{"id":15840,"date":"2026-01-21T01:04:23","date_gmt":"2026-01-20T22:04:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/?p=15840"},"modified":"2026-01-21T01:05:03","modified_gmt":"2026-01-20T22:05:03","slug":"greeces-new-defence-doctrine-a-strategic-misstep-in-the-making-mehmet-ogutcu","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/2026\/01\/greeces-new-defence-doctrine-a-strategic-misstep-in-the-making-mehmet-ogutcu\/","title":{"rendered":"Greece\u2019s New Defence Doctrine: A Strategic Misstep in the Making – Mehmet \u00d6\u011f\u00fct\u00e7\u00fc"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

I still remember my early days in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, working in the NATO department. The alliance\u2019s infrastructure planning regularly ground to a halt because of the endless tug-of-war between T\u00fcrkiye and Greece. Years later\u2014after a career spent analysing security dynamics across regions\u2014I listen to Athens\u2019 new defence doctrine and see far more than a technical military upgrade. I sense a psychology, a fear, and perhaps a dose of misguided confidence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Greece\u2019s defence minister has recently taken to describing T\u00fcrkiye as the country\u2019s \u201cprincipal threat.\u201d I heard him repeat the same message at the Anglo-Hellenic conference in Cambridge, where I also spoke. He outlined plans to fortify Aegean islands with heavy weapons, deploy new missile systems and essentially re-engineer Greece\u2019s entire defence posture. As I listened, one thought kept returning to me: \u201cI wish our neighbour would not place such a heavy burden on itself; this strategy risks boomeranging back and harming Greek interests more than it protects them.\u201d No country tolerates the militarisation of islands lying just off its shores. This is not a uniquely Turkish reflex. The United States would never accept a militarised Cuba; the UK would not allow France to fortify the Channel Islands; Japan would resist similar moves around the Kurils; and China\u2019s sensitivity in the South China Sea speaks for itself. Geography dictates power; proximity defines threat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Understandable Motives, Faulty Methods<\/em><\/strong><\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Greece\u2019s desire to feel safer is legitimate. Historical trauma, the Cyprus conflict, periodic tensions in the Aegean, and economic fragility all shape Athens\u2019 threat perception. But the pursuit of security requires the right strategy. Today\u2019s path\u2014expanding US basing rights, deepening defence pacts with France and Israel, militarising islands\u2014does not enhance Greece\u2019s security. It makes the region more brittle. Every new weapons system placed on the islands provokes a stronger Turkish security reflex. Every additional US facility revives Ankara\u2019s strategic anxieties. Every military exercise structured around excluding T\u00fcrkiye undermines the fragile but real diplomatic thaw between the two capitals. None of Greece\u2019s partners, rhetoric aside, would enter a military confrontation with T\u00fcrkiye on Athens\u2019 behalf. This is neither a humiliation for Greece nor a triumph for T\u00fcrkiye. It is merely how international politics works.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Status of the Islands is not a Slogan\u2014It is Written Law.<\/em><\/strong><\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

There is often confusion in public debates, but the relevant treaties leave little room for ambiguity:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Under the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, Lesvos, Chios, Samos, and Ikaria were ceded to Greece on the condition of a limited military presence. The Paris Peace Treaties (1947) transferred the Dodecanese to Greece under a strict demilitarised status, and the Montreux Convention of  1936 altered the Straits regime but did not change the demilitarisation provisions for the islands. These clauses were inserted to preserve the delicate strategic balance of the time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Today, Greece\u2019s deployment of missile batteries, air-defence systems, and military installations on these islands raises not only military but also legal concerns. It has led some nationalist circles in T\u00fcrkiye\u2014who have long questioned the legitimacy of the islands\u2019 transfer\u2014to ask: \u201cIf the conditions of sovereignty are being violated, is the sovereignty itself still valid?\u201d Nobody should wish to walk down that dangerous path. But Athens\u2019 recent steps are giving hardliners on both sides the arguments they crave.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Two NATO Allies Calling Each Other a Threat Makes No Sense<\/em><\/strong><\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

NATO exists so that its members protect one another\u2014not to designate one another as enemies. The notion that T\u00fcrkiye, a candidate EU member for decades, would launch an attack on an EU state defies strategic logic. Yet Athens\u2019 actions are expanding American basing rights, advocating the end of the US arms embargo on Southern Cyprus, joining exercises that deliberately exclude T\u00fcrkiye, and codifying T\u00fcrkiye as its \u201cprimary threat\u201d in official doctrine. These are all weakening Greece\u2019s security rather than strengthening it. They also strain NATO cohesion at a time when Russia\u2019s war in Ukraine is already stretching the alliance\u2019s bandwidth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Regional Reality: Understanding T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s Weight<\/em><\/strong><\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Today\u2019s T\u00fcrkiye is, by any measure a nearly $1.5 trillion economy, a military power with expanding deterrence capabilities, a rapidly evolving defence industry, a diplomatic actor from the Balkans to Africa and Central Asia, and a state with deep strategic ties to China, Russia, Germany and the Gulf.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Historically, every expansion of Greek security, status or borders\u2014from independence in 1821 onward\u2014occurred within a balance calibrated with T\u00fcrkiye. That remains true today. Preserving the status quo is overwhelmingly in Greece\u2019s interest.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cayenne Pepper on a Fragile Dish<\/em><\/strong><\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Militarising the islands is not deterrence; it is a psychological reflex dressed up as strategy. The risks of militarisation are the following:<\/p>\n\n\n\n