{"id":11545,"date":"2022-05-10T14:38:47","date_gmt":"2022-05-10T11:38:47","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/2022\/05\/rs-theory2\/"},"modified":"2024-11-21T00:09:58","modified_gmt":"2024-11-20T21:09:58","slug":"ir-theory-and-russian-apologia-onur-erpul","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/2022\/05\/ir-theory-and-russian-apologia-onur-erpul\/","title":{"rendered":"IR Theory and Russian Apologia -Onur Erpul"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine has called into question the major paradigms of International Relations (IR) \u2013 Realism in particular \u2013 and reinvigorated debates about great power politics. An important strand of Realist thought has set the tone<\/a>, highlighting the culpability of the West in interfering with Russia\u2019s traditional sphere of influence and goading the Russians into a desperate situation. These sentiments are echoed<\/a> and embraced across the political spectrum<\/a> by individuals who are quick to draw attention to similarities<\/a> between Russia\u2019s current invasion and dozens of interventions and invasions the US and its allies have carried out since the unipolar moment. The insurmountable gaps both among global public opinion and between IR theories on what to make of this invasion necessitate a theoretical recontextualization of Russian behavior. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

I argue that IR theories frame discussions\nof international order through moralistic concepts, but also underscore that\ntheir limited utility necessitates a nuanced understanding of state behavior\npredicated on a state\u2019s disposition towards international order. Russian\naggression against Ukraine in the current case needs to be contextualized through\nRussia\u2019s long-standing reluctance to become a stakeholder in the present\ninternational order. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

IR Theory as Apologia <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Great powers assert moral superiority,\noften labeling intransigent states with epithets like a revisionist, rogue or\nauthoritarian. Writing on the eve of the Second World War, E. H. Carr cautioned\nagainst the moral aspirations\nof the great<\/a> powers that underpin international orders. Despite its central\nrole in the present international order as both great power and a permanent\nmember of the UN Security Council, the invocation of anti-imperial\nresistance<\/a> forms the basis by which Russia often justifies its foreign and\ndomestic policies. After all, the United States maintains an empire and it can\ninterfere in the affairs of, or outright invade, other states with impunity,\nwhich is just as harmful to international order. IR\u2019s self-professedly most amoral\ntheory \u2013 Realism \u2013 frames international order as the remainder of an inadvertent\nbalance of power, professing no qualms about advocating for a nuclear-armed great\npower like Russia to have an inherent right<\/a> to maintain an inviolable sphere\nof interest<\/a>, never mind the agency of lesser power states.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Liberal IR theory, meanwhile, is also\nculpable. Liberal IR theory conflates harmony with international order with a\nstate\u2019s regime type, propensity for economic interdependence, membership within\ninternational institutions, and normative performance. These liberal values\nrepresent the trappings of American hegemony, however, and as a litany of\nanalysts will point out, the underlying cause of the war is NATO\u2019s (and the EU\u2019s)\nrapid expansion. In other words, Russia fits well into the mold of a\nbelligerent and intransigent actor per the liberal IR tradition, yet the track record\nof liberal great power states, including their own humanitarian failings,\nbestows a modicum of normalcy to Russian conduct. Russia\u2019s foreign policy\naspirations could be based on a desire to enhance its prestige and status at a\ntime of decline and external encroachment, but it is easy to identify the\nmismatch between its status aspirations and the policy instruments used to\nachieve them. After all, Ukraine is not a peer-competitor of Russia, and the\nact of invading Ukraine, again with the flimsy victimhood-laden\njustifications<\/a>, murdering civilians in troves, and having one\u2019s military\nhumiliated, does nothing to enhance Russian power or prestige.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

