The increasing use of technology and its growing prevalence in everyday life have brought with them new security challenges. The recent integration of artificial intelligence-enabled technologies into this sector has further contributed to the acceleration of cyberattacks. Cyberattacks targeting the refrigeration systems of hundreds of supermarkets in France have emerged as a striking example of the consequences digital threats can have in the physical world. The attackers took control of the refrigeration systems, which were accessible via the internet, causing temperatures in fridges and freezers to rise. Food products spoiled, fires broke out in some premises, and retail chains faced significant financial losses. In a statement issued by the French government on 13 October, it was reported that approximately 700 supermarkets had been affected, whilst it was noted that there was no risk to the country\u2019s overall food supply at that stage. However, the scale of the incident highlighted that food safety cannot be considered in isolation from digital infrastructure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Moreover, the attack’s repercussions did not merely spark a debate confined to France. There is a widespread belief that similar incidents may have occurred in Spain, Portugal, Poland, Germany and Belgium as well<\/a>. It was reported that another wave of attacks targeting French cooling systems took place on 13 October. However, it has not yet been confirmed that all the incidents in Europe were carried out by the same attacker. A separate cybersecurity incident experienced by the Dutch retail company Ahold Delhaize has not been linked to the attacks in France.<\/a> Consequently, the table should be interpreted not as evidence of a single coordinated operation, but as a series of developments that reveal various security vulnerabilities in interconnected digital infrastructures. It is important to note that the real significance of the incident in France lies in the fact that the consequences of a cyber-attack extend far beyond computer screens. There is a significant difference between attackers gaining access to data within a system and manipulating the systems that control physical processes. In the former case, personal data, trade secrets or financial information may be compromised. In the latter, the cold chain may be disrupted, production may come to a halt, equipment may be damaged, and people\u2019s access to basic necessities may be affected. For this reason, the issue should not be viewed merely as a matter of combating cybercrime; it must be emphasised that the core concern is the protection of critical infrastructure, economic resilience and national security.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Digitalisation of Food<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The modern food system has moved beyond being a physical chain stretching from the field to the supermarket shelf. Agricultural irrigation systems, automated production lines, warehouses, cold storage facilities, logistics networks and retail order systems are increasingly managed using digital technologies. Whilst this transformation delivers efficiency and cost benefits, it also increases the interdependence of these systems. A failure in a distribution company\u2019s order system can cause delays in deliveries, even if the products are physically available. A breach of a cold store\u2019s control system could jeopardise safe product storage. An outage in systems managing agricultural irrigation, meanwhile, could disrupt production processes, particularly in regions where water resources are limited. The case of United Natural Foods (UNFI) in the US highlighted the impact of this interdependence on the supply chain. In June 2025, the company took some of its systems offline due to a cybesecurity incident. Disruptions to electronic ordering and invoicing processes affected the company\u2019s ability to distribute products to its customers. On 26 June, UNFI announced that it had safely brought its core systems back online and that distribution was returning to near-normal levels<\/a>. In 2021, a ransomware attack on meat producer JBS also highlighted a similar security issue. The disruption to some of the company\u2019s production operations demonstrated the impact of cyberattacks on the food supply. JBS announced that it had paid a ransom of 11 million dollars following the incident<\/a>. These examples do not suggest that a single point of failure must cause food systems to collapse entirely. Sometimes, a disruption lasting just a few days at a distribution centre, or the temporary closure of a production facility, or a deterioration in storage conditions may be sufficient. In interconnected systems, a seemingly minor disruption can have wider consequences where alternatives are limited. However, it would be incorrect to claim that every cyber-attack will lead to a food crisis. The impact depends on the scope and duration of the attack, existing stock levels, alternative supply options and the capacity of public authorities to intervene. In the case of France, the government\u2019s statement that there was no general risk to the national food supply highlights the need to distinguish between local and sector-specific damage and a nationwide food crisis. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Targeting the Healthcare System<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Whilst disruptions to food systems have economic and social consequences, cyber-attacks on healthcare infrastructure can become a more direct threat to human safety. Hospitals are no longer merely physical spaces housing doctors, nurses and medical equipment. Electronic patient records, laboratory results, medication management, imaging systems, intensive care equipment, appointment systems and medical supply chains all consist of interconnected digital systems. The World Health Organisation (WHO) notes that the digitalisation of the healthcare sector has brought significant benefits to patients, but that inadequate security measures can leave healthcare organisations vulnerable to cyber-attacks. According to the WHO, such attacks can have consequences ranging from the blocking of access to patient records to the disruption of emergency services and cancer treatments<\/a>. An attack that disrupts the continuity of healthcare services cannot, therefore, be viewed merely as an organisational IT issue. The Conti ransomware attack on the Health Service Executive (HSE) in Ireland in May 2021 was one concrete example of this risk. Following the attack, numerous information systems at healthcare organisations were taken offline, resulting in widespread service disruptions. The incident demonstrated the extent to which a cyber-attack can disrupt the delivery of healthcare services on a large scale, due to hospitals\u2019 reliance on digital systems<\/a>. Similarly, the Synnovis cyber-attack in June 2024, which affected healthcare services and hospital laboratories in London, caused serious disruptions to the continuity of diagnostic services. Due to problems with blood tests and other laboratory services, some procedures were postponed, and healthcare organisations were forced to resort to alternative working methods<\/a>. In such cases, the attackers do not necessarily aim to cause physical harm to patients. The locking of data or the rendering of systems inoperable may lead to delays in healthcare services. However, when it comes to emergency interventions, blood transfusions, intensive care or time-critical treatments, the clinical consequences of such delays can be severe. Consequently, the fundamental issue regarding hospital security is not merely the protection of data confidentiality. The accuracy of data, the ability to access systems when required, and the uninterrupted provision of healthcare services are equally important.