{"id":11645,"date":"2021-02-13T13:52:58","date_gmt":"2021-02-13T13:52:58","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/2021\/02\/jeopolitik-bir-aktor-olarak-avrupa-birliginin-ortadogu-ve-kuzey-afrikadaki-rolu\/"},"modified":"2024-11-21T00:28:29","modified_gmt":"2024-11-20T21:28:29","slug":"jeopolitik-bir-aktor-olarak-avrupa-birliginin-ortadogu-ve-kuzey-afrikadaki-rolu","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/2021\/02\/jeopolitik-bir-aktor-olarak-avrupa-birliginin-ortadogu-ve-kuzey-afrikadaki-rolu\/","title":{"rendered":"Jeopolitik Bir Akt\u00f6r Olarak Avrupa Birli\u011fi\u2019nin Ortado\u011fu ve Kuzey Afrika\u2019daki Rol\u00fc &#8211; Mehmet Bardak\u00e7\u0131"},"content":{"rendered":"<ul>\n<li>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tE-ISSN: 2718-0549<\/li>\n<li>\n\t\t\t\t\t<a href=\"https:\/\/dx.doi.org\/10.13140\/RG.2.2.30777.60006\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><br \/>\nDOI: 10.13140\/RG.2.2.28320.71689<br \/>\n<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"986\" height=\"1024\" src=\"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/08\/EU-Italy-2-986x1024.jpg\" alt=\"\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/08\/EU-Italy-2-986x1024.jpg 986w, https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/08\/EU-Italy-2-289x300.jpg 289w, https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/08\/EU-Italy-2-768x798.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/08\/EU-Italy-2-1479x1536.jpg 1479w, https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/08\/EU-Italy-2-1972x2048.jpg 1972w, https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/08\/EU-Italy-2-360x374.jpg 360w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 986px) 100vw, 986px\"><\/p>\n<h4>\u00d6zet<\/h4>\n<p>Avrupa Birli\u011fi (AB), 2016\u2019da K\u00fcresel Strateji\u2019yi kabul etti. AB\u2019nin bu ad\u0131m\u0131, k\u00fcresel ve b\u00f6lgesel d\u00fczeyde ger\u00e7ekle\u015fen bir dizi geli\u015fmenin sonucunda ger\u00e7ekle\u015fti. Son on be\u015f y\u0131lda otoriter rejimlerin yayg\u0131nla\u015fmas\u0131, ABD\u2019nin artan bir \u015fekilde k\u00fcresel siyasetten k\u0131smi \u00e7ekili\u015fi, \u00e7ok kutuplu k\u00fcresel d\u00fczenin yayg\u0131nl\u0131k kazanmas\u0131 ve Arap Uyan\u0131\u015f\u0131\u2019n\u0131n Ortado\u011fu ve Kuzey Afrika\u2019da (OKA) do\u011furdu\u011fu kaos g\u00fc\u00e7 politikas\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6nemini art\u0131rd\u0131. Bu geli\u015fmelere cevap olarak AB, jeopolitik bir akt\u00f6re d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015fmek i\u00e7in \u00e7e\u015fitli ad\u0131mlar att\u0131. Bunlar\u0131n en ba\u015f\u0131nda 2016\u2019da K\u00fcresel Strateji\u2019yi kabul etmesi gelmektedir. \u201cStratejik otonomi\u201dyi merkeze yerle\u015ftiren K\u00fcresel Strateji, Blo\u011fu b\u00f6lgesel geli\u015fmelerde etkin bir oyuncuya d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcrmeyi ama\u00e7lamaktad\u0131r. Birlik, jeopolitik bir akt\u00f6re d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015fmek yolunda Libya\u2019da 2019\u2019da hayata ge\u00e7irilen \u201c\u0130rini Operasyonu\u201d gibi baz\u0131 m\u00fctevaz\u0131 giri\u015fimlerde bulundu. Kollektif askeri operasyonlarda AB Ortak D\u0131\u015f ve G\u00fcvenlik Politikas\u0131\u2019n\u0131n (ODGP) en \u00f6nemli sorunu ortak bir politika olu\u015fturulmas\u0131ndaki g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fckt\u00fcr. Bu engelin a\u015f\u0131lmas\u0131nda en uygun \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm, askeri operasyonlara kat\u0131lacak \u00fclkelerin g\u00f6n\u00fcll\u00fcl\u00fck esas\u0131na g\u00f6re belirlenmesi g\u00f6r\u00fcnmektedir. ABD\u2019nin \u00f6n\u00fcm\u00fczdeki y\u0131llarda uluslaras\u0131 sistemde oynayaca\u011f\u0131 rol\u00fcn azalmaya devam edece\u011fi, \u00e7ok kutuplulu\u011fa ge\u00e7i\u015fin s\u00fcrece\u011fi, OKA\u2019daki yap\u0131sal istikrars\u0131zl\u0131klar\u0131n uzun y\u0131llar boyunca b\u00f6lgeyi etkisi alt\u0131na alaca\u011f\u0131, \u00c7in ve Rusya gibi Bat\u0131l\u0131 olmayan otoriter \u00fclkelerin k\u0131sa ve orta vadede d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015f\u00fcme u\u011framas\u0131n\u0131n beklenmedi\u011fi ve ODGP\u2019deki g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fcklere \u201cg\u00f6n\u00fcll\u00fcler koalisyonu\u201dnun bir \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm oldu\u011funun g\u00f6r\u00fcld\u00fc\u011f\u00fc g\u00f6z \u00f6n\u00fcnde bulundurulursa en az\u0131ndan k\u0131sa ve orta vadede AB\u2019nin OKA\u2019da jeopolitik rol\u00fcn\u00fc art\u0131rmas\u0131 gerekti\u011fi g\u00f6r\u00fclmektedir.<\/p>\n<h3>Giri\u015f<\/h3>\n<p>Avrupa Birli\u011fi (AB), Avrupa k\u0131tas\u0131n\u0131 iki defa yerle bir eden D\u00fcnya sava\u015flar\u0131n\u0131n b\u0131rakt\u0131\u011f\u0131 sava\u015f kar\u015f\u0131t\u0131 miras nedeniyle bir daha sava\u015f \u00e7\u0131kmamas\u0131 ad\u0131na \u00fcyelerinin ekonomilerini ve di\u011fer sekt\u00f6rleri kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131kl\u0131 olarak birbirine ba\u011flayan, g\u00fc\u00e7 politikas\u0131na s\u0131rt\u0131n\u0131 d\u00f6nen ve yumu\u015fak g\u00fcce dayal\u0131 bir yap\u0131 olarak kuruldu. Bununla birlikte 2000\u2019lerin ortalar\u0131ndan itibaren otoriter rejimlerin y\u00fckseli\u015fi, ABD\u2019nin d\u00fcnya siyasetinden k\u0131smi \u00e7ekili\u015fi, \u00e7ok kutuplu bir k\u00fcresel d\u00fczene ge\u00e7i\u015f s\u00fcrecinin h\u0131zlanmas\u0131 ve Arap ayaklanmalar\u0131 sonras\u0131nda Ortado\u011fu ve Kuzey Afrika\u2019da (OKA) kaosun hakim olmas\u0131yla birlikte jepolitikan\u0131n \u00f6nemi artt\u0131. \u0130stikrars\u0131z co\u011frafyalarda sert g\u00fc\u00e7 kullan\u0131m\u0131n\u0131n yayg\u0131nla\u015fmas\u0131na bir cevap olarak AB, OKA gibi \u00e7alkant\u0131l\u0131 b\u00f6lgelerde jeopolitik bir akt\u00f6re d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015fmek i\u00e7in \u00e7aba i\u00e7erisine girdi.<\/p>\n<p>So\u011fuk Sava\u015f\u2019\u0131n bitiminden &nbsp;sonra AB, bir ortak d\u0131\u015f ve g\u00fcvenlik politikas\u0131 ve bunlar\u0131 hayata ge\u00e7irecek ara\u00e7lar ve makamlar olu\u015fturmay\u0131 hedefledi. Ne var ki, bu politikalar AB\u2019yi etkin bir k\u00fcresel jeopolitik akt\u00f6re d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcrme amac\u0131n\u0131 ta\u015f\u0131m\u0131yordu. AB\u2019nin k\u00fcresel bir akt\u00f6r olarak rol\u00fc So\u011fuk Sava\u015f sonras\u0131 d\u00f6nemde 1990\u2019lar\u0131n ortas\u0131ndan itibaren hem Birlik i\u00e7i (\u00f6rn. AB\u2019nin zamanla b\u00fcy\u00fcmesi) hem de Birlik d\u0131\u015f\u0131 geli\u015fmelere (\u00f6rn. Yugoslavya\u2019y\u0131 par\u00e7alanmaya g\u00f6t\u00fcren sava\u015flar) ba\u011fl\u0131 olarak geli\u015fim g\u00f6sterdi. AB, Ortak D\u0131\u015f ve G\u00fcvenlik Politikas\u0131 (ODGP) ve zamanla bununla ili\u015fkili kurumlar ve ara\u00e7lar olu\u015fturdu. ODGP \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde AB kurumlar\u0131na verilen yetkiler giderek geni\u015fletildi. 