{"id":15351,"date":"2025-12-02T11:16:38","date_gmt":"2025-12-02T08:16:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/?p=15351"},"modified":"2025-12-02T11:18:41","modified_gmt":"2025-12-02T08:18:41","slug":"china-threat-or-the-greatest-opportunity-of-the-21st-century-part-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/2025\/12\/china-threat-or-the-greatest-opportunity-of-the-21st-century-part-2\/","title":{"rendered":"China: Threat \u2013 or the Greatest Opportunity of the 21st Century? (Part 2)"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Messages to T\u00fcrkiye from Beijing\u2019s quiet rooms (2) <\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

I have climbed the Great Wall more times than I can count \u2013 with ministers, business leaders, ambassadors and, most recently, with my wife. Standing in the wind at Badaling, I was reminded again that this is not just stone and mortar; it is a physical expression of a state\u2019s fears, strategy and worldview. In T\u00fcrkiye, one question is asked constantly: \u201cWas this wall built against the Turks?\u201d The answer requires nuance. It was not built only against the Turks. But from the Huns and G\u00f6kt\u00fcrks to the Mongols and other steppe empires, all the northern raiders \u2013 including Turkic peoples \u2013 were very much in mind. Did the Wall always work? No. The Mongols and Manchus often came through not by assaulting stone walls, but through trade, marriage, and politics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Today, real power does not lie in walls and tanks, but in trade routes, ports, data flows and energy corridors. The Great Wall\u2019s message to the present is clear: No wall is eternal. What endures are not fortifications, but relationships and bridges. Once facing each other across a frontier, Turks and Chinese now sit on the same side of the table in energy, finance and infrastructure talks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Beyond the \u201cChina Threat\u201d Slogans<\/em><\/strong><\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Western capitals, you hear three familiar mantras: \u201cChina threat\u201d, \u201cdebt trap diplomacy\u201d, \u201ca plan to take over the world.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But if you look at Africa\u2019s debt structure, you will still find that Western banks and funds are the largest creditors. China is certainly important, but not dominant, and much of China\u2019s finance goes into revenue-generating infrastructure: ports, highways, metros, power plants, hospitals, and factories. That does not mean the model is problem-free. There are legitimate concerns about transparency, collateral, political bargaining, and how defaults are handled. But the line that China is simply \u201clending to seize countries\u201d is, in most cases, a political slogan rather than a serious analysis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The reality is this: the world is no longer locked into Western capital as its only option. There is an alternative source of finance and infrastructure \u2013 and it is Chinese. This shakes the comfort of being the only game in town. Many of the loudest complaints stem from that loss of monopoly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Of course, China has its own internal problems: Tough regulation, uneven legal predictability, the opacity created by the party\u2013state fusion, persistent intellectual property disputes, and a sense among some foreign firms that they are under political or regulatory pressure. All of that is real. But the answer is not decoupling or building walls. Supply chains are deeply intertwined, technology depends on global circulation, and capital flows do not respect borders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Which brings us to the core conclusion: You cannot take China out of the system. You can only decide how intelligently you will work with it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The West\u2019s Deep Fear \u2013 and a \u201cCold Peace\u201d<\/em><\/strong><\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In conversations with Western leaders, technocrats and investors, one underlying sentiment is unmistakable. For the first time in two centuries, they can clearly see that they may no longer be the sole architects of the global order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

China has a permanent space station.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It produces the overwhelming share of the world\u2019s solar panels.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It dominates the EV and battery supply chains.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It leads in high-speed rail.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Chinese firms control critical nodes in global port networks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In refining critical minerals, in battery chemistry, and in rare earths, China is close to a monopoly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If oil once had OPEC, critical minerals now have a de facto OPEC \u2013 and it is China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the US\u2013China axis, I describe the current state as a \u201ccold peace\u201d. We see handshakes, warm phrases and \u201ccompetition, not conflict\u201d rhetoric. Beneath that, we are watching one of the fiercest strategic struggles of the century. Trade persists, but investment is retreating. Technology sharing is curtailed. Sanctions and countersanctions proliferate. It is an odd balance where countries, in effect, \u201ctalk while they fight \u2013 and trade while they decouple\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye at the Crossroads: Neither Just West, Nor Just East<\/em><\/strong><\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye is literally and figuratively a crossroads country. It is a NATO member, part of the EU Customs Union, and deeply enmeshed with the US and Europe in defence and trade. At the same time, it is a critical node for the Belt and Road, the core of the Middle Corridor, and the junction for Caspian and Middle Eastern energy routes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

