{"id":15590,"date":"2025-12-24T01:06:33","date_gmt":"2025-12-23T22:06:33","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/?p=15590"},"modified":"2025-12-24T16:03:58","modified_gmt":"2025-12-24T13:03:58","slug":"turkiye-iraq-relations-opportunities-and-tensions-in-security-and-connectivity-derya-gocer-meliha-altunisik","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/2025\/12\/turkiye-iraq-relations-opportunities-and-tensions-in-security-and-connectivity-derya-gocer-meliha-altunisik\/","title":{"rendered":"T\u00fcrkiye\u2013Iraq Relations: Opportunities and Tensions in Security and Connectivity &#8211; Derya G\u00f6\u00e7er &amp; Meliha Altun\u0131\u015f\u0131k\u00a0"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This paper presents the&nbsp;consolidated&nbsp;findings of the project&nbsp;\u201cT\u00fcrkiye\u2013Iraq Relations: Opportunities and Tensions in Security and Connectivity\u201d,&nbsp;carried out under the CATS Network between 2024 and 2025. The project set out to explain the recent rapprochement between T\u00fcrkiye and Iraq, to map Ankara\u2019s evolving goals,&nbsp;strategies&nbsp;and tools in Iraq, and to&nbsp;identify&nbsp;the implications for regional order and for&nbsp;EU\u2013T\u00fcrkiye&nbsp;cooperation. It did so through three substantive lenses: security, economic&nbsp;reconstruction&nbsp;and connectivity (including water), and finally, it also included the European\/NATO dimension.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The research design combined desk research with multi-sited fieldwork: interviews and stakeholder conversations in Ankara,&nbsp;Istanbul&nbsp;and Brussels; close reading of official documents from the Turkish and Iraqi central government, Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)&nbsp;and EU institutions; and sector-specific data on trade,&nbsp;logistics&nbsp;and water governance. These methods were applied across four linked case studies (security, water, connectivity, and the EU dimension).&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Over the course of the project, the team produced several policy-oriented&nbsp;outputs.<sup>1<\/sup>&nbsp;Taken together, these studies show that T\u00fcrkiye\u2013Iraq relations have moved from a narrow, threat-centric framework to a multi-layered relationship in which security, connectivity and external (especially European) actors are deeply entangled.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>2. Security: from fragmented frontier to co-managed space<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>2.1 Dual-track security policy<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A first core finding is that T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s Iraq policy has become a dual-track approach that combines intensified military operations with sustained diplomatic and institutional&nbsp;engagement, and&nbsp;entails simultaneous engagement with both Baghdad and Erbil. Since 2020 and especially after the formation of the al-Sudani government, Ankara has sought to&nbsp;normalise&nbsp;ties with the federal government while&nbsp;maintaining&nbsp;its dense relations with the KRG. The long-standing priority of&nbsp;containing&nbsp;the PKK and&nbsp;maintaining&nbsp;Iraq\u2019s territorial integrity remained&nbsp;central, but&nbsp;is now embedded in a broader strategy that includes political dialogue, economic&nbsp;statecraft&nbsp;and corridor politics.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This dual-track logic became&nbsp;evident&nbsp;in 2020, with the coexistence of military and diplomatic tools. On the one hand,&nbsp;T\u00fcrkiye&nbsp;expanded its cross-border operations in northern Iraq (Metina, Zap,&nbsp;Ava\u015fin&nbsp;and adjacent regions), framing them as necessary to dismantle PKK infrastructure and to cut the logistical and human links between PKK cadres in Iraq and PYD\/YPG forces in Syria. On the other hand, we witnessed increased&nbsp;institutionalisation&nbsp;of relations with both Baghdad and Erbil, characterized by high-level visits, joint committees, Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs)&nbsp;on security and military cooperation, and Iraq\u2019s designation of the PKK as a&nbsp;\u201cprohibited&nbsp;organisation\u201d&nbsp;in 2024\u2014all&nbsp;signalling&nbsp;a move away from purely unilateral action towards co-managed security arrangements.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As a result, Iraq has increasingly shifted in Turkish discourse from a fragmented security frontier to a central regional node where Ankara\u2019s domestic peace agenda, counter-PKK strategy, and regional aspirations intersect. The&nbsp;\u201crecalibration\u201d&nbsp;lies not in the abandonment of hard power, but in the attempt to embed it within a more predictable framework negotiated with both Baghdad and Erbil. More recently, the&nbsp;\u201cT\u00fcrkiye without Terror\u201d&nbsp;project has added a new domestic-regional dimension to Ankara\u2019s Iraq policy. Although&nbsp;ultimately a&nbsp;domestic project, it has a clear regional&nbsp;component&nbsp;in which cooperation with both Baghdad and the KRG is critical. At the same time, both Erbil and Baghdad have shown close interest in the process and its success, as it is likely to shape their relations with Ankara and help ease existing latent tensions.