2003\u2019te AB, Avrupa G\u00fcvenlik Strateji\u2019ni (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/en\/documents-publications\/publications\/european-security-strategy-secure-europe-better-world\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">AG<\/a>S yay\u0131nlayarak Avrupa k\u0131tas\u0131na d\u00f6n\u00fck g\u00fcvenlik tehditlerini tan\u0131mlad\u0131. AGS\u2019nin yerini alan ve 2016 y\u0131l\u0131nda yay\u0131nlanan \u201cAvrupa Birli\u011fi D\u0131\u015f ve G\u00fcvenlik Politikas\u0131 i\u00e7in K\u00fcresel Strateji\u201dsiyle (k\u0131saca K\u00fcresel <a href=\"https:\/\/eeas.europa.eu\/sites\/eeas\/files\/eugs_review_web_0.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Strateji<\/a>) AB, b\u00f6lgesindeki jeopolitik de\u011fi\u015fime bir cevap vermek istedi. K\u00fcresel Strateji\u2019nin ama\u00e7lad\u0131\u011f\u0131 \u201cstratejik otonomi\u201d, Birli\u011fi b\u00f6lgesindeki geli\u015fmelere kar\u015f\u0131 edilgen bir seyirci olmaktan \u00e7\u0131kararak etkin bir akt\u00f6r haline getirmeyi hedeflemektedir.<\/p>\n<h3>Uluslararas\u0131 Siyasette Jeopolitikan\u0131n Y\u00fckseli\u015fi<\/h3>\n<p>Son y\u0131llarda AB yetkilileri jeopolitikan\u0131n \u00f6nemini s\u0131kl\u0131kla vurgulad\u0131. Avrupa Komisyonu Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Ursula von der Leyen, \u201cjeopolitika komisyonu\u201d kurulmas\u0131 gerekti\u011finden <a href=\"https:\/\/carnegieeurope.eu\/2020\/02\/25\/how-eu-can-survive-in-geopolitical-age-pub-81132\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">bahsetti<\/a>. AB D\u0131\u015f \u0130li\u015fkiler ve G\u00fcvenlik Politikas\u0131 Y\u00fcksek Temsilcisi Josep Borell, AB\u2019nin \u201cg\u00fcc\u00fcn dilini kullanmay\u0131 \u00f6\u011frenmesi\u201d gerekti\u011fini <a href=\"https:\/\/carnegieeurope.eu\/2020\/02\/25\/how-eu-can-survive-in-geopolitical-age-pub-81132\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">s\u00f6yledi.<\/a>Fransa Devlet Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Emmanuel Macron ise AB\u2019nin bir stratejik g\u00fc\u00e7 olarak hareket etmemesi halinde \u201cjeopolitik olarak yok olaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131\u201d <a href=\"https:\/\/carnegieeurope.eu\/2020\/02\/25\/how-eu-can-survive-in-geopolitical-age-pub-81132\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">s\u00f6yledi.<\/a>Jean Monnet ve Robert Schuman\u2019\u0131n temellerini att\u0131\u011f\u0131 ve sert g\u00fcc\u00fcn yerini yumu\u015fak g\u00fcce terk etti\u011fi AB\u2019de son zamanlarda jeopolitikan\u0131n y\u00fcceltilmesi AB\u2019nin bar\u0131\u015f\u00e7\u0131l ruhuna bir tezat gibi g\u00f6r\u00fcnmekle birlikte, bu noktaya birden bire gelinmedi\u011fini an\u0131msamakta yarar var.<\/p>\n<p>Birka\u00e7 unsur bu de\u011fi\u015fimde etkili oldu. Birincisi, 2008-2009 mali-ekonomik krizinden ABD\u2019nin derin bir \u015fekilde etkilenmesi, Afganistan ve Irak\u2019taki askeri operasyonlarda binlerce Amerikan askerinin \u00f6lmesi ve trilyonlarca dolar\u0131n harcanmas\u0131 nedeniyle Amerikan halk\u0131n\u0131n tepki g\u00f6stermesi ve bu y\u00fczden y\u00f6netimin \u00fclkenin i\u00e7 sorunlar\u0131na y\u00f6nelmesi ve \u00c7in\u2019in k\u00fcresel bir akt\u00f6r olarak y\u00fckseli\u015fi sonucunda ABD\u2019nin Asya-Pasifik b\u00f6lgesine y\u00f6nelme ihtiyac\u0131 duymas\u0131 gibi nedenlerle ABD, Ba\u015fkan Barack Obama d\u00f6neminden ba\u015flayarak k\u00fcresel siyasetten \u2013 Avrupa ve OKA b\u00f6lgesi dahil \u2013 k\u0131smen \u00e7ekilmeye ba\u015flad\u0131. Bu da ABD\u2019nin \u00e7ekildi\u011fi b\u00f6lgelerde b\u00fcy\u00fck bir g\u00fc\u00e7 bo\u015flu\u011funa neden oldu. Bu \u00e7ekilme ABD Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Donald Trump d\u00f6neminde dramatik bir hale d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc. Trump, k\u00fcresel siyasetten ABD\u2019yi daha h\u0131zl\u0131 olarak \u00e7ekmekle kalmay\u0131p k\u00fcresel liberal d\u00fczenin ve transatlantik ortakl\u0131\u011f\u0131n alt\u0131n\u0131 oyacak giri\u015fimlerde bulundu. Trump, ittifaklardan, \u00e7ok tarafl\u0131l\u0131ktan, AB\u2019den ho\u015flanmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ifade etti ve NATO\u2019nun gereksiz oldu\u011funu a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a <a href=\"https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/08\/FP_20190905_hostile_ally.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">s\u00f6yledi<\/a>. Trump\u2019\u0131n bu tutumu transatlantik ili\u015fkilerde bariz bir k\u0131r\u0131lmaya yol a\u00e7t\u0131 ve \u015fimdiye kadar ABD\u2019nin g\u00fcvenlik \u015femsiyesi alt\u0131nda ya\u015fayan AB\u2019nin jeopolitik olarak daha fazla sorumluluk almas\u0131n\u0131 gerektirdi.<\/p>\n<p>\u0130kinci nedense 2000\u2019lerin ortas\u0131ndan itibaren Bat\u0131l\u0131 olmayan iki b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00fclkenin demokratik rejimlere sahip olmayaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131n anla\u015f\u0131lmas\u0131d\u0131r. Bunlar, \u00c7in ve Rusya\u2019d\u0131r. Beklentilerin aksine Rusya, Sovyetler Birli\u011fi da\u011f\u0131ld\u0131ktan sonra liberal bir demokrasiye d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015fmek yerine \u201cse\u00e7imli (yada rekabet\u00e7i) otoriterlik\u201d denilen otoriter bir rejime evrildi ve 2014\u2019te K\u0131r\u0131m\u2019\u0131 ilhak ettikten sonra Bat\u0131\u2019yla rekabet halinde etraf\u0131ndaki b\u00f6lgelerde etkin bir jeopolitik akt\u00f6r olmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131. \u00c7in ise ekonomik kalk\u0131nman\u0131n \u00e7o\u011fulculuk ve demokrasiye yol a\u00e7aca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ileri s\u00fcren demokratikle\u015fme teorisindeki varsay\u0131mlar\u0131n aksine nev\u2019i \u015fahs\u0131na m\u00fcnhas\u0131r bir sistemin temsilcisi oldu. Yani, liberal ekonomiyi kom\u00fcnist tek parti idaresiyle birle\u015ftirdi. Rusya gibi \u00c7in de \u00f6zellikle ekonomik alanda k\u00fcresel d\u00fczlemde Bat\u0131\u2019n\u0131n rakibi oldu ve onun etkisini s\u0131n\u0131rland\u0131rd\u0131. &nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>\u00dc\u00e7\u00fcnc\u00fcs\u00fc, 2008-2009 mali-ekonomik krizi k\u00fcresel sistemde bir g\u00fc\u00e7 kaymas\u0131na yol a\u00e7t\u0131. Bu kriz Bat\u0131\u2019n\u0131n kriziydi ve en \u00e7ok ABD ve AB gibi Bat\u0131l\u0131 \u00fclkeleri etkiledi. Bu kriz neticesinde g\u00fc\u00e7, zengin Bat\u0131l\u0131 \u00fclkelerin yer ald\u0131\u011f\u0131 Kuzey\u2019den yoksul ve geli\u015fmekte olan \u00fclkelerin bulundu\u011fu g\u00fcneye kayd\u0131. Yani, 1990\u2019lardan sonra ba\u015flayan \u00e7ok kutuplu k\u00fcresel d\u00fczene ge\u00e7i\u015f 2000\u2019lerin sonuna do\u011fru meydana gelen bu mali-ekonomik krizden sonra daha da h\u0131zland\u0131. \u00c7ok kutuplu sistem, Rusya, \u00c7in ve T\u00fcrkiye gibi y\u00fckselen g\u00fc\u00e7lerin kendi ulusal \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n\u0131 daha etkin olarak koruyup ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z politikalar izleyebilecekleri bir ortam yaratt\u0131. Bu ortam da bu \u00fclkelerin b\u00f6lgesel ve k\u00fcresel meselelerde gerekti\u011finde askeri g\u00fc\u00e7 kullanmas\u0131n\u0131 kolayla\u015ft\u0131rd\u0131.