<\/p>\n\n\n\n From Data Security to Biosecurity<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The area where cyber security and biosecurity intersect reveals an even more sensitive picture. Biological laboratories may be dependent on digital infrastructure through diagnostic processes, research, sample storage, the cold chain, laboratory information management and various automation systems. Attacks on these systems may not be limited to the theft of research data or the disruption of laboratory operations. If a diagnostic laboratory\u2019s information systems are taken offline, the matching of samples with test results, the verification of results and their transmission to hospitals may be delayed. The unauthorised alteration of data, meanwhile, may cast doubt on the reliability of the results. The failure of systems monitoring sample storage conditions could pose a risk to the integrity of the samples. The fundamental issue arising in these scenarios is not a direct biological attack, but rather the undermining of the reliability of the healthcare and research infrastructure. In a more critical scenario, disruptions to systems supporting the secure storage of biological materials and the physical security of laboratories could make it difficult to implement existing biosafety procedures. However, a breach of a laboratory\u2019s digital systems does not, in itself, mean that a hazardous biological material will be released or that a deliberate biological attack will be carried out. Such outcomes depend on a number of factors, including physical security measures, laboratory operating procedures, backup systems and incident response capacity. The distinction between biosecurity and biosafety is also important here. Whilst biosecurity encompasses practices aimed at preventing the accidental release of biological materials or unintended exposure, biological safety also includes the protection of these materials against unauthorised access, loss, theft or deliberate misuse. Cyber security is one of the elements that contributes to the reliable operation of both areas. For this reason, the security of biological laboratories cannot be ensured by network protection alone. Digital systems and physical security processes must be able to operate independently of one another and, where necessary, in a secure manner. Backing up laboratory information systems, restricting access rights, verifying the integrity of critical records and regularly testing emergency procedures are fundamental components of this approach.<\/p>\n\n\n\n When Does a Cyber Attack Become a National Security Crisis?<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The targeting of a food warehouse, a hospital or a biological laboratory does not, in itself, mean that a national security crisis is underway. The decisive factors are the scope of the attack, the criticality of the targeted service, and the potential for the consequences to spread across the wider community. However, a scenario in which different critical infrastructure systems are disrupted simultaneously could lead to more serious consequences. In particular, disruptions to food distribution combined with interruptions to healthcare services could strain the crisis management capacity of public authorities. Accompanying misinformation, unverified reports of shortages or rumours that the healthcare system has collapsed could heighten public anxiety. However, a coordinated attack is not a prerequisite for such a scenario to unfold; unrelated incidents and ineffective crisis communication can also create similar pressure. It is at this point that the concept of a hybrid threat takes on its full meaning. Cyber-attacks, economic pressure, information manipulation and attacks on physical infrastructure can be used as complementary tools. However, it is incorrect to characterise any attack as a state-sponsored operation or a hybrid warfare activity without concrete evidence. The role of security analysis is not to make unsubstantiated inferences about the perpetrator, but to identify the conditions under which different types of attacks could produce strategic outcomes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Conclusion<\/strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The supermarket attacks in France have shown that the physical consequences of cyber threats are no longer a remote possibility. Incidents affecting the food supply chain in the US, service disruptions in hospitals and risks to laboratory infrastructure all point to the same fundamental problem: as critical services become digitised, the consequences of security breaches can extend beyond the boundaries of individual organisations. However, not every attack will necessarily lead to shortages, epidemics or national crises. The scale of the threat depends on how systems are designed, the physical security measures in place, and how quickly organisations can recover. The key issue is not to present the worst-case scenario as an inevitable future, but to build the capacity to reduce the likelihood of such scenarios occurring and to limit the damage should they do occur. In the coming period, national security cannot be assessed solely in terms of the protection of borders, military installations or energy infrastructure. Warehouses where food is stored, hospitals where patients are treated and laboratories where biological research is conducted are also part of this security architecture. In the future, a country\u2019s resilience will be measured not only by its ability to protect its critical systems from attacks, but also by its ability to continue meeting the basic needs of society when these systems are targeted.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" The increasing use of technology and its growing prevalence in everyday life have brought with them new security challenges. The recent integration of artificial intelligence-enabled technologies into this sector has further contributed to the acceleration of cyberattacks. Cyberattacks targeting the refrigeration systems of hundreds of supermarkets in France have emerged as a striking example of […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":275,"featured_media":17542,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[486],"tags":[1029,1028,711],"class_list":["post-17541","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-opinion","tag-biosecurity","tag-cyber-security","tag-food-security"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17541","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/275"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=17541"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17541\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":17544,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17541\/revisions\/17544"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/17542"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=17541"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=17541"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.globalpanorama.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=17541"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}