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>2.2 NATO and the alliance dimension<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The project also finds that Iraq can be depicted as a testing ground for NATO\u2019s evolving out-of-area posture and for Europe\u2019s geopolitical ambitions, with the NATO Mission Iraq (NMI) sitting at the intersection of allied interests, US drawdown, and intra-alliance divergences. Turkey features here both as an indispensable ally, with its critical geographic positions, and other anchors such as the&nbsp;\u0130ncirlik base&nbsp;and also as a source of complexity, due to its operations in northern Iraq, its insistence on recognition of the PKK as a threat, and its preference for flexible coalitions and regionally&nbsp;\u201cowned\u201d&nbsp;solutions.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The project\u2019s security outputs therefore converge on the argument that NATO\u2019s viability in Iraq is partly contingent on how Ankara\u2019s recalibration is managed by&nbsp;T\u00fcrkiye&nbsp;itself, by allies, and by Iraqi counterparts. If&nbsp;Turkish\u2013Iraqi&nbsp;cooperation on&nbsp;counter-terrorism&nbsp;and border security can be aligned with NMI\u2019s advisory role and with EU efforts on security sector reform, Iraq could become a showcase for adaptable collective security. If not, alliance instruments risk being sidelined by more ad hoc,&nbsp;T\u00fcrkiye-centric&nbsp;arrangements.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>2.3 Risks and constraints<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Across the security-focused studies, three constraints recur:&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol start=\"1\" class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Iraqi&nbsp;domestic&nbsp;fragmentation (Baghdad\u2013Erbil disputes, intra-Kurdish\/intra-Iraq competition, militia politics) can both enable and obstruct T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s security agenda. Ankara\u2019s close alignment with the KDP, and tense relations with the PUK, or general political fragmentation in Iraq complicate any truly&nbsp;\u201cnational\u201d&nbsp;Iraqi framework with which&nbsp;T\u00fcrkiye&nbsp;can engage with.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<ol start=\"2\" class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Iran\u2019s entrenched networks in Iraq limit the scope for a purely&nbsp;T\u00fcrkiye\u2013Iraq security condominium. While the weakening of Iran\u2019s regional position after 7 October opens windows for Ankara, Tehran&nbsp;retains&nbsp;leverage through armed groups, economic&nbsp;ties&nbsp;and alternative connectivity projects.&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<ol start=\"3\" class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Domestic politics in T\u00fcrkiye and Iraq (electoral cycles, nationalist discourse, governance crises) set hard limits on de-escalation. Turkish decision-makers must balance the need for Iraqi cooperation with domestic expectations for assertive action against the PKK; Iraqi leaders face criticism for tolerating Turkish incursions and for&nbsp;failing to secure&nbsp;a binding water and security settlement with Ankara.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Overall, the project concludes that security relations are moving towards co-management, but on an asymmetric basis where T\u00fcrkiye&nbsp;retains&nbsp;significant initiative and leverage, and where Iraqi buy-in hinges on perceived benefits from economic and water cooperation.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>3. Connectivity:&nbsp;<\/strong><strong>T<\/strong><strong>rade,&nbsp;<\/strong><strong>C<\/strong><strong>orridors and&nbsp;<\/strong><strong>W<\/strong><strong>ater as&nbsp;<\/strong><strong>S<\/strong><strong>trategic&nbsp;<\/strong><strong>A<\/strong><strong>ssets<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>3.1 T\u00fcrkiye<\/strong><strong>\u2019<\/strong><strong>s middle-power economic statecraft<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The core analytical contribution of the connectivity outputs is to frame T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s Iraq policy as a case of middle-power economic statecraft, in which Ankara uses trade, infrastructure, construction and&nbsp;logistics&nbsp;to shape its strategic environment. Elements of this economic statecraft practice include:&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Iraq has become one of T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s top export markets, with bilateral trade hovering around the mid-teens (in USD billions) in recent years.&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The&nbsp;Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) is pivotal:&nbsp;roughly one-third&nbsp;of registered foreign companies in the KRI are Turkish, and a large share of T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s exports to Iraq transit via KRI border crossings such as&nbsp;Habur\/Ibrahim Khalil.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Turkish firms dominate construction and infrastructure contracts in the KRI and are increasingly present in federal Iraq, aided by the resolution of double-tariff issues and by Baghdad\u2019s interest in diversifying partners.&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The project finds that T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s economic statecraft is&nbsp;sectorally&nbsp;uneven: highly effective in construction,&nbsp;retail&nbsp;and low-to-mid-tech manufacturing; more constrained in energy (due to legal disputes and competition from Gulf and Emirati actors) and in high-standard infrastructure finance, where EU and multilateral actors&nbsp;retain&nbsp;an advantage.