<\/p>\n<p>Son olarak, 2010\u2019un sonunda Tunus\u2019ta patlak veren Arap ayaklanmalar\u0131 hemen hemen b\u00fct\u00fcn Arap Ortado\u011fu\u2019suna yay\u0131ld\u0131. Arap ayaklanmalar\u0131 beklendi\u011finin aksine Ortado\u011fu\u2019da demokratik rejimlere ge\u00e7i\u015fi sa\u011flamak yerine \u2013 k\u0131smen Tunus haricinde \u2013 ya M\u0131s\u0131r \u00f6rne\u011finde oldu\u011fu gibi otoriter rejimlere yol a\u00e7t\u0131 ya da Libya, Yemen ve Suriye \u00f6rneklerinde oldu\u011fu gibi d\u0131\u015f g\u00fc\u00e7lerin de m\u00fcdahil oldu\u011fu i\u00e7 sava\u015flara meydan verdi. OKA\u2019da Arap ayaklanmalar\u0131n\u0131n ortaya \u00e7\u0131kard\u0131\u011f\u0131 bu istikrars\u0131zl\u0131k, ABD\u2019nin k\u00fcresel siyasetten k\u0131smen \u00e7ekilmesi ve AB\u2019nin de sert g\u00fc\u00e7 kullanmadaki isteksizli\u011fi ve haz\u0131rl\u0131ks\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131 g\u00f6z \u00f6n\u00fcnde bulunduruldu\u011funda Rusya, \u0130ran, T\u00fcrkiye ve Suudi Arabistan gibi b\u00f6lgesel g\u00fc\u00e7lerin ortaya \u00e7\u0131kan g\u00fc\u00e7 bo\u015flu\u011funu doldurdu\u011fu bir ortam yaratt\u0131. Ba\u015fka bir deyi\u015fle b\u00f6lgedeki kaos jeopolitikan\u0131n geri d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fc h\u0131zland\u0131rd\u0131.<\/p>\n<p>Nihayetinde bu geli\u015fmeler sonucunda 2016 y\u0131l\u0131nda AB D\u0131\u015f Politika \u015eefi Federica Mogherini taraf\u0131ndan a\u00e7\u0131klanan \u201cAvrupa Birli\u011fi D\u0131\u015f ve G\u00fcvenlik Politikas\u0131 i\u00e7in K\u00fcresel Strateji\u201dsiyle (k\u0131saca K\u00fcresel <a href=\"https:\/\/eeas.europa.eu\/archives\/docs\/top_stories\/pdf\/eugs_review_web.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Strateji<\/a>) AB, b\u00f6lgesel ve k\u00fcresel geli\u015fmeler temelinde g\u00fcvenlik politikas\u0131n\u0131 g\u00fcncellemeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Yeni K\u00fcresel Strateji, AB i\u00e7in \u201cstratejik otonomi\u201dyi hedeflemektedir. Stratejik otonomi AB\u2019nin ABD\u2019den ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z askeri operasyonlar y\u00fcr\u00fctme kapasitesine kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131k gelmektedir. Stratejik otonomi AB\u2019nin g\u00fcvenlik politikas\u0131n\u0131 etkilemekle kalmay\u0131p AB\u2019nin savunma sanayinde de \u00e7e\u015fitli ad\u0131mlar atmas\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6n\u00fcn\u00fc a\u00e7maktad\u0131r. Ba\u015fka bir deyi\u015fle, stratejik otonomi, daha fazla askeri donan\u0131m ve silah\u0131n d\u0131\u015far\u0131dan sat\u0131n al\u0131nmas\u0131 yerine AB \u00fclkelerinde \u00fcretilmesi anlam\u0131na da gelmektedir. Stratejik otonominin ger\u00e7ekle\u015fmesi yolunda, Trump\u2019\u0131n da te\u015fvikiyle AB \u00fclkelerinin NATO b\u00fct\u00e7esindeki paylar\u0131 artt\u0131. Stratejik otonomiyi hayata ge\u00e7irmek i\u00e7in ilk at\u0131lan ad\u0131mlardan birisi 2017\u2019de yirmi be\u015f Birlik \u00fcyesi taraf\u0131ndan olu\u015fturulan Daimi Yap\u0131land\u0131r\u0131lm\u0131\u015f \u0130\u015fbirli\u011fi\u2019dir (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/media\/32079\/pesco-overview-of-first-collaborative-of-projects-for-press.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">PESCO)<\/a>. PESCO \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde \u00fcye devletler savunma harcamalar\u0131n\u0131n art\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131 ve silahl\u0131 kuvvetlerin haz\u0131rl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n geli\u015ftirilmesi gibi konularda i\u015fbirli\u011fini ama\u00e7lamaktad\u0131rlar. Bunun yan\u0131nda bir dizi giri\u015fim ve projeyle AB, \u00fcyelerinin savunma yat\u0131r\u0131mlar\u0131n\u0131 koordine etmeyi, savunma konusundaki ara\u015ft\u0131rmalar\u0131n ve ihalelerin finanse edilmesini ve birliklerin mobilizasyonunu kolayla\u015ft\u0131rmak i\u00e7in alt yap\u0131 yat\u0131r\u0131mlar\u0131 yapmay\u0131 ama\u00e7lamaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n<p>AB, yukar\u0131da say\u0131lan savunma yeteneklerini geli\u015ftirme \u00e7abalar\u0131n\u0131n yan\u0131nda ortak hareket etme kabiliyetlerini de ilerletmeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Bu \u00e7er\u00e7evede Ortak G\u00fcvenlik ve Savunma Politikas\u0131 (OGSP) kapsam\u0131ndaki askeri operasyonlar\u0131n rol\u00fc azal\u0131rken g\u00f6n\u00fcll\u00fcler koalisyonunun \u00f6nemi artt\u0131. \u00d6rne\u011fin, Frans\u0131z Devlet Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Emmanuel Macron taraf\u0131ndan olu\u015fturulan Avrupa M\u00fcdahale Giri\u015fimi (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.clingendael.org\/sites\/default\/files\/2019-09\/The_European_Intervention_2019.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">EI2<\/a>), on iki AB devletini bir araya getiren ve askeri operasyonlarda birlikte hareket etmeyi ama\u00e7layan bir giri\u015fimdir.