{"id":11642,"date":"2021-02-18T08:53:16","date_gmt":"2021-02-18T08:53:16","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/2021\/02\/turkey-as-a-middle-power-in-international-politics-betwixt-and-between-a-militarized-foreign-policy-and-active-diplomacy\/"},"modified":"2024-11-21T00:27:50","modified_gmt":"2024-11-20T21:27:50","slug":"turkey-as-a-middle-power-in-international-politics-betwixt-and-between-a-militarized-foreign-policy-and-active-diplomacy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/2021\/02\/turkey-as-a-middle-power-in-international-politics-betwixt-and-between-a-militarized-foreign-policy-and-active-diplomacy\/","title":{"rendered":"Turkey as a Middle Power in International Politics: Betwixt and Between a Militarized Foreign Policy and Active Diplomacy – \u00d6zlem Kayhan Pusane"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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For the past few years, Turkey has been experiencing a middle power country’s dilemmas in its foreign policy. Especially since 2016, Turkey\u2019s military activism has been on the rise in a number of issue areas ranging from the Syrian civil war and the Libyan crisis to the Azerbaijan-Armenia confrontation and the Eastern Mediterranean conflict. Turkey has achieved some successes on all of these fronts, too. However, the country is once again on the news concerning its diplomatic signals and efforts in the region and beyond, trying to reconcile with the United States, Israel, and the Gulf countries. This turn of events is closely connected to Turkey\u2019s being a middle-ranked country in international politics. Specifically, the gap between Turkey\u2019s expectations and capabilities has brought the country\u2019s policymakers back into the realm of diplomacy and reconciliation in foreign policy. Thus, in order to flourish in regional and international politics, Turkey must find a balance between its military instruments and soft power politics. While Turkish policymakers need to continue with their support for and investment in the country\u2019s thriving defense industry and be ready for military engagement when necessary, they also need to re-energize Turkey\u2019s soft power politics, and revitalize the diplomatic path to improve the country\u2019s position in various regional and international institutions and alliances.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Scholars have often characterized Turkey as a middle power<\/a> in international politics, which is expected to be involved with regard to global issues, build effective coalitions based on normative principles<\/a>, and  act as a bridge between the North and the South<\/a>. In the emerging multipolar world, though, where the U.S. hegemony seems to be in decline, middle powers today tend to act more independently in their foreign policies and find  \u201cmore room to maneuver through a variety of instruments and policies\u201d<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

As an emerging middle power, Turkey became a prominent actor in regional and international politics with its soft power from the early 2000s until recently. It gained a significant amount of visibility through efforts including, but not limited to, its presence in the United Nations Security Council as a non-permanent member between 2009-2010, its involvement in the resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue with Brazil, and acting as a mediator in the Israeli-Syrian talks. However, especially since 2016, Turkey has been pursuing a foreign policy based on hard power and military activism on several fronts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Winds of Change<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Analysts have come up with different arguments as to why Turkey has increased the use of military tools in its foreign policy in recent years. While some have emphasized the\u00a0rise of a conservative-nationalist alliance<\/a>between the ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalk\u0131nma Partisi-AKP<\/em>) and the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi-MHP<\/em>) as well as\u00a0President Recep Tayyip Erdogan\u2019s efforts to maintain his popularity at home<\/a>, others have directed attention to the\u00a0insufficiency of soft power tools<\/a>\u00a0in a changing regional order, the\u00a0recent strides in the Turkish defense industry<\/a>\u00a0and the\u00a0implications of the 2016 Coup attempt<\/a>. Some also mentioned the power vacuum created by the\u00a0\u201cdiplomatic divestment of the United States from Europe<\/a>\u201d. Without a doubt, all of these factors have contributed to the emergence of a more hardline direction in Turkish foreign policy. However, there is also a more general framework within which we can place this hard power stance in Turkish foreign policy: the recent gradual dissolution of the Western liberal international order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since the end of World War II, the liberal international order has been characterized by the institutions and alliances formed under the United States\u2019 leadership. However, in recent years the principles and norms of this order have received significant damage. Developments such as the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, the murder of Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul in 2018, and President Trump\u2019s recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights in March 2019 are but a few examples of how some of the basic norms of the liberal international order have been blatantly violated in the past few years. Relative Western silence or inaction in the face of these developments contributed to a decrease in the emerging middle powers\u2019 willingness to act as normative actors and engage in global governance mechanisms. During this period, Turkish officials also found themselves focused more on Turkey\u2019s immediate neighborhood, dealing with the country\u2019s security challenges through Realpolitik lenses and hard power tools rather than on diplomatic and multilateral efforts to address global issues.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Turkey\u2019s military engagement in several theaters of conflict<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

