China’s Track Record in Addressing Non-Traditional Security Threats – İrem Tabirlioğlu

3 November 2025
7 dk okuma süresi

The People’s Republic of China has in recent years intensified its efforts to address a wide spectrum of non-traditional security threats, ranging from cyberattacks and public health emergencies to the challenges of climate change, organized crime, economic volatility, and the disruptive potential of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence. These issues, unlike conventional military threats, are complex in nature: they are diffuse, transnational, and often operate outside the reach of traditional state mechanisms. Their fragmented and unpredictable character makes it exceedingly difficult for governments to adopt decisive, uniform, and lasting measures. For China, this complexity has prompted the adoption of a security strategy that blends technological innovation with centralized governance and an emphasis on national interests. Investments in digital infrastructure, extensive surveillance systems, and state-driven research in AI and biotechnology have become cornerstones of Beijing’s response to this situation. Such policies have yielded visible short-term gains, particularly in strengthening state resilience and enhancing control over critical sectors. However, they have also come at a considerable cost: transparency has been limited, mutual trust with international actors has eroded, and opportunities for cooperative, multilateral solutions have often been overlooked. This tension between immediate effectiveness and long-term legitimacy defines much of China’s record in the field of non-traditional security and highlights the inherent difficulty of reconciling domestic priorities with the demands of international trust and collaboration. 

In the cyber domain, China’s strategy has oscillated between defensive measures designed to protect critical infrastructure and offensive operations aimed at projecting power beyond its borders. Reports from 2024 and 2025 indicate not only a sharp increase in the number of cyberattacks linked to Chinese actors but also a notable shift in their complexity and coordination, reflecting both technological advancement and a more assertive strategic posture. Taiwan’s governmental and institutional networks have been among the most prominent targets, frequently attacked by highly organized Chinese hacker groups, particularly advanced persistent threat (APT) units with strong ties to state agencies. These incidents demonstrate Beijing’s willingness to integrate cyber operations into broader political and strategic objectives, using them as tools for coercion, deterrence, and intelligence-gathering. At the same time, China has invested heavily in strengthening its cyber capacity through massive funding for research, recruitment of cyber specialists, and the establishment of advanced digital infrastructure. It has sought to consolidate “data sovereignty” through tighter domestic regulations, asserting control over data flows as a matter of national security, while also developing ambitious artificial intelligence initiatives that blur the line between civilian innovation and military application. Notably, Beijing’s reliance on non-state actors—ranging from semi-official hacker collectives to private security contractors—has become a defining feature of its cyber strategy. These groups act as deniable proxies: on the one hand, they assist in safeguarding domestic systems and responding to cyber intrusions, and on the other hand, they are deployed offensively to disrupt adversaries without directly implicating the state. This hybrid approach expands China’s operational flexibility while complicating attribution for international observers. In the short run, such a multi-layered strategy has allowed China to meet several key objectives, including gathering sensitive intelligence, preventing or minimizing economic losses from cyber disruptions, and enhancing the resilience of national infrastructure. Beyond these immediate benefits, however, the long-term implications are more ambiguous. Heavy reliance on coercive or opaque cyber tactics risks eroding China’s international credibility, provoking retaliatory measures, and deepening suspicions about Beijing’s intentions in the digital sphere. Nevertheless, China’s integration of cyber power into its overall security framework illustrates how non-traditional domains are increasingly central to great power competition, positioning Beijing as both a formidable actor in cyberspace and a controversial one in the eyes of the global community. 

Health security presents a different picture. The lessons of the COVID-19 pandemic forced internal reforms, and after the adoption of the Global Pandemic Accord at the 2025 World Health Assembly, China introduced new legal and institutional arrangements aimed at clarifying local responsibilities, tightening reporting mechanisms, and imposing penalties for noncompliance. As a result, while domestic preparedness has improved, global trust-building remains slow, and participation in WHO-led data-sharing initiatives has become an important form of diplomatic capital.  

Climate change and environmental risks are now a central element of China’s non-traditional security agenda. The severe droughts, floods, and extreme weather events of 2025 underscored the vulnerability of both rural communities and the national economy, with analyses showing a significant share of the population and GDP at high risk. Beijing has responded to these risks with massive adaptation programs—water management projects, climate-smart agriculture, and resilient infrastructure—while also promoting its leadership in clean energy and climate finance as tools of “climate diplomacy.” These investments serve both domestic security by reducing vulnerability and foreign policy by strengthening China’s role as a provider of green technology and infrastructure. However, climate-related resource shortages and population displacement could generate new tensions over the long term. 