<\/p>\n<h3>Ortado\u011fu ve Kuzey Afrika\u2019da AB\u2019nin Jeopolitik Bir Oyuncu Olma Aray\u0131\u015f\u0131<\/h3>\n<p>Arap Bahar\u0131 s\u00fcrecinde jeopolitikan\u0131n y\u00fckselmesiyle birlikte AB de OKA b\u00f6lgesinde jeopolitik bir akt\u00f6r olmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmaktad\u0131r. Oysa AB\u2019nin b\u00f6lgedeki daha \u00f6nceki giri\u015fimleri aras\u0131nda yer alan Barselona S\u00fcreci\u2019ndeyse kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131kl\u0131 i\u015fbirli\u011fine ve b\u00f6lgenin sosyo-ekonomik kalk\u0131nmas\u0131na dayal\u0131 olarak istikrar sa\u011flanmas\u0131 ama\u00e7lan\u0131yordu. Arap Bahar\u0131 sonras\u0131ndaysa AB \u00fclkeleri, ABD\u2019nin DAE\u015e\u2019e kar\u015f\u0131 Irak ve Suriye\u2019de y\u00fcr\u00fctt\u00fc\u011f\u00fc askeri operasyona kat\u0131lmakla kalmay\u0131p bu b\u00f6lgeye istikrar ve insani yard\u0131m sa\u011flanmas\u0131nda \u00f6nemli bir rol oynad\u0131. Fransa, \u0130talya, Yunanistan ve Almanya\u2019dan olu\u015fan AB \u00fclkeleri 2019\u2019da ba\u015flat\u0131lan \u201c\u0130rini Operasyonu\u201dyla Libya\u2019ya uygulanan Birle\u015fmi\u015f Milletler (BM) silah ambargosunun hayata ge\u00e7irilmesini sa\u011flamaktad\u0131r. AB \u00fclkeleri, ABD\u2019nin 2018 y\u0131l\u0131nda terk etti\u011fi \u0130ran\u2019la yap\u0131lan n\u00fckleer anla\u015fmay\u0131 korumaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmaktad\u0131r. Bunun yan\u0131nda, Fransa ve bir grup \u00fclke, Ocak 2020\u2019de ba\u015flat\u0131lan H\u00fcrm\u00fcz Bo\u011faz\u0131 Avrupa Deniz Fark\u0131ndal\u0131k misyonuyla Basra K\u00f6rfezi\u2019nde \u0130ran ve K\u00f6rfez \u00fclkeleri aras\u0131ndaki artan gerilime bir cevap vermek istedi. Bu giri\u015fimler b\u00fcy\u00fck ad\u0131mlar olmamakla birlikte AB \u00fclkelerinin kolektif olarak ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirdi\u011fi ilk, \u0131l\u0131ml\u0131 fakat ba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7 itibar\u0131yla \u00f6nemli jeopolitik ad\u0131mlard\u0131r. Bunlar\u0131n yan\u0131nda AB, \u0130srail-Filistin meselesinde, Suriye \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmas\u0131nda ve K\u00f6rfez b\u00f6lgesinde de etkin olmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmaktad\u0131r. <em>&nbsp;<\/em><\/p>\n<p>Birli\u011fin jeopolitik bir akt\u00f6r olma hedefinin \u00f6n\u00fcndeki \u00f6nemli engellerden birisi yirmi yedi \u00fcyeden olu\u015fan bir yap\u0131da ortak bir d\u0131\u015f ve g\u00fcvenlik politikas\u0131 olu\u015fturulmas\u0131 konusundaki g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fckt\u00fcr. Bu sorunun \u00fcstesinden gelmek i\u00e7in AB\u2019nin bundan sonraki jeopolitik giri\u015fimlerinin iste\u011fe ba\u011fl\u0131 olarak \u00fclke gruplar\u0131 taraf\u0131ndan ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirilmesi en mant\u0131kl\u0131 bir \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm olarak g\u00f6z\u00fckmektedir. 2007\u2019de imzalanan Lizbon Antla\u015fmas\u0131\u2019n\u0131n \u0130kinci B\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fc 49. Maddesi\u2019nde AB devletleri aras\u0131nda jeopolitik konularda ileri i\u015fbirli\u011fini kolayla\u015ft\u0131ran h\u00fck\u00fcmler yer almaktad\u0131r. D\u0131\u015f ve g\u00fcvenlik politikas\u0131 gibi hassas konularda AB\u2019de oybirli\u011fi esast\u0131r ve bunu de\u011fi\u015ftirmek pek olas\u0131 de\u011fildir. G\u00f6n\u00fcll\u00fcl\u00fck esas\u0131na dayal\u0131 olarak \u00fclke gruplar\u0131n\u0131n bu t\u00fcr askeri operasyonlara kat\u0131lmas\u0131 Birli\u011fe bu t\u00fcr harekatlar\u0131 ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirmede esneklik ve h\u0131z kazand\u0131rmaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n<p>AB\u2019nin OKA\u2019da jeopolitik bir akt\u00f6re d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015fme \u00e7abas\u0131n\u0131n yan\u0131nda Birli\u011fin b\u00f6lgede etkili bir akt\u00f6r olmas\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6n\u00fcnde ba\u015fka baz\u0131 engeller bulunmaktad\u0131r. Bunlar\u0131n ba\u015f\u0131nda, AB\u2019nin OKA\u2019daki faaliyetlerinin temelini daha ziyade ikili ili\u015fkilerin olu\u015fturmas\u0131d\u0131r. Bu da AB\u2019nin b\u00f6lge \u00fclkelerine d\u00f6n\u00fck politikalar\u0131n\u0131n AB\u2019nin resmi politikalar\u0131ndan ziyade bireysel Birlik \u00fcyeleri taraf\u0131ndan y\u00f6nlendirildi\u011fini ortaya koymaktad\u0131r. AB\u2019nin OKA\u2019ya d\u00f6n\u00fck politikas\u0131nda ba\u015fka bir sorun, kapsay\u0131c\u0131 ve tutarl\u0131 bir strateji belgesinin eksikli\u011fidir. Birlik, b\u00f6lgeye d\u00f6n\u00fck faaliyetlerini i\u015fbirli\u011fi belgeleri yada \u00e7e\u015fitli b\u00f6lgesel kom\u015fuluk politikalar\u0131 \u2013 Avrupa Kom\u015fuluk Politikas\u0131 (AKP), Akdeniz i\u00e7in Birlik (AiB) yada anla\u015fmalar \u2013 1988 AB-K\u00f6rfez \u0130\u015fbirli\u011fi Konseyi (K\u0130K) Anla\u015fmas\u0131 \u2013 arac\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131yla y\u00fcr\u00fctmektedir. Yada, Birlik, Arap Birli\u011fi ve \u0130slam \u0130\u015fbirli\u011fi \u00d6rg\u00fct\u00fc\u2019yle do\u011frudan i\u015fbirli\u011fine girmektedir. AB\u2019nin Orta Asya (<a href=\"https:\/\/data.consilium.europa.eu\/doc\/document\/ST-10113-2007-INIT\/en\/pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">2007<\/a>), Afrika (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/uedocs\/cms_data\/docs\/pressdata\/en\/er\/97496.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">2007<\/a>) ve ba\u015fka baz\u0131 b\u00f6lgelere d\u00f6n\u00fck strateji belgeleri \u00f6rne\u011finde oldu\u011fu gibi Birli\u011fin b\u00fct\u00fcn OKA\u2019ya d\u00f6n\u00fck bu par\u00e7alanm\u0131\u015f politikalar\u0131 tutarl\u0131, iyi d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fclm\u00fc\u015f bir strateji belgesine d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcrmesi gerekir. Bunun yan\u0131nda, AB, OKA\u2019n\u0131n en \u00f6nemli ticari orta\u011f\u0131 ve ABD\u2019den sonra ikinci b\u00fcy\u00fck kalk\u0131nma ve insani yard\u0131m sa\u011flay\u0131c\u0131s\u0131 ve \u00f6nemli bir do\u011frudan yat\u0131r\u0131mc\u0131s\u0131 ve kredit\u00f6r\u00fcd\u00fcr. 2014-2017 y\u0131llar\u0131 aras\u0131nda AB\u2019nin b\u00f6lgeyle yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 ticaretin hacmi 637 milyar ABD dolar\u0131yken onun ard\u0131ndan gelen \u00c7in ise sadece 209 milyar ABD dolarl\u0131k bir ticaret hacmine <a href=\"https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/special\/mapping_eu_leverage_mena\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">ula\u015fabilmi\u015ftir.<\/a>Ayn\u0131 d\u00f6nemde, AB, b\u00f6lgeye yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 8.2 milyar ABD dolarl\u0131k kalk\u0131nma yard\u0131m\u0131 ve insani yard\u0131mla, OKA\u2019ya bu alanlarda 10.9 milyar ABD dolarl\u0131k yard\u0131m yapan ABD\u2019nin arkas\u0131ndan <a href=\"https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/special\/mapping_eu_leverage_mena\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">gelmektedir.