{"id":11555,"date":"2022-04-14T15:33:01","date_gmt":"2022-04-14T15:33:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/2022\/04\/cin-ukr\/"},"modified":"2024-11-21T00:11:39","modified_gmt":"2024-11-20T21:11:39","slug":"beijings-reaction-to-ukraine-crisis-divergence-from-principled-foreign-policy-abdurrahim-sagir","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/2022\/04\/beijings-reaction-to-ukraine-crisis-divergence-from-principled-foreign-policy-abdurrahim-sagir\/","title":{"rendered":"Beijing\u2019s Reaction to Ukraine Crisis: Divergence From Principled Foreign Policy?- Abdurrahim Sa\u011f\u0131r"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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Adoption of a new\ndiplomatic framework titled \u2018Major Power Diplomacy\u2019 at the 17th Party congress\nhas been a milestone for Chinese diplomacy.[i]<\/a>\nChinese foreign policy (CFP) entered a transition period where Beijing was\nready to abandon \u2018developing country\u2019 identity and appear as a \u2018responsible\nmajor power\u2019. Ever since, reflections of a new way of strategic thinking in\nBeijing has been evident in policy outputs. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

While this gradual change was taking place in CFP, Chinese leadership took every opportunity to confirm their adherence to the guiding principles of Chinese diplomacy. The innovative features of Xi Jinping\u2019s foreign policy were added to solid foundation of CFP tradition. Therefore, an adequate evaluation of the gradual change in CFP calls for a reading in the context of Chinese diplomacy. This piece offers a reading of China\u2019s reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine with adding core principles of CFP into the perspective. In this regard, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping\u2019s contributions to Chinese diplomacy will be briefly highlighted to draw a basic framework for Chinese diplomacy tradition. The focus of the paper will be on Beijing\u2019s divergence from its traditional attitude by offering political and economic support to Moscow. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    People\u2019s Republic of China\u2019s (PRC) Diplomacy\nTradition<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Introduced by Zhou Enlai, the first premier of China, in 1958, \u201cThe Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence\u201d could be regarded as foundation stones of PRC\u2019s diplomacy. These principles are<\/a>; \u2018mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity\u2019, \u2018non-aggression\u2019, \u2018non- interference in each other\u2019s internal affairs\u2019, \u2018equality and mutual benefit’, and \u2018peaceful coexistence\u2019. These principles are underpinning Chinese diplomacy for the last 65 years. Among five, Beijing places special emphasis on territorial integrity and national sovereignty. Beijing\u2019s policy on Syrian crisis was built upon these two principles. Despite all the international pressure, Beijing -together with Moscow- provided a security umbrella for Assad regime at UNSC by issuing 9 vetoes<\/a> for \u201cprotecting Syria\u2019s territorial integrity\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Deng Xiaoping, paramount leader of PRC, has been another leader that has left his personal influence on Chinese diplomacy. He managed to alter struggle-centered ideological world view in Beijing. Peace and development was \u201cthe current theme of the international affairs\u201d according to Deng.[ii]<\/a> Within this context, \u2018non-alignment\u2019 principle and \u2018keeping a low profile\u2019 strategy have been his most salient contributions that become to be core principles of Chinese diplomacy. Non-alignment principle enabled Chinese leaders to refrain from forming alliances with loads of long-term commitments and responsibilities. Instead, Beijing developed a strategy of building flexible partnerships across the world. Keeping a low-profile strategy on the other hand, was suggesting maintaining a low profile in international affairs. The strategy was aimed at focusing on its development while presenting a benign image to the world as a status quo power. In practical terms these principles have facilitated Chinese government to avoid political confrontations and focus on its development goals. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

     Beijing\u2019s\nReactions to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Evaluation of Beijing\u2019s reaction to Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine in this context, indicates abandonment of some of the core principles of Chinese diplomacy. Given the degree of emphasis placed on sovereignty and territorial integrity for decades, China\u2019s reaction could be regarded as \u2018unusual\u2019. At the initial phases of the crisis, Chinese diplomats have refrained from making any references to Ukraine\u2019s sovereignty or territorial integrity. On February 24<\/a>, after being asked if China considers Russia\u2019s action as an invasion, Foreign Ministry spokesperson described the situation as a result of \u201ccomplex historical background\u201d and \u201cinterplay of various factors\u201d. Chinese government choose to frame the Russian attacks as \u201cRussia\u2019s special military operation\u201d which also reflected in the coverages of Chinese media outlets. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Considering China\u2019s firm stance on protecting Syria\u2019s sovereignty and territorial integrity, Beijing\u2019s attitude towards Ukraine raises questions about the Beijing\u2019s principled foreign policy behaviors. Beijing is simultaneously displaying two different attitudes towards the two ongoing crises. In this regard, selective application of \u2018respect for sovereignty\u2019 principle is likely to lead to questioning of \u2018responsible major power\u2019 image that Beijing has been eagerly trying to establish under Xi Jinping\u2019s leadership.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another point that deserves attention is the nature of relationship between China and Russia. Chinese government has always been clear that Sino-Russia relation is a strategic partnership not an alliance. However, Xi-Putin meeting at the 2022 Winter Olympics marked escalation of relations to a further level. In the joint statement<\/a> running over 5000 words long, two countries emphasized their shared world view and declared that there are \u201cno limits\u201d to the two\u2019s \u201cfriendship\u201d and \u201cno \u2018forbidden\u2019 areas of cooperation.\u201d The two countries endorsed each other\u2019s security concerns such as expansion of NATO or AUKUS. Another significant outcome of the meeting was China\u2019s pledge to purchase 117.5 billion worth of the Russian gas and oil, which have strengthened Putin\u2019s hand in the face economic sanctions. Chinese foreign ministry also underlined<\/a> that \u201cChina firmly opposes any form of unilateral sanctions.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

