How Asia’s New Energy Order Is Being Redrawn – Mehmet Öğütçü

Asia today is not only the world’s economic engine; it has also become the uncontested centre of global energy security. Four major consumers — China, India, Japan and South Korea — account for roughly 45 per cent of global crude imports and nearly 70 per cent of LNG purchases. Such a concentration of demand inevitably reshapes the strategies of all major producers, from the United States and Russia to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE.

Recent developments — most notably the accelerating energy partnership between India and the United States — signal a profound shift across this vast geography. Yet that is merely the visible edge of a more profound transformation. China’s recalibration of its energy security doctrine, the structural vulnerabilities of Japan and South Korea, and Taiwan’s geographic exposure are collectively redrawing Asia’s energy map in ways that will define the coming decade.

China: The Super-Consumer That Treats Energy Security as Regime Security

China is the world’s largest energy consumer by a wide margin, burning close to 14 million barrels of oil per day, consuming about 390 billion cubic metres of natural gas annually, and accounting for more than half of global coal use. For Beijing, energy security is therefore not an economic convenience but an existential matter.

China’s strategy now rests on three pillars: First is diversification. Russian pipeline gas via the Power of Siberia corridor, a massive inflow of Middle Eastern crude, LNG sourced from the US and Qatar, and a web of upstream investments in Africa and Latin America provide a deliberately wide supply base. China imports oil from more than 45 countries and LNG from over 30 — a spread unmatched by any other major economy. The second pillar is stockpiling. With a strategic petroleum reserve approaching one billion barrels, China now rivals the US and Japan in its buffer capacity. The third pillar is technological dominance. China manufactures 80% of the world’s solar panels, three-quarters of global batteries, and half of all electric vehicles. In the emerging green energy system, technical command is as essential as access to resources, and China intends to lead both.

Yet China’s vulnerabilities are striking. Nearly 80% of its imported energy passes through the narrow Malacca Strait, patrolled by the US Navy. Any disruption around Taiwan could choke off flows within days. Beijing’s energy strategy, for all its sophistication, is built on this fragile maritime foundation.

Japan: Caught Between Nuclear Trauma and LNG Dependence

Fukushima reconfigured Japan’s energy landscape more radically than any market shock. The shutdown of much of its nuclear fleet forced Tokyo into deep dependence on LNG, which now generates around one-third of its electricity. Japan remains one of the world’s top three LNG importers. This dependence carries uncomfortable risks. The Sakhalin projects tie Japan — reluctantly — to Russian supplies. LNG procurement from the US and Australia leaves Tokyo exposed to global spot volatility. Domestic renewable expansion, meanwhile, has been slowed by land constraints, cost pressures, and local resistance. India’s tightening partnership with the US has also triggered concern in Tokyo. If Washington increasingly prioritises New Delhi as its anchor energy partner in Asia, Japan fears a more competitive environment for long-term LNG contracts. This is one reason Tokyo has quietly begun preparing to restart a significant portion of its dormant nuclear reactors by 2030.

South Korea: A High-Tech Powerhouse on a Fragile Energy Base

South Korea’s economic model — spanning semiconductors, batteries, steel and automotive exports — is extraordinarily energy-intensive. Yet the country imports 92 per cent of its energy. Few OECD economies are as exposed to fluctuations in LNG prices as Seoul, which endured severe shocks over the past three years. India’s growing closeness with the US has triggered a debate within South Korea’s national security establishment. If Washington reorders its strategic priorities in Asia, will Korea find itself second in line for US LNG and energy cooperation? In a country where industrial output hinges on uninterrupted fuel flows, this question is more than theoretical.

Taiwan: The Most Exposed Energy System in the Region

Taiwan is the most geopolitically vulnerable energy system in Asia. With 85% of its electricity reliant on imported fossil fuels, limited LNG storage, and a politically stalled nuclear programme, Taiwan depends on a handful of maritime routes that cut directly through areas of strategic tension. The island’s most significant risk is not technical failure but geopolitical interruption. A minor confrontation in the Taiwan Strait could cause LNG carriers to adjust course, enough to paralyse the economy within 48 hours. Taipei has therefore begun redesigning its energy security through the lens of worst-case contingency planning.

The India–US Axis: A Quiet Rebalancing of Asia’s Energy Geometry

India’s rapid deepening of energy ties with Washington marks the most consequential strategic pivot in the region in years. A landmark deal to import 2.2 million tonnes of US LPG annually from 2026 — about 10 per cent of India’s total LPG imports — signals a deliberate shift away from decades-long Middle Eastern dependence. Equally significant is India’s suspension of discounted crude purchases from Rosneft and Lukoil under Western pressure. At their peak in 2023–24, these flows reached 1.7 million barrels per day. A slowdown sends Moscow a rare and unmistakable message. The LNG domain is even more fluid. India’s leading importers, including GAIL, are increasingly turning to US LNG as Washington eases export restrictions. Discussions around new 5 to 10-year supply contracts are gathering pace, suggesting a more structurally embedded India–US energy axis.

The New Frontiers: Critical Minerals and Battery Technology

Asia’s energy contest is no longer confined to oil and gas. The race is now expanding to electric vehicles, energy storage, and the critical minerals that power both. Half of global lithium production originates in Australia, two-thirds of the world’s cobalt comes from the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Indonesia has emerged as a dominant force in nickel. Yet it is China that controls more than 70 per cent of global battery value chains, from refining to cathode and cell production. In this domain, technological leverage matters as much as geological endowment. Future energy leadership will belong not to those who merely hold resources, but to those who master the processing and innovation.

The US Indo-Pacific Strategy: Energy as Geopolitical Leverage

Washington has placed energy at the heart of its Indo-Pacific strategy. By elevating India as a strategic partner, reinforcing its alignment with Japan and South Korea on LNG and critical minerals, and integrating Australia into a comprehensive supply-chain framework, the US is constructing a new architecture implicitly designed to constrain China’s influence. Energy flows, once seen as commercial pathways, have become instruments of geopolitical design. Washington now views energy corridors not simply as pipelines and shipping lanes, but as levers within a broader contest for regional leadership.

A New Asian Energy Order Emerges

What is unfolding in Asia is not a routine adjustment of supply routes, but a fundamental reorganisation of global power. The India–US partnership, China’s fortified security posture, Japan and Korea’s structural vulnerabilities, Taiwan’s exposure, and the escalating race for critical minerals together form the contours of a new regional energy order. In this landscape, the winners will be those who recognise the shift early, position themselves with clarity, and act with strategic foresight. Those who hesitate risk being overtaken not only in energy but in the wider struggle for influence in the emerging world.