<\/a>2014-2017 y\u0131llar\u0131 aras\u0131nda Birli\u011fin, Avrupa Kalk\u0131nma Bankas\u0131 arac\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131yla OKA \u00fclkelerine verdi\u011fi kredi tutar\u0131 2 milyar ABD dolar\u0131n\u0131 a\u015fm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r; b\u00f6lgeye yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 direkt yabanc\u0131 yat\u0131r\u0131m ise 292 milyar ABD dolar\u0131na <a href=\"https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/special\/mapping_eu_leverage_mena\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">ula\u015fm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/a>&nbsp;Blo\u011fun, sahip oldu\u011fu ekonomik avantajlar\u0131 b\u00f6lgede g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir siyasi etkiye d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcrememesi \u00f6nemli bir eksiklik olarak g\u00f6ze \u00e7arpmaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n<p>AB\u2019nin g\u00fcn\u00fcm\u00fczde OKA\u2019daki krizlerdeki rol\u00fcn\u00fc ele al\u0131rsak Libya\u2019da AB, OGSP kapsam\u0131nda y\u00fcr\u00fct\u00fclen \u0130rini <a href=\"https:\/\/www.operationirini.eu\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Operasyonu\u2019nu<\/a>ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirmektedir. 2019\u2019da ba\u015flayan operasyonun amac\u0131 \u0130kinci Libya Sava\u015f\u0131\u2019ndan sonra BM\u2019nin Libya\u2019ya uygulad\u0131\u011f\u0131 silah ambargosunun uygulanmas\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flamakt\u0131r. AB, Libya\u2019da en \u00f6nemli insani yard\u0131m sa\u011flay\u0131c\u0131s\u0131d\u0131r ve Libya D\u00f6rtl\u00fc Grubu\u2019nda etkili bir akt\u00f6rd\u00fcr. AB\u2019nin Libya\u2019da hedefleri aras\u0131nda bar\u0131\u015f\u0131n sa\u011flanmas\u0131, bir g\u00f6\u00e7 krizinin ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131n\u0131n engellenmesi ve enerji kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131n g\u00fcvenli\u011fi yer almaktad\u0131r. AB ve Fransa\u2019n\u0131n Libya\u2019da farkl\u0131 gruplar\u0131 desteklemesi AB\u2019nin bu \u00fclkede izledi\u011fi politikalar\u0131n g\u00fcc\u00fcn\u00fc zay\u0131flatan bir durumdur. AB, resmen, uluslararas\u0131 toplum taraf\u0131ndan tan\u0131nm\u0131\u015f Ulusal Mutabakat H\u00fck\u00fcmeti\u2019ni desteklerken, Fransa ise muhalif Halife Haftar\u2019\u0131n taraf\u0131n\u0131 tutmaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n<p>\u0130ran n\u00fckleer meselesine geldi\u011fimizdeyse AB\u2019nin i\u015fi daha kolay g\u00f6r\u00fcnmektedir. Yeni ABD Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Joseph Biden, \u0130ran\u2019la n\u00fckleer m\u00fczakere masas\u0131na d\u00f6nece\u011fi y\u00f6n\u00fcnde i\u015faret verdi. 2018\u2019de Trump, ABD\u2019yi n\u00fckleer m\u00fczakerelerden \u00e7ekip \u0130ran\u2019a kar\u015f\u0131 sert ambargolara ba\u015flad\u0131ktan sonra AB\u2019nin anla\u015fmay\u0131 korumak i\u00e7in g\u00f6sterdi\u011fi \u00e7abalar yetersiz kald\u0131. Birli\u011fin \u0130ran\u2019la ticareti canl\u0131 tutmak i\u00e7in kullanmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131\u011f\u0131 INSTEX gibi ara\u00e7lar ba\u015far\u0131l\u0131 olmad\u0131. Birlik, Trump d\u00f6neminde transatlantik ili\u015fkilerin ini\u015fe ge\u00e7mesi nedeniyle \u2013 Trump\u2019\u0131n AB\u2019ye so\u011fuk bak\u0131\u015f\u0131, NATO\u2019yu gereksiz g\u00f6rmesi ve ABD-AB aras\u0131nda \u00e7e\u015fitli \u00fcr\u00fcnlerde kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131kl\u0131 olarak ithalat vergilerinin y\u00fckseltilmesi gibi nedenlerle \u2013 AB, \u0130ran\u2019a kar\u015f\u0131 \u201cmaksimum bask\u0131\u201d politikas\u0131 uygulayan ABD\u2019yle \u0130ran meselesi nedeniyle \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmak istemedi. Blok, ABD\u2019nin \u0130ran\u2019a kar\u015f\u0131 tutumu kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131nda yekpare bir politikaya sahip de\u011fildir. \u00d6rne\u011fin, Macaristan ile Rusya\u2019ya kar\u015f\u0131 topraklar\u0131ndaki Amerikan askeri varl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 bir g\u00fcvence olarak g\u00f6ren Polonya ve Balt\u0131k \u00fclkeleri Trump\u2019\u0131n \u0130ran\u2019a kar\u015f\u0131 n\u00fckleer meseledeki sert tutumuna kar\u015f\u0131 sessiz kalmay\u0131 tercih etti. Fakat Biden\u2019\u0131n n\u00fckleer m\u00fczakerelere d\u00f6nmesiyle birlikte \u0130ran\u2019la yap\u0131lan n\u00fckleer anla\u015fman\u0131n yeniden canland\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131 anla\u015fman\u0131n en \u00f6nemli savunucusu olan AB\u2019nin bu konudaki rol\u00fcn\u00fcn g\u00fc\u00e7lenmesine katk\u0131da bulunacakt\u0131r.<\/p>\n<p>\u0130srail-Filistin meselesinde AB, Trump\u2019\u0131n ortaya att\u0131\u011f\u0131 Ortado\u011fu Bar\u0131\u015f plan\u0131n\u0131 desteklemedi. Bunun en ba\u015fta gelen sebebi, bu plan\u0131n daha \u00f6nce \u00fczerinde uzla\u015f\u0131lan iki devletli \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm ilkesinden vazge\u00e7mesidir. Bununla birlikte AB\u2019nin resmi g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fc yans\u0131tan bu tutum b\u00fct\u00fcn AB devletleri taraf\u0131ndan <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mei.edu\/publications\/understanding-eu-mena-relations-current-and-changing-dynamics\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">desteklenmemektedir<\/a>. \u00d6zellikle Macaristan ve Polonya, Trump\u2019\u0131n ortaya att\u0131\u011f\u0131 bar\u0131\u015f plan\u0131na s\u0131cak bakmad\u0131. Bunun yan\u0131nda, ABD\u2019nin Filistinlilere yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 ekonomik yard\u0131m\u0131 kesmesinden kaynaklanan a\u00e7\u0131\u011f\u0131 AB, Filistinlilere sa\u011flad\u0131\u011f\u0131 ekonomik yard\u0131m\u0131 art\u0131rarak gidermeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Yan\u0131s\u0131ra, ABD\u2019nin \u0130srail\u2019in ba\u015fkentini Kud\u00fcs\u2019e ta\u015f\u0131mas\u0131na \u00f6nc\u00fcl\u00fck etmesini AB endi\u015feyle kar\u015f\u0131lad\u0131. Di\u011fer taraftan yine bu konuda Do\u011fu Avrupa \u00fclkeleri ABD\u2019nin tutumunu destekleyen bir tav\u0131r ald\u0131. AB i\u00e7indeki bu b\u00f6l\u00fcnme \u0130srail-Filistin meselesinde AB\u2019nin etkin bir akt\u00f6r olmas\u0131n\u0131 zay\u0131flatan bir durumdur. Bununla birlikte Biden\u2019\u0131n iktidara geli\u015fiyle birlikte ABD\u2019nin \u0130srail-Filistin politikas\u0131nda da normalle\u015fme beklenmelidir. Bu normalle\u015fme iki devletli \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fc savunan AB\u2019nin meseledeki rol\u00fcn\u00fcn artmas\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flayacakt\u0131r.