In 2016, 2018, and 2019, Turkey has carried out military interventions in northern Syria as part of its struggle against the Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party (Partiya Karker\u00ean Kurdistan\u00ea \u2014\u00a0<\/em>PKK) and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In the same time period, Turkey\u2019s counterterrorism efforts also involved the Turkish Armed Forces\u2019 cross-border military operations in northern Iraq. In November 2019, Turkey\u00a0signed a maritime agreement<\/a>\u00a0with the UN-recognized Government of National Accord in Libya at the dismay of Egypt and Greece, and in summer 2020,\u00a0provided military support<\/a>\u00a0for this Tripoli-based government in its military struggle against Khalifa Haftar forces backed by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates. Furthermore, in the most recent Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict in late 2020, Turkish leaders provided\u00a0\u201cunequivocal support\u201d<\/a>\u00a0for the Azeri side. They declared that Turkey would\u00a0\u201cstand by Azerbaijan whichever way it prefers<\/a>\u201d. Turkish military engagement in these areas had a significant impact on the ground, too. For example, Turkey prevented the formation of a Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yek\u00eetiya Demokrat<\/em>\u00a0\u2014 PYD)-dominated Kurdish corridor in northern Syria, which it identifies as an existential threat due to the PYD\u2019s and its armed wing People\u2019s Protection Units\u2019 (Yek\u00eeney\u00ean Parastina Gel<\/em>\u00a0\u2014 YPG) ties with the PKK. At the same time, it shifted the balance of forces in favor of Fayez Al-Sarraj and Haidar Aliyev governments in Libya and Azerbaijan, respectively. Turkey\u2019s military engagement in these places also turned into an opportunity to\u00a0showcase the developments in the country\u2019s defense industry<\/a>, especially its\u00a0\u201chomemade armed drones\u201d<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As a middle power, Turkey cannot pursue an entirely independent foreign policy, irrespective of the global players, such as the United States and China, and regional players, such as Russia.<\/p><\/blockquote><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

However, there is a limit to what Turkey can achieve militarily and politically on its own in these conflict zones and other issue areas. As a middle power, Turkey cannot pursue an entirely independent foreign policy, irrespective of the global players, such as the United States and China, and regional players, such as Russia. Turkish officials received a green light or at least a yellow light from the United States and\/or Russia before they opted for active military engagement in the abovementioned areas. Furthermore, it seems that Turkish policymakers have not been able to turn all of their battlefield achievements into political successes so far. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Back to diplomacy and reconciliation<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Thus, it is not surprising to observe Turkish officials once again turning back to the path of diplomacy and reconciliation these days. Turkish government\u2019s policy to appoint a new ambassador to Israel<\/a> after the 2018 decision to withdrew its diplomat in the midst of the U.S. Embassy\u2019s move to Jerusalem, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlut Cavusoglu\u2019s announcement in late 2020 that Turkey and Egypt are working on a rapprochement<\/a> in their bilateral relations, Turkey\u2019s positive signals to the Biden Administration<\/a>, President Erdogan\u2019s declaration that Turkey is \u201cready to put our relations back on track\u201d<\/a> in a meeting with the European Union ambassadors in January 2021, all demonstrate that Turkey is embarked on a new agenda<\/a> of diplomacy, and reconciliation in its relations with other regional and international actors. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

There is no doubt that the gradual decline of the Western liberal international order has turned Turkey\u2019s attention away from normative principles toward hard power instruments. However, Turkey will be a more successful actor in its region if it combines the its military achievements with diplomatic openings. Being aware of its strengths and weaknesses as a middle power, while Turkish policymakers should continue with their support for and investment in the country\u2019s thriving defense industry and be ready for military engagement when necessary, they also need to re-energize Turkey\u2019s soft power politics, and to revitalize the diplomatic path in order to improve the country\u2019s position in various regional and international institutions and alliances.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u00d6zlem Kayhan Pusane<\/strong> is an Associate Professor of International Relations at I\u015f\u0131k University, \u0130stanbul, Turkey. Her research interests include security studies, civil-military relations, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and Turkey\u2019s security and foreign policy.<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n

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To cite this work<\/strong> :<\/strong> Ozlem Kayhan Pusane, \u201cTurkey as a Middle Power in International Politics: Betwixt and Between a Militarized Foreign Policy and Active Diplomacy\u201d, Panorama<\/em>, Online, 18 February 2021, https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/blog\/2021\/02\/18\/turkey-as-a-middle-power-in-international-politics-betwixt-and-between-a-militarized-foreign-policy-and-active-diplomacy\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Copyright@UIKPanorama.<\/em>All on-line and print rights reserved. Opinions expressed in this work belongs to the author(s) alone, and do not imply endorsement by the IRCT, the Editorial Board or the editors of the Panorama<\/em>. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

For the past few years, Turkey has been experiencing a middle power country’s dilemmas in its foreign policy. Especially since 2016, Turkey\u2019s military activism has been on the rise in a number of issue areas ranging from the Syrian civil war and the Libyan crisis to the Azerbaijan-Armenia confrontation and the Eastern Mediterranean conflict. Turkey […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":91,"featured_media":8465,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[486,508,499],"tags":[656,653],"class_list":["post-11642","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-opinion","category-turkey","category-usa","tag-english","tag-international-politics"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11642","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/91"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=11642"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11642\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/8465"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=11642"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=11642"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=11642"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}