201cHas\nChina\u2019s Belt and Road Initiative Shifted the Geopolitical Regional Debate from\nAPAC to the Indo-Pacfic?\u201d Silk Road Briefing<\/em>, 04 November, https:\/\/www.silkroadbriefing.com\/news\/2020\/11\/04\/has-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-shifted-the-geo-political-regional-debate-from-apac-to-the-indo-pacific\/<\/a> (Accessed 07\/10\/2022).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[4]<\/a> Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich (2016). \u201cFuture Warfare in the Western\nPacific: Chinese Antiaccess\/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the\nCommons in East Asia.\u201d International Security<\/em>, 41 (01), 7\u201348. http:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/24916870<\/a> (Accessed 07\/10\/2022).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[5]<\/a> Michael Swaine\nand Bruce Klingner (2017). \u201cWhat\u2019s the Best Way for Trump to Persuade China to Up the\nPressure on North Korea?\u201d ChinaFile<\/em>, 25 April 2017, https:\/\/www.chinafile.com\/conversation\/whats-best-way-trump-persuade-china-pressure-north-korea<\/a> (Accessed 07\/10\/2022).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[6]<\/a> Robert E. Osgood (1968). Alliances and American Foreign Policy<\/em>.\nBaltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins Press. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[7]<\/a> The SCO currently comprises eight Member States (China, India,\nKazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Pakistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), four\nObserver States interested in acceding to full membership (Afghanistan,\nBelarus, Iran, and Mongolia) and six \u201cDialogue Partners\u201d (Armenia, Azerbaijan,\nCambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Turkey). http:\/\/eng.sectsco.org<\/a> (Accessed 07\/10\/2022).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[8]<\/a> Thomas S. Wilkins\n(2011). \u201c\u2018Alignment\u2019, not \u2018alliance\u2019 \u2013 the shifting paradigm of\ninternational security cooperation: toward a conceptual taxonomy of alignment.\u201d\nReview of International Studies<\/em>, 38(01),\n53\u201376. doi:10.1017\/s0260210511000209<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[9]<\/a> Founding members of the ASEAN are\nIndonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam\njoined ASEAN on 7 January 1984, followed by Viet Nam on 28 July 1995, Lao PDR\nand Myanmar on 23 July 1997, and Cambodia on 30 April 1999, making up what is\ntoday the ten Member States of ASEAN. https:\/\/asean.org\/about-asean__trashed\/member-states\/<\/a> (Accessed 07\/10\/2022).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[10]<\/a> Sebastian Bobowski and\nPawel Passierbiak (2018). \u201cAn Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor-Premises and\nImplications of the U.S. Project.\u201d The 12th<\/sup> International Day of\nStatistics and Economics, Prague, 6-8 September 2018, p. 207, https:\/\/msed.vse.cz\/msed_2018\/article\/210-Bobowski-Sebastian-paper.pdf<\/a> (Accessed 07\/10\/2022).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[11]<\/a> Felix Heiduck and\nGudrun Wacker (2020). \u201cFrom Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific: Significance,\nImplementation and Challenges.\u201d SWP Research Paper<\/em> 9, p.17, https:\/\/www.swp-berlin.org\/publications\/products\/research_papers\/2020RP09_IndoPacific.pdf<\/a> (Accessed 07\/10\/2022).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[12]<\/a> Felix Heiduck and\nGudrun Wacker (2020). \u201cFrom Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific: Significance,\nImplementation and Challenges.\u201d SWP Research Paper<\/em> 9, p.10, https:\/\/www.swp-berlin.org\/publications\/products\/research_papers\/2020RP09_IndoPacific.pdf<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[13]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[14]<\/a> Rush Doshi (2021). \u201cThe\nLong Game: China\u2019s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order.\u201d Brookings<\/em>,\n2 August 2021, https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/essay\/the-long-game-chinas-grand-strategy-to-displace-american-order\/<\/a> (Accessed 07\/10\/2022).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[15]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[16]<\/a> David Scott\n(2018). \u201cThe Indo-Pacfic in US Strategy: Responding to Power Shifts.\u201d Rising\nPowers Quarterly<\/em>, 3(2), 19-43, https:\/\/risingpowersproject.com\/the-indo-pacific-in-us-strategy-responding-to-power-shifts\/<\/a> (Accessed 07\/10\/2022).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Assoc. Prof.<\/strong> Sanem \u00d6zer<\/strong> ,<\/strong> Akdeniz University <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sanem \u00d6zer is associate professor of International Relations at Akdeniz University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences. She graduated from Bilkent University, Department of English Language and Literature in 1999. She earned her MA on European Studies in the University of Exeter, UK and her PhD on EU Politics and International Relations with her thesis \u201cA Common Foreign Policy towards the Caucasus? With Special Reference to Some EU Member States\u201d in the European Union Institute, Marmara University, Istanbul. She had a Rotary Peace Fellowship for Professional Development Certificate Program in Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand in 2013. She is also the editor of one national book on the politics of Asia-Pacific and the author of many national and international book chapters and articles. She gives lectures on conflict resolution, Asia-Pacific politics, migration and the politics of energy. <\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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To cite this work :<\/strong> Sanem \u00d6zer\u201cThe Future of Alignments in the Indo-Pacific\u201d, Panorama<\/em>, Online , 12 October 2022, https:\/\/www.uikpanorama<\/a>.com\/blog\/2022\/10\/12\/indo\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Copyright@UIKPanorama. All on-line and print rights reserved. Opinions expressed in works published by the Panorama<\/em> belongs to the authors alone unless otherwise stated, and do not imply endorsement by the IRCT, Global Academy, or the Editors\/Editorial Board of Panorama. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The Indo-Pacific region is a political term to dub the geopolitical area that stretches from the west coast of the United States (U.S.) to the west coast of India. It connects the tropical waters of the Indian Ocean with the western and central Pacific Ocean and is made up of twenty-four countries, all of which […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":178,"featured_media":9327,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[502,486],"tags":[540,656,575],"class_list":["post-11497","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-asia","category-opinion","tag-alignments","tag-english","tag-indo-pacific"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11497","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/178"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=11497"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11497\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/9327"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=11497"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=11497"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=11497"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}