IR theories have little to contribute, it\nseems, in terms of contextualizing one of the most significant conflicts\nunfolding before us. IR theories often adopt labels like revisionist or status\nquo states, which have very limited analytical utility and only seem to appear\nin both IR theoretical and public discourses as moralistic framings. Without\nthe understanding that states interact with international order in a variety of\nways at different junctures, it becomes difficult to prevail against the\n\u201cwhataboutism\u201d that seems to poison conversations about international\nrelations. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Sources of Russian Conduct<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia has always been a distinct and\nself-professedly exceptional<\/a>\nactor in international relations. It has often been treated as an outsider to international\nsociety (again, largely due to its own exceptionalism), but few would dispute\nthat Russia is a major military and political actor that has been a cornerstone\nof the post-Cold War international order. More than any other factor, this\nduality stems from the inability of Russia to buy into the present global\narrangements in such a way that it perceives a long-term benefit from playing\nby the rules. This is to say that Russia is not a revisionist state per se<\/em>\ngiven that it cooperates with the West on a variety of high-politics issues. It\ndoes, however, engage in order-challenging behavior and has been more than willing\nto upend the rules of international order whenever its leadership has thought\nit advantageous to do so. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The invasion of Ukraine occurred at the\nintersection of Russian exceptionalist thinking and the Russian leadership\u2019s\ndesire to avoid future losses. It is difficult for the leaders of a state like\nRussia to normatively invest in what they perceive to be an unwelcoming\ninternational order. Since the 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet\nUnion, Russia has been working on shepherding together its former empire and\nstaving off what it perceives as Western encroachment in its backyard. At the\nsame time, however, Russia\u2019s ruling classes seem content to reap the fruits of\nRussia\u2019s deep commercial ties with the rest of the world and heavily invest in\nWestern countries in myriad sectors ranging from energy trade to football<\/a>,\nnot to mention illicit\ntransactions<\/a>. Clearly, the Russian leadership is invested in maintaining at\nleast a modicum of transactionalism, if not more, with the West. Endorsing a\nfull-scale invasion of Ukraine and being subjected to increasingly punitive\nsanctions is not\nto their advantage<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A far more important factor is Putin, whose long-standing presence at the helm obscures analytical distinctions between the qualities of his leadership<\/a> and the structural features of the Russian regime. Putin\u2019s own brand of leadership has been controversial, to say the least. He has been alternatingly labeled a great leader because of his past exploits and a madman because of Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine, which seems to have been engineered and is being directed primarily by Putin alone. The question here, of course, is the gap between Putin\u2019s stated concerns over Western encroachment, Russia\u2019s claims over Ukraine, and actual Russian policy. Putin could have achieved his goals with a circumscribed invasion of the disputed regions. Instead, Russia\u2019s current destructive path makes sense only in the context of a leader contemptuous of Ukrainian statehood<\/a> and one who cannot make peace with an international order unwilling to accommodate Russian exceptionalism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Putin\u2019s rationale is likely also affected\nby Russia\u2019s grim prospects. Despite its reputedly sanction-proof economy, the\nRussian economy is likely to contract because of sanctions and the costs of the\nwar itself. Despite the overall successes of the Russian economy under Putin, hydrocarbons\nconstitute most<\/a>\nof Russia\u2019s exports, which portends economic volatility and vulnerability,\nespecially if Russia\u2019s major trading partners like Germany decided to terminate\nthe importation of Russian gas<\/a>. Russia has also been facing a demographic\ndecline<\/a> since the end of the Cold War, which has only become more\npronounced in recent years, with projections casting doubt about the\npossibility of Russia having the necessary manpower to be able to conduct war at\nthe scale of its invasion of Ukraine in the future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Russian leadership, or Putin at the\nvery least, must be viewing Russia\u2019s prospects with concern. They were willing\nto invade a large neighboring state to rectify this problem. The said state exists\non geopolitically significant real estate and, like many of its neighbors,\nattempted to court the West to allay the eventuality of a Russian invasion. Disdainful\nof Ukrainian independence, and lacking any compunctions about using force, Putin\u2019s\ndecision appears to be a calculated risk taken to resuscitate Russian power by a\nleadership unwilling to accept their country\u2019s decline.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Calling a Spade, a Spade<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The fact of the matter is that Russia\u2019s\nwholesale invasion of a neighboring country is consistent with Russia\u2019s past modus\noperandi<\/em>. It is, moreover, a serious blow to international order as it\nundermines the sovereignty of Ukraine, the security arrangements in the region,\nand the fundamental goals of the international order to promote peaceful\ncoexistence. Ultimately, Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine rests on flimsy,\njingoistic reasoning. Russia has long expressed grievances over Western\ninfluence and its waning influence among neighbors. Its decision to escalate in\nUkraine ultimately lies in a fundamental inability to link Russia\u2019s long-term interests\nwith that of the international community, and the urgency with which the Russian\nleadership seeks to address Russia\u2019s projected decline. NATO and EU expansion\nno doubt aggravated these concerns, but the Russian response essentially\nvindicates its former imperial subjects\u2019 zealous desire to join the West.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conventional IR theoretical \u201cwisdom\u201d should\nnot distract us from decades of Russian exceptionalism and its disposition\ncontra international order. Presently, the international community has no other\noption than to act in solidarity with Ukraine until the end of the hostilities,\nafter which the international community needs to work hard to make Russia a\ngenuine stakeholder in the system. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Dr. Onur Erpul <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Onur Erpul earned his BA and MA in International Relations from Bilkent University, and Ph.D. from Florida International University. He is a postdoctoral researcher at the Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research. His research interests include IR Theory, foreign policy analysis, security studies, state formation Erpul\u2019s publications have appeared in International Theory, Foreign Policy Analysis, and the Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies.<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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To cite this work :<\/strong> Onur Erpul \u201c IR Theory and Russian Apologia \u201d, Panorama<\/em>, Online , 10 May 2022, https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/blog\/2022\/05\/10\/rs-theory2\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Copyright@UIKPanorama. All on-line and print rights reserved. Opinions expressed in works published by the Panorama<\/em> belongs to the authors alone unless otherwise stated, and do not imply endorsement by the IRCT, Global Academy, or the Editors\/Editorial Board of Panorama. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine has called into question the major paradigms of International Relations (IR) \u2013 Realism in particular \u2013 and reinvigorated debates about great power politics. An important strand of Realist thought has set the tone, highlighting the culpability of the West in interfering with Russia\u2019s traditional sphere of influence and goading the Russians […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":158,"featured_media":9131,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[512,486],"tags":[656,621,643,644],"class_list":["post-11545","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-crisis-in-ukraine","category-opinion","tag-english","tag-russia","tag-theory-and-method","tag-ukraine"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11545","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/158"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=11545"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11545\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/9131"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=11545"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=11545"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=11545"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}