Türkiye has long been described as a “middle power”: a state too limited to determine the rules of the international system, yet too strategically significant to be treated merely as a passive rule-taker. This conceptualisation has been useful in explaining Ankara’s activism over the last decade, particularly its pursuit of strategic autonomy, its growing defence-industrial capacity, its expanding diplomatic reach and its willingness to act across multiple regional theatres. Yet the concept may no longer fully capture the most interesting dimension of Türkiye’s evolving international role. What increasingly matters is not simply how much material power Ankara possesses, but where Türkiye is positioned within a fragmented set of overlapping regional security networks and how effectively it can exploit that position. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit to Egypt on 13–14 August offers a useful lens through which to examine this development. The visit was significant not simply because Turkish-Egyptian relations have recovered from a decade of hostility, but because this rapprochement increasingly intersects with a wider regional security architecture stretching from the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean to the Gulf and the Red Sea. Read together with the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement signed by Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, these developments raise a broader analytical question: is Türkiye attempting to move from being merely a middle power towards becoming what might be called a bridging power, a state whose influence derives partly from its capacity to connect otherwise partially separated security networks?
Beyond the Conventional Middle-Power Framework
The traditional middle-power literature focuses on states that compensate for their relative lack of great-power capabilities through coalition-building, multilateral diplomacy, niche specialisation and institutional activism. That framework remains relevant to Türkiye, but it is increasingly incomplete. Recent debates in international relations have shifted attention toward more relational understandings of power, in which influence derives not only from military expenditure, population size or economic output, but also from a state’s position inside diplomatic, political and security networks. The logic of brokerage is particularly important here. States located between actors that are not otherwise closely connected can sometimes transform their position into political leverage, gaining access, information and bargaining opportunities that larger but more isolated actors may not possess. Türkiye’s current position appears increasingly compatible with this logic. Ankara is simultaneously embedded in several strategic environments that overlap only partially, such as it is a NATO member with one of the alliance’s largest armed forces, it maintains a working relationship with Russia while supporting Ukraine militarily, it has deepened defence ties with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, it has restored political and military dialogue with Egypt, and it continues to cultivate close relations with Qatar and other Gulf states. The significance of this configuration lies less in Türkiye dominating any one of these arenas than in its ability to remain present across several of them at the same time.
This is why the notion of bridging power is potentially more useful than simply describing Türkiye as an assertive middle power. Bridging power does not necessarily lead a bloc, establish a hierarchy, or dictate outcomes. Instead, it derives part of its relevance from occupying the intersections between political spaces that remain institutionally or strategically distinct. In Türkiye’s case, this means being able to operate simultaneously within NATO, within an emerging set of Middle Eastern defence arrangements, within Black Sea security diplomacy and within the increasingly important Red Sea–Eastern Mediterranean nexus. Such a role is particularly valuable in a fragmented international system in which regional states are becoming more reluctant to rely exclusively on one alliance framework or one great-power patron. Türkiye’s foreign policy over the last several years can therefore be read not simply as an effort to maximise autonomy, but as an attempt to convert cross-network connectivity into strategic relevance.
Mecca, Cairo and the Emerging Regional Security Architecture
The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement gives this argument greater weight. The agreement signed by Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan introduces a collective-defence principle according to which an attack against one party is to be regarded as an attack against all. Even if the practical meaning of that commitment remains uncertain, the political symbolism is considerable. More importantly, the agreement envisages cooperation beyond rhetorical solidarity, including high-level military coordination, joint exercises, defence-industrial cooperation and collaboration in areas such as air defence, autonomous systems, logistics and emerging military technologies. In other words, the arrangement is not merely an additional diplomatic forum; it represents an attempt to institutionalise a new layer of security cooperation among three states that already possess significant bilateral defence ties but had not previously been integrated into a common framework of this kind.
The importance of Egypt emerges precisely at this point. For much of the previous decade, Turkey-Egypt relations were interpreted primarily through bilateral disputes over Libya, the Eastern Mediterranean, political Islam and competing regional alignments. That lens is now becoming too narrow. Ankara’s rapprochement with Cairo increasingly intersects with Türkiye’s expanding relations with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, while Egypt itself remains central to the security of the Eastern Mediterranean, the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. This does not mean that Cairo is automatically becoming part of a Turkish-led geopolitical bloc; such a reading would overstate both Türkiye’s influence and the willingness of other regional actors to accept Ankara’s leadership. Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan each possess their own strategic priorities, institutional weight and regional ambitions. The more plausible interpretation is that Ankara is attempting to place itself at the intersection of these actors’ overlapping interests. Türkiye may not be able to lead them, but it can try to become difficult to bypass whenever their security agendas converge.
This distinction matters. The emerging regional picture does not resemble a classical alliance system built around a single centre. It looks more like a network of partially overlapping arrangements in which different states cooperate on different issues without necessarily sharing a unified strategic worldview. Türkiye’s relationship with Saudi Arabia may involve defence-industrial cooperation and Gulf security; its relationship with Pakistan adds a military and nuclear dimension as well as long-standing strategic ties; its relationship with Egypt links these developments to the Eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea and its NATO membership keeps Ankara anchored inside the Euro-Atlantic security order. The Mecca Agreement therefore matters not because it proves the existence of a coherent new bloc, but because it illustrates how Türkiye is becoming increasingly active across several institutional layers at once. What is emerging is not a replacement for NATO, nor a Turkish-led Middle Eastern alliance, but a denser pattern of regional security networking in which Ankara appears determined to occupy a brokerage position.