<\/p>\n<p>Suriye krizindeyse AB\u2019nin \u00f6ncelikli hedefi, 2015\u2019dekine benzer bir g\u00f6\u00e7 krizinin patlak vermesini engellemektir. \u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc 2015\u2019te g\u00f6r\u00fclm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr ki kitlesel bir g\u00f6\u00e7 AB\u2019de \u00f6nemli siyasal, diplomatik ve toplumsal etkilere yol a\u00e7maktad\u0131r ve Birlik \u00fclkeleri aras\u0131nda b\u00f6l\u00fcnmeye neden olmaktad\u0131r. AB\u2019nin Suriye\u2019deki rol\u00fc daha ziyade Birlik \u00fcyelerinin faaliyetlerini tamamlamakt\u0131r. AB \u00fclkelerinin Suriye sava\u015f\u0131nda destekledikleri muhalefet gruplar\u0131 marjinal bir siyasal etkiye sahip oldu\u011fu i\u00e7in Suriye krizinin gidi\u015fat\u0131nda AB \u00fclkelerinin etkisi azd\u0131r. ABD\u2019nin \u00fclkeden \u00e7ekilmesinden sonra ba\u015fta Rusya olmak \u00fczere T\u00fcrkiye ve \u0130ran Suriye\u2019de etkili akt\u00f6rler oldu ve bu \u00fclkeler Suriye meselesinin \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fc i\u00e7in Astana S\u00fcreci\u2019ni beraber y\u00fcr\u00fctmektedirler. AB\u2019yse Suriye krizinin \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fc i\u00e7in 2012\u2019de ba\u015flayan ve BM denetiminde y\u00fcr\u00fct\u00fclen fakat ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131zl\u0131\u011fa u\u011frayan Cenevre S\u00fcrecini desteklemi\u015ftir.&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>AB\u2019nin K\u00f6rfez Arap \u00fclkelerindeki rol\u00fcne gelince, AB, K\u0130K \u00fcyelerine a\u011f\u0131rl\u0131kl\u0131 olarak ekonomik bir perspektiften bakt\u0131. Bu da AB\u2019nin b\u00f6lgedeki etkisinin s\u0131n\u0131rl\u0131 kalmas\u0131na neden oldu. K\u0130K \u00fcyelerine ABD\u2019nin sa\u011flad\u0131\u011f\u0131 g\u00fcvenlik kalkan\u0131 i\u015flevinden AB\u2019nin yoksun olmas\u0131 Birli\u011fin b\u00f6lgede \u00f6nemsiz bir jeopolitik role sahip olmas\u0131na neden oldu. Blo\u011fun bu b\u00f6lgedeki di\u011fer bir eksikli\u011fi, ili\u015fkilerin Br\u00fcksel \u00fczerinden de\u011fil daha ziyade ikili ili\u015fkilerle y\u00fcr\u00fct\u00fclmesidir. Bunun yan\u0131nda 2008-2009 k\u00fcresel mali-ekonomik krizinin kuzeye ve g\u00fcneye farkl\u0131 bir etkide bulunmas\u0131 da AB\u2019nin K\u0130K \u00fczerindeki manivela g\u00fcc\u00fcn\u00fcn azalmas\u0131na neden oldu. Bu kriz Avro krizine yol a\u00e7arak AB\u2019yi olduk\u00e7a olumsuz bir \u015fekilde etkilemi\u015fken K\u0130K\u2019i avantajl\u0131 hale getirdi. K\u0130K \u00fclkeleri, bu krizden sonra AB \u00fclkelerinde \u00f6nemli yat\u0131r\u0131mlar yapt\u0131 ve bu \u00fclkelere mali destek <a href=\"https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/publication\/a_gulf_apart_how_europe_can_gain_influence_with_gulf_cooperation_council\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">sa\u011flad\u0131<\/a>. K\u0130K-AB aras\u0131nda ekonomik dengenin bozulmas\u0131yla birlikte AB\u2019nin K\u00f6rfez b\u00f6lgesinde jeopolitik bir oyuncu olma hedefi darbe ald\u0131.<\/p>\n<h3>AB\u2019nin OKA\u2019daki Jeopolitik Rol\u00fc Konusunda Gelecekteki Olas\u0131l\u0131klar<\/h3>\n<p>\u00d6n\u00fcm\u00fczdeki y\u0131llarda AB\u2019nin OKA\u2019daki jeopolitik etkisinin nas\u0131l geli\u015fece\u011fi konusuna gelince \u00f6zellikle birka\u00e7 fakt\u00f6r\u00fcn bu meselede etkili olaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 s\u00f6yleyebiliriz: ABD\u2019nin uluslararas\u0131 sistemdeki rol\u00fc, uluslararas\u0131 sistemin yap\u0131s\u0131, OKA\u2019daki jeopolitik geli\u015fmeler, \u00c7in ve Rusya gibi Bat\u0131l\u0131 olmayan \u00fclkelerin uluslararas\u0131 d\u00fczendeki yeri ve AB OGDP\u2019nin geli\u015fimi.<\/p>\n<p>ABD\u2019yle ba\u015flarsak Ocak 2021\u2019de Joe Biden\u2019\u0131n ABD ba\u015fkanl\u0131k koltu\u011funu devralmas\u0131yla birlikte transatlantik ili\u015fkilerde b\u00fcy\u00fck bir de\u011fi\u015fiklik meydana gelecektir. Ba\u015fka bir ifadeyle, Biden d\u00f6neminde ABD-AB ili\u015fkileri normalle\u015fecek, ABD\u2019nin NATO\u2019ya ve AB\u2019nin savunmas\u0131na olan ba\u011fl\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131 devam edecektir. Bununla birlikte baz\u0131 meselelerde Trump\u2019\u0131n b\u0131rakt\u0131\u011f\u0131 miras devam edecektir. Olduk\u00e7a eski bir mazisi bulunan AB\u2019nin kendi savunmas\u0131n\u0131 daha fazla \u00fcstlenme konusundaki Amerikan talebi Biden d\u00f6neminde de devam edecektir. Yan\u0131s\u0131ra, Obama d\u00f6neminde ba\u015flam\u0131\u015f olan ve yap\u0131sal bir de\u011fi\u015fikli\u011fe i\u015faret eden ABD\u2019nin OKA\u2019dan ve Avrupa k\u0131tas\u0131ndan \u00e7ekilerek yeni y\u00fckselen g\u00fc\u00e7 ve ABD\u2019nin en \u00f6nemli askeri tehdit olarak g\u00f6rd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc \u00c7in\u2019e ve Asya-Pasifik b\u00f6lgesine odaklanma s\u00fcreci Biden d\u00f6neminde de devam edecektir. Bu geli\u015fme \u015fu anlama gelmektedir: Her ne kadar Biden AB\u2019nin kom\u015fuluk alan\u0131nda yer alan krizlerde \u2013 \u00f6rne\u011fin, bug\u00fcn Libya ve Suriye\u2019deki krizler \u2013 AB\u2019nin askeri operasyonlar\u0131na istihbarat ve g\u00f6zetim gibi konularda geriden destek verse de bu krizlerin bertaraf edilmesindeki ana sorumluluk AB\u2019nin olacakt\u0131r. Bu nedenle AB\u2019nin OKA\u2019daki jeopolitik rol\u00fcn\u00fcn geli\u015fmesi beklenmelidir.<\/p>\n<p>Uluslararas\u0131 sistemin yap\u0131s\u0131ysa giderek \u00e7ok kutuplulu\u011fa do\u011fru evrilmektedir. \u00c7in, \u00f6n\u00fcm\u00fczdeki y\u0131llarda da ekonomik olarak b\u00fcy\u00fcmeye devam edecek ve k\u00fcresel ekonomideki etkisini art\u0131racakt\u0131r. AB\u2019nin K\u0131r\u0131m\u2019\u0131n 2014\u2019te ilhak\u0131 nedeniyle uygulad\u0131\u011f\u0131 ekonomik ambargoya, \u00fclkenin i\u00e7inde bulundu\u011fu ekonomik krize ve do\u011fal gaz fiyatlar\u0131n\u0131n d\u00fc\u015fmesine ra\u011fmen Rusya, Suriye\u2019de ve Libya\u2019da etkin bir jeopolitik akt\u00f6r olmaya devam etmektedir.<\/p>\n<p>Liberal de\u011ferler a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan de\u011ferlendirildi\u011finde \u00f6n\u00fcm\u00fczdeki y\u0131llarda hem \u00c7in\u2019in hem de Rusya\u2019n\u0131n otoriter bir yap\u0131ya sahip olmaya devam edece\u011fi s\u00f6ylenebilir. Ki\u015fi ba\u015f\u0131na milli gelir a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan \u00c7in, uzun y\u0131llar boyunca elde etti\u011fi h\u0131zl\u0131 ekonomik b\u00fcy\u00fcme oranlar\u0131yla yoksul \u00fclkeler kategorisinden \u00e7\u0131k\u0131p orta s\u0131n\u0131f \u00fclkeler grubuna y\u00fckselmesine ra\u011fmen bu \u00fclkede demokrasiye ge\u00e7i\u015f olmad\u0131. \u00c7in\u2019in kendine \u00f6zg\u00fc rejimi nedeniyle k\u0131sa ve orta vadede de bunun ger\u00e7ekle\u015fmesi beklenmemektedir. Rusya da 2000\u2019lerden sonra k\u00f6kle\u015fmi\u015f bir otoriter rejime sahip oldu. Devletten ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z olarak geli\u015fen bir orta s\u0131n\u0131f ve burjuva olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 i\u00e7in Rusya\u2019n\u0131n da k\u0131sa ve orta vadede liberal bir siyasal sisteme ge\u00e7mesi beklenmemelidir. \u0130lliberal rejimlere sahip bu iki \u00fclke k\u00fcresel d\u00fczlemde ekonomik a\u00e7\u0131dan \u2013 daha \u00e7ok \u00c7in \u2013 ve jeopolitik olarak \u2013 daha \u00e7ok Rusya \u2013 Bat\u0131\u2019n\u0131n rakibidirler.