Transnational organized crime and illicit networks pose yet another challenge. Reports increasingly suggest that Chinese criminal groups have expanded their global reach, gaining influence within diaspora communities and sometimes aligning with state objectives. While Beijing has pursued crackdowns at home and cooperated with these criminal groups in international policing, analysts argue that the government may overlook or even tacitly benefit from these networks when they serve foreign policy interests. Such dynamics complicate regional security and foster mistrust among states engaging with China, as illicit finance and opaque networks raise questions about Beijing’s intentions.  

At the same time, the rise of ideologically filtered AI models has opened a new front in the information domain. These systems, alongside disinformation and perception campaigns, have deepened concerns over China’s role in shaping the global information environment. Domestically, China enforces strict content regulation, while internationally it seeks to export its technological platforms, Yet this strategy risks eroding trust, undermining China’s diplomatic reputation, and generating skepticism toward its technologies abroad. Economic security and supply chain resilience also form part of China’s non-traditional security concerns. Global debates on “de-risking” have targeted reliance on China, but its central position in supply chains remains intact, bringing both leverage and vulnerability for China. Food security, meanwhile, is increasingly strained by the interaction of trade tensions and climate change. Beijing has responded through supply diversification, strategic reserves, and the use of Belt and Road projects to secure access to resources. While such measures give China powerful tools of influence, they also invite countermeasures that could limit its long-term economic dominance. Taken together, China’s record in addressing non-traditional security threats reveals a set of strengths and weaknesses. Centralized governance, AI-driven monitoring, and abundant financial resources enable rapid responses and, in some areas such as climate finance, even enhance China’s soft power. Yet the persistent lack of transparency, reliance on coercive cyber operations, the ambiguous role of organized crime networks, and the manipulative use of AI in information campaigns undermine trust in Beijing’s intentions. In the short term, China’s technical and economic tools are likely to consolidate its regional influence, but in the medium to long term, shortcomings in international cooperation may limit its soft power, while the spillover from cyber operations, illicit networks, and climate-driven pressures may intensify tensions and even contribute to the militarization of its foreign relations. 

İrem Tabirlioğlu

Born in İzmir, İrem Tabirlioğlu is a researcher and graduate student specializing in the field of international relations. She completed her undergraduate studies as both the faculty and department valedictorian. Beginning her academic career during her undergraduate years with a focus on various national and international issues, Tabirlioğlu’s graduate research particularly concentrates on intelligence studies, security policies, U.S. foreign policy, Middle Eastern politics, and international organizations. 

To date, she has authored numerous academic analyses, conference papers, and articles. Her work addresses contemporary security issues—such as artificial intelligence, big data, surveillance policies, propaganda, and asymmetric interstate relations—through the lens of political theory. Among her notable works are: Military Technology and Intelligence in the Iran–Israel Conflict; The Eye of the Alliance in the Digital Age: Five Eyes; Strategic Surveillance and Next-Generation Threats; Genetic Intelligence as a Biopolitical Tool: DNA-Based Power Strategies of Modern States; Peace Talks and Power Struggles: The Tumultuous Journey of the Korean War; Realization of a Bold Dream at Gunpoint: Underground Jewish Organizations; Saddam Hussein and the Realpolitik of Authoritarianism: Power Consolidation, Strategic Miscalculations, and Regional Instability in the Middle East; Structural Impediments to Collective Security: The United Nations Security Council, Geopolitical Interests, and the Crisis of Legitimacy; An Analysis of EU–Russia Relations under Vladimir Putin within the Framework of Asymmetric Interdependence and the Energy Security Theory; as well as detailed studies on non-traditional security threats, cybersecurity, the Arab Spring, artificial intelligence, and hybrid threats in international relations. Other works include Can International Law Effectively Regulate Anti-Terrorist Policies? A Critical Evaluation; Opposing Directions in Energy: Trump’s Competitive Neorealism and Biden’s Conciliatory Neoliberalism; and Germany’s Influence on U.S. Policies and a Historical Overview of Bilateral Relations: The Converging and Diverging Paths of Two Nations

Currently continuing her graduate studies, Tabirlioğlu is also conducting original research within the discipline of international relations. Her scholarship stands out for its theoretical originality and multidisciplinary approach. 

To cite this work: İrem Tabirlioğlu, "China’s Track Record in Addressing Non-Traditional Security Threats – İrem Tabirlioğlu" Global Panorama, Online, 3 November 2025, https://www.globalpanorama.org/en/2025/11/chinas-track-record-in-addressing-non-traditional-security-threats-irem-tabirlioglu/

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