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>3.2 The Development Road and competing corridors<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A second cluster of findings concerns the Development Road Project (DRP) \/ Dry Canal, envisaged as a&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.thedevelopmentroad.it\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">1,200-km rail and highway corridor<\/a>&nbsp;linking the Grand Faw port in Basra to the Turkish border, and, through T\u00fcrkiye, to Europe. The April 2024 quadrilateral MoU among Iraq, T\u00fcrkiye,&nbsp;Qatar&nbsp;and the UAE can be interpreted as&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>an attempt to embed Iraq in a Gulf\u2013T\u00fcrkiye\u2013Europe connectivity axis, partly bypassing the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea chokepoints;&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>a vehicle for T\u00fcrkiye to&nbsp;leverage&nbsp;its construction,&nbsp;logistics&nbsp;and port sectors to&nbsp;consolidate&nbsp;a&nbsp;T\u00fcrkiye-centric economic zone reaching into Iraq and the Gulf;&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>a site of competition with alternative connectivity projects (Basra\u2013Shalamcheh&nbsp;railway towards Iran; the New Levant initiative linking Iraq\u2013Jordan\u2013Egypt; potential Mosul\u2013Aleppo lines) that diversify Iraq\u2019s options and complicate Ankara\u2019s ambitions.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Our findings on the KRI perspective add a crucial sub-national dimension. For Erbil, the DRP is opportunity and risk at once: it supports the project in principle, but fears being bypassed if Baghdad and Ankara open new crossings (such as Ovak\u00f6y) that circumvent KRG-controlled gateways like Fish Khabur. Past joint&nbsp;Turkish\u2013Iraqi&nbsp;military exercises after the 2017 KRI referendum are read as signals that Baghdad could seek to assert more direct control over border zones critical for corridor politics.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>3.3 Economic rivals and regional fragmentation<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The connectivity outputs also map the competitive field in which T\u00fcrkiye&nbsp;operates:&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The UAE has&nbsp;emerged&nbsp;as a primary rival, particularly in high-profile infrastructure and energy projects in both the KRI and federal Iraq.&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Iran, under heavy sanctions, still&nbsp;maintains&nbsp;substantial trade with Iraq (including the KRI) and is&nbsp;seeking&nbsp;to deepen economic ties via new free-trade zones and cross-border projects, especially after President Pezeshkian\u2019s outreach to the KRI.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>China and India remain major trade partners for Iraq, especially in hydrocarbons, but their role is more distant and commodity-centric; this leaves space for T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s proximity-based, diversified engagement and for EU firms that can navigate regulatory and political obstacles.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In this setting, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s connector-producer role is&nbsp;fundamental&nbsp;but&nbsp;not uncontested. It depends on&nbsp;maintaining&nbsp;access to KRI markets, managing relations with Baghdad,&nbsp;and navigating competition from Gulf and Iranian actors.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>3.4 Water as a critical connectivity and legitimacy issue<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The project concludes that water has moved from a latent source of tension to a test of cooperative statecraft.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Key findings include:&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The 10-Year Water Management Agreement of 2024 and the appointment of a Turkish special envoy, former minister of environment and forestry between 2007-2011, Veysel Ero\u011flu, mark a shift toward&nbsp;institutionalised&nbsp;bilateral cooperation, including plans for joint dams (Abu Takiya in Sinjar, Abyad 2.0 in Karbala, al-Kharaz in Samawah) and land-reclamation projects.&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>T\u00fcrkiye has at times adjusted the filling of&nbsp;Il\u0131su&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.hpacenter.org\/tr\/news\/2219\/severe_drought_in_iraq._turkiye_releases_additional_water_from_the_tigris\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">and released extra volumes (e.g.&nbsp;420 m\u00b3\/s in summer 2025)<\/a>&nbsp;to mitigate acute Iraqi drought, strengthening the narrative of&nbsp;\u201cresponsive cooperation\u201d.&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Yet domestic discontent in Iraq&nbsp;remains&nbsp;high: protests in Basra and other southern provinces link water scarcity and electricity cuts to corruption, mismanagement and to perceived Turkish over-exploitation. Critics fear that, in a context of weak Iraqi dam capacity and governance, water cooperation could entrench asymmetric dependence, including potential future reliance on imported Turkish hydroelectric power.