 In the context of both sides\u2019 increased dissatisfaction with the US-led order and their confrontation with the US, this meeting can be interpreted as escalation of bilateral ties further then partnership relations. In fact, many Western analysists viewed the joint statement as a \u2018\u2018landmark document\u2019\u2019<\/a> which is a declaration of a \u2018\u2018de facto security alliance<\/a>\u2019\u2019. This might be an execration for the moment, but Beijing\u2019s covert support for the Russian actions should not be underseen. Beijing\u2019s political and economic support for Moscow at such a crucial time is not a usual practice in Chinese diplomacy. After abstaining from UN resolution<\/a> condemning Russian invasion of Ukraine on 25 February, China issued sole supporting vote for Russia\u2019s resolution on 24 March<\/a>. Following the discovery of civilian bodies at the town of Bucha, Beijing once again refrained from naming or criticizing the perpetrator. Despite the tense international criticism against Moscow, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson<\/a> called to \u201cexercise restraint and avoid unfounded accusations\u201d until the full picture is clear.  At the General Assembly vote on 7April<\/a>, China voted against the resolution for suspending Russia from UN Human Rights Council. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Given Beijing\u2019s\nlongstanding emphasis on sovereignty and territorial integrity, these\ncompromises are overperforming the level of commitment expected in a\npartnership relation. Beijing\u2019s actions are resembling more of backing up an\nally who is facing international backlash. And both parties shared threat\nperception of the US and their sufferings from unilateral sanctions makes this\nrapprochement more spontaneous. Although China and Russia do not share the\nexact same vision for the future of international order and there are potential\nsources of conflict between the two, recent developments are creating favorable\nincentives for the emergence of a Russia-China axis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

 Overall, China\u2019s support for the Russian aggression would potentially jeopardize Xi Jinping\u2019s global governance vision of \u201cbuilding a community of shared future for all humankind<\/a>\u201d. Despite the embracive narratives of the Chinese government on global governance, refraining from taking any measures against the perpetrator in an international crisis will lead to questionings at the international stage. Reflections of these actions will stay as warning notice especially for the developing world that is in expectance of a principled, value-driven foreign policy approach from China. As Josep Borrell, the European Union\u2019s high representative for foreign affairs, stated<\/a> recently \u201cChina cannot pretend to be a responsible great power but close its eyes or cover its ears when it comes to a conflict that obviously makes it uncomfortable…\u201d
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[i]<\/a> For further reading; Michael D. Swaine,\n\u201cChinese Views of Foreign Policy in the 19th Party Congress,\u201d China Leadership\nMonitor No:55 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2018<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[ii]<\/a> Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. III,\np. 104 in Honghua Men, “China\u2019s grand strategy: a framework analysis” \nSingapore, Peking University Press and Springer, 2020<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Abdurrahim Sa\u011f\u0131r,<\/strong> received his undergraduate degree in Chinese Law from Wuhan University and continues his graduate studies in International Relations and Diplomacy at Shanghai University. He continues his research activities at Shanghai University Center for Global Governance. His research interests include Chinese Foreign Policy, China’s Middle East Strategy, China-Middle East Relations and Chinese Think Tanks. <\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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To cite this work :<\/strong> Abdurrahim Sa\u011f\u0131r, \u201c Beijing\u2019s Reaction to Ukraine Crisis: Divergence From Principled Foreign Policy?\u201d, Panorama<\/em>, Online , 14 April 2022, https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/blog\/2022\/04\/14\/cin-ukr\/ <\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Copyright@UIKPanorama. All on-line and print rights reserved. Opinions expressed in works published by the Panorama<\/em> belongs to the authors alone unless otherwise stated, and do not imply endorsement by the IRCT, Global Academy, or the Editors\/Editorial Board of Panorama. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Adoption of a new diplomatic framework titled \u2018Major Power Diplomacy\u2019 at the 17th Party congress has been a milestone for Chinese diplomacy.[i] Chinese foreign policy (CFP) entered a transition period where Beijing was ready to abandon \u2018developing country\u2019 identity and appear as a \u2018responsible major power\u2019. Ever since, reflections of a new way of strategic […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":60,"featured_media":9081,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[509,512,486],"tags":[601,656,563,644],"class_list":["post-11555","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-china","category-crisis-in-ukraine","category-opinion","tag-china","tag-english","tag-foreign-policy-and-diplomacy","tag-ukraine"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11555","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/60"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=11555"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11555\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/9081"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=11555"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=11555"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=11555"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}