&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>OKA\u2019da Arap ayaklanmalar\u0131ndan sonra hi\u00e7 olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 kadar karga\u015fa ortam\u0131 ortaya \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131. Ortaya \u00e7\u0131kan istikrars\u0131zl\u0131k sadece M\u0131s\u0131r\u2019da \u2013 bir darbe sonucunda askerlerin iktidar\u0131 ele almas\u0131yla \u2013 ve Tunus\u2019ta \u2013 sivil toplum gruplar\u0131n\u0131n uzla\u015fmas\u0131na dayal\u0131 bir istikrar\u0131n sa\u011flanmas\u0131yla \u2013 bertaraf edilebildi. Suriye, Libya ve Yemen\u2019deyse i\u00e7 sava\u015f s\u00fcrmektedir. Yan\u0131 s\u0131ra, OKA, otoriter rejimlerin hakim oldu\u011fu, tart\u0131\u015fmal\u0131 s\u0131n\u0131rlara sahip bir co\u011frafyad\u0131r ve ekonomik, etnik, dini, toplumsal ve siyasal nedenlerden kaynakl\u0131 yeni \u00e7alkant\u0131lar\u0131n patlak vermesi uzak bir olas\u0131l\u0131k de\u011fildir.<\/p>\n<p>Son olarak, OGDP konusunda AB\u2019de tam bir uzla\u015fma s\u00f6z konusu de\u011fildir. Bu konuda ayr\u0131\u015fman\u0131n iki kayna\u011f\u0131 oldu\u011fu s\u00f6ylenebilir. Birincisi, OKA\u2019da AB \u00fclkelerinin ikili ili\u015fkilere sahip olmas\u0131 OGDP\u2019nin \u00f6nemini azaltmakta ve onu g\u00f6lgede b\u0131rakmaktad\u0131r. \u0130kincisiyse, topraklar\u0131nda ABD askeri \u00fcslerine ev sahipli\u011fi yapan ve Rusya\u2019n\u0131n tehdidine kar\u015f\u0131 ABD\u2019yi bir g\u00fcvenlik garantisi olarak g\u00f6ren Do\u011fu Avrupa \u00fclkeleri, OGDP\u2019ye her zaman destek vermemekte ve ABD\u2019den yana tutum almaktad\u0131rlar. Bunun \u00fcstesinden gelmenin en iyi yolu olarak AB\u2019nin OGDP kapsam\u0131nda ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirece\u011fi askeri operasyonlarda bir \u201cg\u00f6n\u00fcll\u00fcler koalisyonu\u201d olu\u015fturmas\u0131 g\u00f6r\u00fcnmektedir.<\/p>\n<p>Sonu\u00e7 olarak, yukar\u0131da sayd\u0131\u011f\u0131m\u0131z fakt\u00f6rleri g\u00f6z \u00f6n\u00fcnde bulundurdu\u011fumuzda en az\u0131ndan k\u0131sa ve orta vadede AB\u2019nin OKA\u2019da jeopolitik rol\u00fcn\u00fc ilerletmesi gerekti\u011fi ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmaktad\u0131r. Ba\u015fka bir deyi\u015fle sert g\u00fcc\u00fcn egemen oldu\u011fu yeni k\u00fcresel politik paradigma de\u011ferlendirildi\u011finde Br\u00fcksel\u2019in, \u00f6z\u00fcn\u00fc temsil eden yumu\u015fak g\u00fcc\u00fc terk etmeden fakat hem sert g\u00fc\u00e7 hem de yumu\u015fak g\u00fc\u00e7 unsurlar\u0131n\u0131 bar\u0131nd\u0131ran ak\u0131ll\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7 yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131na ge\u00e7i\u015f yapmas\u0131 bir gereklilik olarak g\u00f6r\u00fcnmektedir. AB i\u00e7in Afrika\u2019n\u0131n giderek artan \u00f6nemi Birli\u011fin OKA\u2019daki jeopolitik rol\u00fcn\u00fc daha da art\u0131rmas\u0131 i\u00e7in \u00f6nemli bir destek sa\u011flayacakt\u0131r. Yoksulluklar\u0131na ra\u011fmen h\u0131zl\u0131 b\u00fcy\u00fcyen Afrika \u00fclkeleri, AB i\u00e7in sadece ekonomik olanaklar sunmakla kalmay\u0131p g\u00fcvenlik, jeopolitika ve g\u00f6\u00e7 a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan riskler do\u011furmaktad\u0131r. Bu y\u00fczden halihaz\u0131rda Afrika k\u0131tas\u0131n\u0131n en \u00f6nemli orta\u011f\u0131 olan AB, 2020\u2019de, 2007\u2019de yay\u0131nlanm\u0131\u015f olan Afrika stratejisini <a href=\"https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/international-partnerships\/system\/files\/communication-eu-africa-strategy-join-2020-4-final_en.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">g\u00fcncelledi.<\/a><\/p>\n<h3>Kaynak\u00e7a<\/h3>\n<p>Bianco, Cinzia. (2020, 25 \u015eubat). \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/publication\/a_gulf_apart_how_europe_can_gain_influence_with_gulf_cooperation_council\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">A Gulf Apart: How Europe Can Gain Influence with the Gulf Cooperation Council<\/a>\u201d. Policy Brief.<i>European Council on Foreign Relations.&nbsp;<\/i>(Eri\u015fim Tarihi: 23 Ocak 2021).<\/p>\n<p>Council of the European Union. (2007, 31 May\u0131s).<a href=\"https:\/\/data.consilium.europa.eu\/doc\/document\/ST-10113-2007-INIT\/en\/pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><i>The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership<\/i><\/a>. 10113\/07. PESC 655. COEST 179. Brussels.&nbsp;(Eri\u015fim Tarihi: 24 Ocak 2021).<\/p>\n<p>Council of the European Union. (2007, 9 Aral\u0131k).<a href=\"https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/uedocs\/cms_data\/docs\/pressdata\/en\/er\/97496.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><i>The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy<\/i><\/a>. 16344\/07 (Presse 291). Lisbon.&nbsp;(Eri\u015fim Tarihi: 23 Ocak 2021).<\/p>\n<p>Council of the European Union. (2009). <a href=\"https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/media\/30823\/qc7809568enc.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><i>European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World<\/i>. Brussels.<\/a> (Eri\u015fim Tarihi: 25 Ocak 2021).<\/p>\n<p>Council of the European Union. (t.y.). <a href=\"https:\/\/www.consilium.europa.eu\/media\/32079\/pesco-overview-of-first-collaborative-of-projects-for-press.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><em>PESCO Overwiew<\/em><\/a>.&nbsp;(Eri\u015fim Tarihi: 26 Ocak 2021).<\/p>\n<p>ECFR. (2019, Aral\u0131k). \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/special\/mapping_eu_leverage_mena\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Strengthening European Autonomy across MENA<\/a>\u201d. <em>European Council on Foreign Relations<\/em>. (Eri\u015fim Tarihi: 24 Ocak 2021).<\/p>\n<p>European Commission. (2016, Haziran). <a href=\"https:\/\/eeas.europa.eu\/archives\/docs\/top_stories\/pdf\/eugs_review_web.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><em>Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union\u2019s Foreign and Security Policy<\/em><\/a>. (Eri\u015fim Tarihi: 25 Ocak 2021).<\/p>\n<p>European Commission. (2020, 9 Mart). <a href=\"https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/international-partnerships\/system\/files\/communication-eu-africa-strategy-join-2020-4-final_en.