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Building on the 2024 framework, in November 2025&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.sde.org.tr\/haber\/fidan-ve-fuad-huseyin-imzalari-atti-turkiye-ve-irak-arasinda-su-konusunda-onemli-anlasma-bolgeyi-cennete-cevirebiliriz-haberi-61233?utm_source=chatgpt.com\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Ankara and Baghdad signed a new&nbsp;\u201cmechanism\u201d&nbsp;agreement<\/a>&nbsp;under which revenues from Iraqi oil exports to&nbsp;T\u00fcrkiye&nbsp;will be used to finance large-scale water infrastructure projects in Iraq implemented by Turkish companies, which Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has described as the biggest infrastructure investment in Iraq\u2019s history and a potential turning point for rehabilitating the country\u2019s water systems.&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>While officials on both sides have presented this&nbsp;\u201coil-for-water\u201d&nbsp;accord as a historic breakthrough that can ease Iraq\u2019s water crisis and deepen economic interdependence,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/amwaj.media\/en\/media-monitor\/officials-hail-iraq-turkey-oil-for-water-accord-as-critics-cry-foul\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">domestic critics in Iraq warn that<\/a>&nbsp;tying scarce oil revenues to projects executed by Turkish firms risks entrenching asymmetric dependence and reproducing opaque, elite-driven decision-making.&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Our project finds that water cooperation is both a lever and a vulnerability for the relationship: it can underpin connectivity and boost&nbsp;institutionalisation&nbsp;of bilateral relations,&nbsp;but especially in the context of the global environmental crisis, water can also become a focal point for nationalist backlash and for criticism of both governments if tangible improvements in water quality and access do not&nbsp;materialise.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>4. European dimension and policy suggestions<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>4.1 The EU as economic, regulatory and security actor<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Across the security and connectivity outputs, the EU and its member states appear as indirect but significant shapers of&nbsp;T\u00fcrkiye\u2013Iraq relationship.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>On the economic side,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/policy.trade.ec.europa.eu\/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region\/countries-and-regions\/iraq_en%23:~:text=11.1%252525%252520of%252520Iraq&#039;s%252520imports%252520came,and%252520mining%252520products%252520(99.8%252525).\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">total EU\u2013Iraq trade<\/a>&nbsp;in goods was about USD 12 billion in 2020, with EU exports at roughly USD 3.9 billion; yet European investors often report poor communication with Iraqi authorities and legal uncertainty concerning licensing, taxation and property rights.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>In infrastructure and energy, European (especially Italian) firms are involved as contractors and consultants in the Development Road and port projects, while the EU\u2019s Global Gateway and sustainability standards shape the broader discursive environment around&nbsp;\u201cquality infrastructure\u201d.&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>On the security side,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.euam-iraq.eu\/en\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">the EU Advisory Mission in Iraq (EUAM Iraq)<\/a>&nbsp;and individual member states\u2019&nbsp;contribution to NMI situate Europe as a partner in Iraqi security sector reform, border management and rule-of-law efforts, even as intra-EU priorities and risk appetites differ.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The project\u2019s findings suggest that Iraq is one of the few domains where, despite the stalled accession process,&nbsp;T\u00fcrkiye&nbsp;and the EU share converging long-term interests: a stable, territorially intact Iraq that functions as a predictable energy, trade and transit partner, and that does not become a vacuum for rival great-power projection.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>5.&nbsp;Conclusion<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The project finds that security and connectivity collaborations in bilateral relations are&nbsp;emphasised&nbsp;by the state and civil society actors&nbsp;in&nbsp;both sides.&nbsp;T\u00fcrkiye-Iraq security cooperation has intensified in recent years, involving both Baghdad and Erbil.&nbsp;T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s policy has combined military instruments with increasingly institutionalized forms of cooperation. With the initiation of&nbsp;\u201cT\u00fcrkiye without Terror\u201d&nbsp;process, this engagement has reached a new level. Nevertheless, cooperation continues to face significant challenges stemming from domestic political dynamics in all involved actors, the involvement of regional and extra regional actors, and ongoing&nbsp;tranformations&nbsp;in regional politics.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Development Road Project (DRP) has already evolved less as a pure engineering venture and more as a political\u2013institutional project. In practice, corridor governance&nbsp;has required&nbsp;coordination among Baghdad and Ankara, federal and KRI authorities, local stakeholders along the route, and\u2014where relevant\u2014private-sector and external partners. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s handling of KRI participation has been central:&nbsp;maintaining&nbsp;some form of Kurdish Regional Government involvement has so far eased fears of economic&nbsp;marginalisation&nbsp;in Erbil and reduced incentives for spoiler&nbsp;behaviour. At the same time, European actors have not only appeared as contractors but, where they engage on governance, environmental and social standards, and customs\/transport facilitation, the DRP tends to be more closely aligned with broader European connectivity agendas and less prone to fragmentation between competing corridors.