T\u00fcrkiye\u2013US trade hovers around $30bn. T\u00fcrkiye\u2013China trade has reached roughly $47bn \u2013 but with a glaring asymmetry: only about $4bn of that is Turkish exports. Chinese FDI in T\u00fcrkiye is about $2bn \u2013 far below US and European levels. This tells us two things: China is an indispensable supplier and technology partner for T\u00fcrkiye. If we design this relationship poorly, we will amplify dependency risks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So the question is not \u201cWhose side are we on?\u201d The more precise question is \u201cWhat kind of China strategy will protect T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s long-term interests, build domestic capacity and reinforce our access to Europe?\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is a mistake to respond with fear and build walls. It is equally dangerous to romanticise China as a saviour. Those who panic will lose. Those who idealise China will also lose. Those who will win are the ones who study China and Asia coldly; who look at data, define their interests clearly and manage the relationship with strategic discipline.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hong Kong: China\u2019s Legal and Financial Laboratory to the World<\/em><\/strong><\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Walking in Hong Kong again, what impressed me most was not a noisy comeback, but a quiet determination. The city is a unique laboratory that fuses China\u2019s economic depth with English law and arbitration traditions. Legal security, arbitration capacity, banking depth and logistical muscle converge in one place. A significant share of global energy and commodity contracts \u2013 their documentation, collateral, insurance, and financing structures \u2013 can be designed and booked here.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For Turks, Hong Kong has a particular relevance. There is now a small but capable Turkish community in banking, law, logistics, technology, jewellery, retail and academia. Many Turkish firms choose to establish first in Hong Kong rather than going directly to the mainland \u2013 using the city as a platform for finance, legal protection and access to regional supply chains. The active presence of Consul-General Sercan Evcim and Trade Counsellor Din\u00e7er Tatl\u0131o\u011flu helps turn this potential into an institutional framework.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Put simply, those who read Hong Kong correctly will understand the mathematics of the new world faster.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

From Hardship Posting to Superpower Stage: Turkish Diplomacy in Beijing<\/em><\/strong><\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

When I served in Beijing during and after Tiananmen, China was still considered a hardship posting. It was closed to the outside world, economically fragile, but searching for a path of transformation. Serving there was a test of both physical endurance and intellectual resilience. That picture has changed completely. China is now the new superpower of the 21st century. Ankara has understood this, and \u2013 like the Americans, British, Japanese, French and Russians \u2013 now sends some of its brightest diplomats to Beijing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The reasoning is simple: Every correctly structured relationship with China will directly affect T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s economic, technological and strategic position in the decades ahead. Today, Ambassador Sel\u00e7uk \u00dcnal and his carefully selected team reflect this new understanding. From the defence attach\u00e9 to the trade counsellor, from investment office representatives to cultural officers, they are not merely performing protocol; they are engaged in multi-dimensional diplomacy across investment, technology, security and culture. Serving in Beijing is no longer a remote hardship. It is standing at the centre of the emerging world order. This time, it is not an age of scarcity, but an age of opportunity \u2013 for those who know how to use it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A Five-Year Roadmap for a T\u00fcrkiye\u2013China \u201cLeap\u201d<\/em><\/strong><\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

If T\u00fcrkiye wants a real leap in relations with China over the next five years, I see five priority tracks. First, elevate leader-to-leader diplomacy into a strategic framework. In China, clear signals come from the top. Without a political green light, neither state-owned enterprises nor provincial governments will take long-term risks. Recent meetings between President Erdo\u011fan and President Xi \u2013 in Astana at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit and in Tianjin \u2013 have already sent a message of \u201ca new period in relations\u201d. The next step is to convert this into a concrete 2025\u20132030 T\u00fcrkiye\u2013China Action Plan with clear sectoral priorities \u2013 energy, critical minerals, defence industry, digital infrastructure, agriculture and food, tourism \u2013 and explicit responsibilities and timelines.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Second, correct the trade imbalance intelligently. We cannot flip the trade deficit overnight; we import a large volume of high-value-added Chinese goods and will continue to do so. But we can raise our exports from roughly $4bn to at least $8\u201310bn. The most realistic channels for this are:<\/p>\n\n\n\n