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><em>Towards a Comprehensive Strategy with Africa<\/em>. JOIN(2020) 4 final. Brussels<\/a>. (Eri\u015fim Tarihi: 26 Ocak 2021).<\/p>\n<p>European Union External Action. (t.y.). <a href=\"https:\/\/www.operationirini.eu\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><em>EUNAVFOR MED Operation IRINI<\/em><\/a>. &nbsp;(Eri\u015fim Tarihi: 23 Ocak 2021).<\/p>\n<p>Lehne, Stefan. (2020, \u015eubat). \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/carnegieeurope.eu\/2020\/02\/25\/how-eu-can-survive-in-geopolitical-age-pub-81132\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">How the EU Can Survive in a Geopolitical Age<\/a>\u201d. <em>Carnegie Europe<\/em>. (Eri\u015fim Tarihi: 25 Ocak 2021).<\/p>\n<p>Osiewicz, Przemys\u0142aw. (2020, 19 \u015eubat). \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.mei.edu\/publications\/understanding-eu-mena-relations-current-and-changing-dynamics\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Understanding EU-MENA Relations: Current and Changing Dynamics<\/a>\u201d. <em>Middle East Institute.<\/em>Washington. (Eri\u015fim Tarihi: 23 Ocak 2021).<\/p>\n<p>Stelzenm\u00fcller, Constanze. (2019, A\u011fustos). \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/08\/FP_20190905_hostile_ally.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Hostile Ally: The Trump Challenge and Europe\u2019s Inadequate Response<\/a>\u201d. <i>Brookings<\/i>. Washington. (Eri\u015fim Tarihi: 25 Ocak 2021).<\/p>\n<p>Zandee, Dick and Kruijver, Kimberley. (2019, Eyl\u00fcl). \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.clingendael.org\/sites\/default\/files\/2019-09\/The_European_Intervention_2019.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">The European Intervention Initiative: Developing a Shared Strategic Culture for European Defence<\/a>\u201d. Clingendael Report. <em>The Clingendael Institute.<\/em>The Hague. (Eri\u015fim Tarihi: 26 Ocak 2021).<\/p>\n<figure><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"198\" height=\"198\" src=\"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/02\/Foto\u011fraf_M.Bardakci.png\" alt=\"\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/02\/Foto\u011fraf_M.Bardakci.png 198w, https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/02\/Foto\u011fraf_M.Bardakci-150x150.png 150w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 198px) 100vw, 198px\"><\/figure>\n<h5>Mehmet Bardak\u00e7\u0131, Do\u00e7. Dr.<\/h5>\n<p>Do\u00e7ent Doktor Mehmet Bardak\u00e7\u0131, Ortado\u011fu\u2019nun uluslararas\u0131 ili\u015fkileri, AB geni\u015fleme ve kom\u015fuluk politikas\u0131 ve T\u00fcrkiye i\u00e7 meseleleri ve d\u0131\u015f politikas\u0131 konusunda uzmanla\u015fm\u0131\u015f olan siyaset bilimi ve uluslararas\u0131 ili\u015fkiler alan\u0131nda bir akademisyendir. Lisans derecesini uluslararas\u0131 ili\u015fkiler alan\u0131nda Bilkent \u00dcniversitesi\u2019nden ve doktora derecesini siyaset bilimi alan\u0131nda Duisburg-Essen \u00dcniversitesi\u2019nden alan Bardak\u00e7\u0131, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019de ve yurtd\u0131\u015f\u0131nda \u00e7e\u015fitli \u00fcniversitelerde ders vermi\u015ftir. Bardak\u00e7\u0131, ara\u015ft\u0131rma yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 alanlarda ulusal ve uluslararas\u0131 yay\u0131nevi ve dergilerde \u00e7ok say\u0131da makale, kitap ve kitap b\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fc yay\u0131nlam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Ortak yazarlar\u0131ndan biri oldu\u011fu ve T\u00fcrkiye \u00e7ap\u0131nda kapsaml\u0131 bir saha ara\u015ft\u0131rmas\u0131na dayanan son \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131ndan birisi T\u00fcrkiye\u2019de dini az\u0131nl\u0131klar \u00fczerine yay\u0131nlanm\u0131\u015f kitapt\u0131r: Mehmet Bardak\u00e7\u0131, Annette Freyberg-Inan, Olaf Leisse ve Christoph Giesel, Religious Minorities in Turkey: Alevi, Armenians, Syriacs and the Struggle to Desecuritize Religious Freedom (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2017).<\/p>\n<p><strong>Bu yaz\u0131ya at\u0131f i\u00e7in:<\/strong> Mehmet Bardak\u00e7\u0131, \u201cJeopolitik Bir Akt\u00f6r Olarak Avrupa Birli\u011fi\u2019nin Ortado\u011fu ve Kuzey Afrika\u2019daki Rol\u00fc\u201d,&nbsp;<em style=\"color: #666666; font-family: 'Nunito Sans';\">Panorama<\/em>, \u00c7evrimi\u00e7i Yay\u0131n, 13 \u015eubat 2021,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/blog\/2021\/02\/13\/jeopolitik-bir-aktor-olarak-avrupa-birligi\u2019nin-ortadogu-ve-kuzey-afrikadaki-rolu\/\">https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/blog\/2021\/02\/13\/jeopolitik-bir-aktor-olarak-avrupa-birligi\u2019nin-ortadogu-ve-kuzey-afrikadaki-rolu\/&nbsp;<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Telif@<em>UIKPanorama<\/em>. Bu yaz\u0131n\u0131n&nbsp;t\u00fcm \u00e7evrimi\u00e7i ve bas\u0131l\u0131 telif haklar\u0131&nbsp;<em>Panorama<\/em> dergisine aittir. Yaz\u0131da yer verilen g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fler yazar\u0131na\/yazarlar\u0131na aittir. U\u0130K Derne\u011fini,&nbsp;<em>Panorama<\/em> Yay\u0131n Kurulunu, dergi edit\u00f6rlerini ve di\u011fer yazarlar\u0131 ba\u011flamaz.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>E-ISSN: 2718-0549 DOI: 10.13140\/RG.2.2.28320.71689 \u00d6zet Avrupa Birli\u011fi (AB), 2016\u2019da K\u00fcresel Strateji\u2019yi kabul etti. AB\u2019nin bu ad\u0131m\u0131, k\u00fcresel ve b\u00f6lgesel d\u00fczeyde ger\u00e7ekle\u015fen bir dizi geli\u015fmenin sonucunda ger\u00e7ekle\u015fti. Son on be\u015f y\u0131lda otoriter rejimlerin yayg\u0131nla\u015fmas\u0131, ABD\u2019nin artan bir \u015fekilde k\u00fcresel siyasetten k\u0131smi \u00e7ekili\u015fi, \u00e7ok kutuplu k\u00fcresel d\u00fczenin yayg\u0131nl\u0131k kazanmas\u0131 ve Arap Uyan\u0131\u015f\u0131\u2019n\u0131n Ortado\u011fu ve Kuzey Afrika\u2019da (OKA) [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":90,"featured_media":8239,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[497],"tags":[656,612],"class_list":["post-11645","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-essay","tag-english","tag-security-strategy-geopolitics"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11645","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/90"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=11645"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11645\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/8239"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=11645"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=11645"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=11645"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}