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The research shows that water has&nbsp;emerged&nbsp;and can continue to evolve as the flagship domain where Turkish technical capacity, Iraqi needs and European&nbsp;expertise&nbsp;intersect. Implementation of the 10-Year Water Management Agreement has already generated new practices of monitoring, data-sharing&nbsp;and basin-level planning, and, at least discursively, has begun to separate water cooperation from day-to-day bargaining over security incidents. In parallel, EU institutions and member states have the&nbsp;oppportunity&nbsp;to increasingly position their engagement around technical&nbsp;assistance&nbsp;on demand-side management, basin&nbsp;restoration&nbsp;and leak reduction, thereby tying water governance to both countries\u2019&nbsp;climate and adaptation commitments and to EU Global Gateway priorities. As a result, water is a key site where sustainability concerns, domestic&nbsp;legitimacy&nbsp;and regional interdependence are negotiated simultaneously.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Taken together, the findings&nbsp;indicate&nbsp;that Iraq functions as a low-visibility but high-impact arena in which&nbsp;T\u00fcrkiye&nbsp;and the EU are already moving, albeit unevenly, beyond reactive crisis management. On the connectivity side, there is a growing pattern of joint or coordinated programming around customs&nbsp;harmonisation, border&nbsp;infrastructure&nbsp;and the&nbsp;digitalisation&nbsp;of trade procedures. In the security field,&nbsp;NATO&nbsp;and EU instruments on the one hand and Turkish bilateral initiatives on the other have produced complementary roles in certain areas of security sector reform, even if this complementarity is not always strategically planned and&nbsp;remains&nbsp;filtered through Iraqi ownership. Finally,&nbsp;emerging&nbsp;triangular dialogues\u2014formal and informal\u2014between&nbsp;T\u00fcrkiye, the EU and Iraq on water governance and climate security show that existing EU\u2013Iraq and EU\u2013T\u00fcrkiye frameworks can be repurposed to manage shared risks in a more pragmatic way. In this sense, Iraq&nbsp;operates&nbsp;as a laboratory for experimenting with modalities of&nbsp;T\u00fcrkiye\u2013EU cooperation that are decoupled from the stagnation of the accession process yet still anchored in overlapping interests.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In sum, the project\u2019s collective work shows that&nbsp;T\u00fcrkiye\u2013Iraq relations have evolved into a densely interdependent relationship where security, connectivity and the European dimension are inseparable. The key challenge for all actors is not whether this interdependence will deepen\u2014it already has\u2014but whether it can be governed in ways that reduce asymmetries, manage regional&nbsp;rivalries&nbsp;and deliver tangible benefits to societies on both sides of the border. As the US recalibrates its presence in and approach to the region, and Iran and Syria are going through critical transformations, the Middle East region is increasingly unstable and fluid.&nbsp;T\u00fcrkiye-Iraq relations become ever more important, not just for their own societies but also for their shared neighbors and for the engagement of extra-regional powers.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>*This paper is part of a research project: \u201cTurkey-Iraq Relations: Opportunities and Tensions in Security and Connectivity\u201d is a project of CATS Network. The Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin is funded by Stiftung Mercator and the Federal Foreign Office. CATS is the curator of the CATS Network, an international network of think tanks and research institutions working on Turkey. \u201cTurkey-Iraq Relations: Opportunities and Tensions in Security and Connectivity\u201d is a project of CATS Network.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>This paper presents the&nbsp;consolidated&nbsp;findings of the project&nbsp;\u201cT\u00fcrkiye\u2013Iraq Relations: Opportunities and Tensions in Security and Connectivity\u201d,&nbsp;carried out under the CATS Network between 2024 and 2025. The project set out to explain the recent rapprochement between T\u00fcrkiye and Iraq, to map Ankara\u2019s evolving goals,&nbsp;strategies&nbsp;and tools in Iraq, and to&nbsp;identify&nbsp;the implications for regional order and for&nbsp;EU\u2013T\u00fcrkiye&nbsp;cooperation. It did [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":235,"featured_media":15597,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[992,506,508],"tags":[653,612],"class_list":["post-15590","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-research","category-mena","category-turkey","tag-international-politics","tag-security-strategy-geopolitics"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15590","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/235"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=15590"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15590\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/15597"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=15590"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=15590"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=15590"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}