From the Black Sea to the Red Sea
The broader geographical picture reinforces this interpretation. To the north, Turkey remains indispensable to Black Sea security because of its NATO membership, control of the Straits under the Montreux Convention, relations with Ukraine and continuing dialogue with Moscow. In the Eastern Mediterranean, the restoration of relations with Egypt reduces one of the most important geopolitical fault lines that had limited Ankara’s room for manoeuvre. In the Gulf, defence ties with Saudi Arabia and Qatar have deepened, while Pakistan provides another strategic axis that links the Middle East to South Asia. Further south, the growing importance of Red Sea maritime security gives Türkiye another arena in which its defence capabilities, political relationships and geographical position can potentially be combined. The resulting arc, Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, Middle East, Gulf and Red Sea, is significant because these theatres were once analysed largely as separate regional security complexes. Ankara increasingly treats them as interconnected.
This emerging role reflects a broader transformation in the international system. Regional powers are no longer simply choosing between the United States, China, Russia or established alliance frameworks. Instead, they are diversifying their partnerships, hedging their dependencies and developing multiple overlapping security relationships. In such an environment, the ability to move between different institutional worlds can become a form of power. Türkiye’s advantage is that it belongs fully to none of these worlds except NATO, yet maintains sufficient access to several of them. Ankara can discuss deterrence with NATO members, defence production with Gulf states, regional security with Egypt, strategic coordination with Pakistan and Black Sea stability with Russia and Ukraine. This does not make Türkiye uniquely influential, but it does give it a form of diplomatic and strategic optionality that many comparable middle powers lack.
Yet the very features that make bridging power attractive also make it fragile. The more networks Türkiye attempts to connect, the more likely it is that the interests of those networks will eventually collide. Ankara may benefit from simultaneously maintaining relations with NATO and Russia, but a sharper confrontation between the two reduces its room for manoeuvre. It can deepen defence cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan while improving ties with Egypt, but different regional crises may force these partners into divergent positions. Bridging power therefore works best when networks overlap sufficiently to permit brokerage, but not so much that they demand exclusive alignment. Türkiye’s ability to sustain this role will depend on how successfully it manages those contradictions.
Connectivity is not the Same as Influence
This leads to the central analytical problem. Connectivity should not be confused with influence. A state can sit at many diplomatic tables, sign multiple security agreements and maintain communication with rival actors without possessing the capacity to shape outcomes. Network centrality may generate access, but access does not automatically produce authority. The Mecca Agreement itself demonstrates this ambiguity. Its collective-defence language is politically ambitious, yet the operational commitments of its members remain uncertain. It is not yet clear how far Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan would be prepared to go in support of one another in a major military crisis, nor whether the agreement will eventually generate genuinely integrated planning rather than remain a largely political mechanism. Similar questions apply to Türkiye’s wider regional activism. Ankara’s capacity to speak simultaneously with Cairo, Riyadh, Islamabad, Moscow, Kyiv and NATO matters only if that access can be converted into concrete diplomatic outcomes, crisis management or sustainable bargaining power.
The distinction is particularly important because Türkiye’s recent foreign-policy activism sometimes creates the appearance of influence before the existence of influence has been demonstrated. Defence exports, military agreements, diplomatic summits and high-level contacts are all indicators of activity, but they are not in themselves evidence of strategic control. The stronger test is whether Türkiye can use its network position to shape the behaviour of others, reduce transaction costs between competing actors, mediate effectively in crises or institutionalise cooperation that would otherwise be difficult to sustain. If Ankara can do that, bridging power becomes a meaningful addition to its middle-power status. If it cannot, the result may be little more than an accumulation of diplomatic access points.
Domestic capacity therefore remains crucial. Bridging power requires not only diplomatic activism but also economic resilience, institutional continuity and foreign-policy predictability. A state that tries to connect several security environments must convince multiple partners that its commitments will survive political shifts, economic pressures and short-term tactical changes. Türkiye’s recent history shows both the opportunities and the limitations of personalised and highly flexible diplomacy. Flexibility may increase manoeuvrability, but without stronger institutionalisation it can also make long-term partnerships appear contingent. The real challenge for Ankara is therefore not simply to become present across multiple strategic theatres, but to transform that presence into a durable and credible international role.
Türkiye may indeed be moving beyond the conventional middle-power model. Its NATO membership, expanding defence-industrial capacity, rapprochement with Egypt, deepening ties with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and growing involvement from the Black Sea to the Red Sea give Ankara an increasingly unusual position within the emerging regional order. The Mecca Agreement adds a new institutional layer to this process, while the Egyptian dimension gives it greater geographical and political depth. Yet the concept of bridging power should not become another flattering label for Turkish activism. Its analytical value depends precisely on maintaining a distinction between being connected and being influential.
